

Resistance to Hegemony within the Core: Domestic Politics, Terrorism, and Policy Divergence within the G7

Thomas J. Volgy, Kristin Kanthak,
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Our approach to the topic of resistance to American hegemony differs in some fundamental ways from most of the contributions to this project. First, we place resistance to hegemonic power in a context focused on changes in hegemonic strength; we believe that the nature, location, and salience of such resistance should vary with the strength of the hegemon. As we note below, declining hegemonic structural strength affects both hegemonic strategies of maintaining world order, and the importance of resistance among critical allies and the institutions within which they work to maintain the status quo.

Second, we focus not on those entities in international politics that are dissatisfied with the status quo but on those in the hegemonic core that are essentially status quo states. We do so for reasons related to our first point: as hegemonic strength declines, the hegemon is likely to come to depend on institutions and groups of states sharing its perspective and commitment to the status quo.¹ When those relationships weaken, hegemonic control over global affairs becomes more tenuous.

¹ We assume that the United States continues to be an actor committed to the status quo, even after the end of the Cold War. This assumption is made for a number of reasons, including our belief that it derives enormous benefit from the institutions it built and the policies it pursued with respect to security and economic issues during the Cold War. Since 1989, its strength has increased vis-à-vis other “major powers” and yet it has not sought to engage in a comprehensive set of changes to global institutions created during the Cold War (*e.g.*, see Volgy and Bailin, 2003), even though substantial lip service has been paid to a “new world order.” Attempts to develop major new global regimes involving environmental and human rights issues have been strongly resisted by U.S. policy makers.

Third, and perhaps most controversial, we focus less on strategies of resistance to hegemonic leadership and more on variation in policy cohesion between the hegemon and its key allies. We do so for two reasons. First, we believe—and it is an almost trivial and obvious but often ignored point—that policy divergence is a critical condition² for resistance, and is by definition true in the case of dissatisfied states, but for pro-status quo coalition partners it is not at all obvious that such policy dissension is substantial. Nor is there necessarily much understanding of the roots of such policy dissension among the “satisfied” states. Second, it is obvious as well that policy dissension can be overcome and resistance to hegemonic control minimized (even in the core), but it is far more costly to do so than when there is policy congruence. The possibility of resistance to hegemonic leadership in the core creates fundamental problems for hegemonic leadership (and especially if such hegemonic leadership requires core support to supplement its capabilities). For these reasons our effort is focused not on resistance strategies but on the critical condition (policy dissension) that gives rise to such strategies in the hegemonic core.

Finally, we focus not on individual states or on regions of resistance, but specifically on the G7 as a group, and particularly on variation in the G7’s aggregated level of policy cohesion. We do so because the G7 was established and institutionalized to supplement declining hegemonic capabilities. As a group, the G7 has at its disposal overwhelming economic, political, and military capabilities in the international system, and for over a quarter century, spanning both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the G7 has played an important

² We refer to this condition as critical but not “necessary,” since realists and neorealists argue that even without policy disagreements, others may resist hegemony for balancing purposes. Yet, we are not aware of many situations in the recent history of international politics where such “balancing” was not accompanied by policy disagreements.

role in maintaining international order.³ Whether it continues to do so may in no small measure depend on the extent that its members maintain a substantial degree of policy cohesion regarding critical international policies and the strategies for pursuing those policies.

Below, we expand on the discussion regarding hegemonic strength, the role of the G7 in international politics, and the historical variation in policy congruence between G7 members. We then outline a strategy for measuring levels of policy cohesion over time, and apply a domestic politics framework to assessing changes in policy cohesion. The results highlight the difficulties that G7 states face in creating a common perspective on new systemic disturbances, such as international terrorism, and we suggest that international terrorism is likely to increase both policy disagreements and G6⁴ resistance to further hegemonic initiatives in this area.

The Issue of Hegemonic Strength

Hegemony (or global leadership) requires much from a leading state, including preponderant strength,⁵ along with the motivation/desire, and competence to use it in developing rules and norms for the international system. Strength is clearly not enough, nor is it followed automatically by motivation or competence. However, global leadership becomes a dangerous illusion in the minds of foreign policy makers⁶ without sufficient strength with

³ See *e.g.*, Bailin, 2003; Volgy and Bailin, 2003.

⁴ The term G7 refers to the original seven members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States. When referring to the G8, we are including Russia as a new member, at least in a symbolic sense. Reference to the G6 is designed to indicate the other six original members, without the United States.

⁵ We are consciously avoiding the term “power” in this discussion, and focusing on the more restrictive term of strength, meaning material capabilities.

⁶ Clearly, our concepts of strength are operationalized using material capabilities. However, we are mindful that material strength is often accompanied by other types of capabilities. See, *e.g.*, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).

which to seek to impose a roadmap on global events, and to enforce the rules and norms required for implementing that roadmap.

Much of the neorealist literature has assumed that sufficient amounts of strength will exist among the great powers in the system to allow for a fashioning of global architecture. According to these assumptions, it is in the changes to the distribution of strength between great powers that determines the shape of the system.⁷⁸ For us, it is an empirical question as to whether or not sufficient strength exists to fashion global architecture and to enforce the norms accompanying it. Especially with respect to hegemony or global leadership, the issue of sufficient strength may be questionable.

What type of strength is needed? Susan Strange (1989) argued forcefully that global leadership requires two types of strength: relational and structural. To Strange, relational strength is the concept many scholars use to gauge the ebb and flow of much that goes on in international politics. She defined the concept as the capabilities of a hegemon or a global leader vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get some groupings of others, by persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do.⁹

Structural strength for Strange reflected a different dimension of capabilities. By structural strength Strange refers to the capability of the hegemon to create essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international system. A global leader/hegemon enjoys “structural power through the capacity to determine the terms on which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made available.”¹⁰ Hegemony then

⁷See *e.g.*, Waltz, 1979; 1993.

⁸*E.g.*, unipolar/ hegemonic, bipolar, multipolar, etc.

⁹ Strange 1989, at 165.

¹⁰ *Id.*

creates and/or sustains critical regimes to further patterns of cooperation and to reduce uncertainty as states pursue their objectives (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger 1996; Keohane, 1984).¹¹

Strange left it to others to operationalize these two approaches to hegemonic strength, a challenge we have pursued previously.¹² The results have yielded a longitudinal perspective on U.S. strength, covering both the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. The results reflect important differences between relational and structural strength, and suggest important implications for both resistance to hegemony in general, and for the salience of policy congruence within the context of the G7.

Recall that the concept of relational strength is the type of capability needed to respond to major challenges on the part of dissatisfied states to global rules and norms. In this sense, it is relative strength, relative to the strength of potential challengers to the status quo.¹³ It is in this context that post-Cold War international politics looks unipolar, as the U.S. looks to have preponderant capabilities, even compared to other “great powers.”

¹¹ Conceptually, relational and structural strength differ in part due to the assumption that maintaining the status quo requires different kinds of strength than changing the nature of an existing world order. However, an intermediate step between the two is to engage in incremental changes to existing structural arrangements (*e.g.*, NATO expansion, the shift from GATT to the WTO, etc.), requiring less structural strength than creating a “new world order” (Volgy and Bailin, 2003).

¹² We lack the space here to summarize fully the operationalization of these concepts and the validation techniques we have used to corroborate that our measures correspond to these concepts. These are detailed in Volgy and Bailin, 2003, and Volgy and Imwalle, 1999. See also Volgy and Imwalle, 1995; 1999.

¹³ Relational strength is operationalized as the economic and military share of all great power resources, yielding three measures: an economic, military, and aggregated (average) share for each great power. For the operationalization of the measure, its validation, and the sources used, see Spiezio, 1990; Volgy and Imwalle, 1999. We use military spending rather than the COW military capabilities measures for two reasons. First, this approach allows us to compare the extent of U.S. structural strength with previous literature estimating British hegemony in the 19th century, while; 2) allowing us to approximate military capabilities without having to rely on measures—*e.g.*, industrial output—less useful for the high technology military environment of the late 20th and early 21st century. Both military spending and the COW military measures appear to be equally useful gross approximation of military capabilities.

Figure 1: Estimates of U.S. Share of Great Power Military and Economic Capabilities, 1960 – 2002





Figure 1 represents our sketch of U.S. relational capabilities, based on measures of economic and military shares of all great power capabilities. As the figure illustrates, U.S. relational strength among the great powers is overwhelming, both in the aggregate and on the individual measures. While there was a significant drop in strength during the 1970 – 1985 period, by the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. relational strength shows to be at its highest point. Furthermore, the disparity between its military and economic capabilities, compared to the other “great powers,” has been virtually eliminated. For our most recent data point, U.S. relational capabilities are in excess of 50 percent of all great power strength.

Figure 2: Estimate of U.S. Structural Strength Index, 1950 – 2003



A different picture emerges, however, when we view strength from a structural perspective. Here, the analysis is focused on the amount of resources made available to foreign activity, and those resources are then modified by both domestic constraints and international system complexities. For example, structural strength may be measured by the growth in system membership, and the extent of state autonomy as measured by its international trade dependence as a percentage of its GDP).¹⁴ The resulting structural index yields a picture, illustrated in Figure 2 that is dramatically different from the relational strength dimension.

The picture conveyed by the U.S. structural strength index is one of dramatic decline. The drop in structural strength is nearly monotonic over time, and by the beginning of the 21st century, it exhibits values that are roughly a third of what they were at the end of the 1950s, and half of the index value exhibited for 1972. This picture is clearly not one of stable unipolarity. Instead it is one in which resources for foreign policy activities by the hegemonic power have not kept up with changing global circumstances...including the growth and complexity of the international system and the increased loss of autonomy created by growing dependence on international trade (two of the key components of the index). If the measure is a valid one of

¹⁴ Unlike the relational strength measure, structural strength is assessed for two dimensions. One is an external strength index, composed of all resources made available for foreign policy activity, modified by increases in international system complexity and the autonomy of the state. A second dimension (not reported here) of the structural measure is the extent to which domestic strength is sufficient to buttress external strength. The external strength index includes military spending as part of all foreign policy resources, but clearly its treatment differs from the way in which it is used for the relational measure since the two indexes are not correlated. Also different from the relational strength measure, structural strength is measured not in comparison to other states, or the system as a whole, but by identifying a single point in time for a given state, and then measuring changes from that point in time, while taking into account both the growth in complexity of the system and changes to a state's autonomy in the system. This is done because while there are measures available for autonomy and system complexity, we lack measures for structural strength for myriad states that would be part of the "denominator" required for comparison with the entire system. Thus, while we can compare changes in the "relative" strength of great powers over time, with this structural measure, we can only show whether or not the structural strength of a state has increased or decreased compared to its demonstrated strength at an earlier point in time. For a thorough discussion of the measures, the process of validation, and the data used, see Volgy and Bailin, 2003.

the strength used to fashion global architecture and help create new rules and norms for the system (and we believe it is), then its low levels since the 1970s, and especially since the end of the Cold War may indicate insufficient structural strength for the United States to act hegemonically unless it is successful in integrating its resources with those of like-minded core allies.

Policy Dissension within the G7

The G7 was created during the mid-1970s, to respond to potential systemic disturbances, and not coincidentally at a time when both U.S. structural strength and its relational strength were in decline. The willingness of the G6 to enter into this institutional arrangement was no doubt facilitated by the reality that the other members of the group were also experiencing declining capabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world.¹⁵ Created as a partnership between states in the economic realm where the United States was the strongest but less than predominant, its scope has gradually extended into the political/military realm (where the United States is much stronger than the other actors), as the norms of partnership from the economic realm have been carried over to a variety of non-economic matters.¹⁶

When acting together, the G7 controls a predominant share of military and economic capabilities in the international system,¹⁷ sufficient capabilities with which to shape the contours of international politics.¹⁸ Such enormous infusion of additional capabilities potentially allows the United States, in cooperation with G7 partners, to shape the post-Cold

¹⁵See *e.g.*, Volgy and Bailin, 2003.

¹⁶ For a recent sampling of non-economic issues being addressed by the G7, see <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca>.

¹⁷ Volgy and Bailin, 2003, at 93.

¹⁸ Such collective strength far exceeds the highest level of power concentration of Britain in the 19th century, or that of the United States after 1945. See Spiezio, 1990; Volgy and Imwalle, 1996.

War order in a manner that it simply may not be able to accomplish with its own structural strength. That is why, elsewhere, we have referred to the period between 1975 and 1997 as a period of “group hegemony,” with the G7 acting as an important institutional mechanism both for system maintenance purposes and as well for helping to design new global architecture, albeit in an incremental manner.¹⁹

Therefore, we view the G7 as a critical mechanism that supplements missing structural hegemonic strength. Yet, little of that harmony is possible unless there is substantial policy congruence between group members. Although the G7 is now deeply institutionalized, resistance even within the G7 to U.S. leadership is the clear outcome if policy cohesion is substantially diminished.

Historically, policy disagreements have fluctuated among G7 partners within a broader framework of policy cohesiveness anchored to similar interests in the Cold War and the global economy. Most recently, the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq underscored substantial divisions between the United States and its G7 partners. While Britain remained a staunch ally of the United States, and eventually Japan and Italy chose to support (albeit nominally) the war option, Germany, France, and Canada resisted American initiatives toward a war-based approach to regime change in Iraq. With the exception of Tony Blair’s enthusiastic support, the “coalition of the willing” was to be found overwhelmingly outside of the G7.²⁰

¹⁹ Volgy and Bailin, 2003.

²⁰ Even during the first weeks of the Iraqi war, Germany’s foreign minister noted that “A world order in which the superpower decides on military strikes based only on its own nation’s interest cannot work,” while the French foreign minister argued for a new world order based on “a number of regional poles.” *The Economist*, 2003, at 27.

The policy dissension over Iraq, however, is not unique to G7 relationships; the group has demonstrated substantial divisions during its history. After the end of the Cold War, French policy makers have consistently questioned American leadership, in opposition to what they perceived as American hegemony.²¹ French, German and (even) British policy makers agreed—after the dominant role of the United States. in the Bosnian conflict—to create an “independent” military capability for the European Union separate from NATO (and U.S. and Turkish) control.²² American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocols has been denounced by most G7 states. Even Japan has at times resisted American leadership in the global political economy at one time seeking an alternative financial structure to the IMF in Asia in cooperation with China.²³

Furthermore, policy disagreements between the United States and its G7 colleagues predate the end of the Cold War. French initiatives toward an independent foreign policy highlighted its relations with the United States as early as the 1960s, and as late as 1986 when France denied “overflight” privileges to United States warplanes attacking Libya. Willie Brandt’s policy initiatives toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe predated moves toward détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. For the Italian government, American involvement in Beirut in the early 1980s signaled major

²¹ For examples of such French dissension, see Erlanger, 1997, at A6; Cohen, 1999. For an example of when such conflicts are minimized, see Sciolino, 2002.

²² Support for a common defense capability for the EU gained additional momentum during the Iraqi war as Belgium invited other EU states to a special summit to discuss a fast track approach to a common European defense policy (The Economist, 2003a). However, the effort is unlikely to yield much without substantial resource commitments, commitments that are not forthcoming. The Economist, 2003b. See, *e.g.* Ginsberg, 2001.

²³ Bergsten, 2000.

disagreements with United States policies toward the Middle East and Israel.²⁴ Descriptions of such disagreements fill the pages of analyses of transatlantic relationships.²⁵

Nevertheless, we should be mindful of the larger dynamic uniting G7 states: policy disagreements have co-existed within a substantially broad range of policy congruence among these status quo powers, but for the most part, the G7 seems satisfied with the direction of affairs in international politics. Policy agreements are critical for the G7 to act in concert. The fact that it has often done so is an indication that policy disagreements, though potentially disruptive, have neither been consistent enough or sufficiently voluminous, or sufficiently disruptive enough to destroy the ability of the G7 to act in concert.

Yet, how much policy cohesion is there in the G7, and how can we account for a diminution of policy cohesion when it does occur, especially when one of the pillars of cohesion—the Cold War—has disappeared? Turning to the first question, we have searched for data that would provide for us a longitudinal perspective on policy cohesion between G7 states. Two such data sources are readily available: one is a demonstration of similarity of preferences through an identification of alliance portfolios. The second is a demonstration of preferences through similar voting patterns in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Alliance portfolios have been used previously in the literature to demonstrate similarities in policies and orientations in international relations.²⁶ Annual observations are available for most states, and there is a substantial history of data validity and reliability. The

²⁴ For example, on December 23, 1983, President Sandro Pertini announced a complete withdrawal of Italian troops from Beirut arguing that US forces “are there in defense of Israel, and not of peace, and they are bombarding Lebanon with tons of bombs.” Facts on File, Dec. 31, 1983.

²⁵ See *e.g.*, Hodge, 2004; Lindstrom, 2003.

²⁶ For examples, see Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Huth et al., 1993; Signorino and Ritter 1999.

major disadvantage in using these data, however, is that a state's alliance portfolio constitutes a structural measure that is not sensitive to rapid fluctuations in the international environment. Nevertheless, an analysis of the alliance portfolios of G7²⁷ states clearly demonstrates a substantial degree of similar policy orientation between members.

Figure 3: Two Measures of G7 Alliance Portfolios, 1975 – 2000




Figure 3 illustrates the commonality of alliance portfolios, using both Tau-b and S measures.²⁸ Although the immediate aftermath of the Cold War is accompanied by a reduction in cohesiveness, there is a remarkable amount of consistency in the G7's alliance portfolios and presumably, the policy preferences among the G7 states across time. Unfortunately, Figure 3 also illustrates that alliance portfolio data do not appear to be very sensitive to the ebbs and flows of policy disagreements between alliance members, except perhaps when there are large-

²⁷ The individual state and dyad data is taken from EuGene version 3.04 (Bennett and Stam, 2000). We compute an average S scores for each year, based on following Signorino and Ritter's (1999) formula.

²⁸ Typically, two statistical techniques are used to assess commonality of alliance portfolios in the literature: S and Tau-b. We report the results of both measures here, although our preference is for the S statistic for assessing foreign policy similarity since it accounts for spatial differences in foreign policy preferences of states, and distinguishes agreements from randomness. See Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Bennett and Rupert, 2003.

scale disruptions to the global environment, such as the differential response to the end of the Cold War among G7 partners. Therefore, we turn to a second measure, both more controversial, but also more sensitive to fluctuations in policy preferences: common voting positions on resolutions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).

We readily accept the fact that measuring commonality in policy preferences through UNGA voting resolutions is not an ideal method for operationalizing policy cohesion between states. Nevertheless, we are able to use voting behavior as a measure of cohesion because we believe that votes cast on UNGA resolutions reflect, at least for powerful states that are generally satisfied with the status quo, typically little more than their policy preferences on issues. While the UNGA may act as a quasi-legislative arena for some members,²⁹ this is not the case for the strongest of states, because few (if any) incentives exist for strong states, states deeply imbedded in regional and international politics, to alter their policy preferences in the UNGA.³⁰ Thus, the cohesiveness of G7 votes in the UNGA should fairly well reflect their policy preferences. We have subjected this assertion to a rigorous, empirical test of validity elsewhere, and found strong support for our tests.^{31,32}

Furthermore, we can find no alternative mechanism with which we can produce consistent observations of the group's policy preferences over time and over a broad range of

²⁹ For example, while caucusing groups may function to increase cohesiveness within the group in the UNGA, there is no G7 caucusing group.

³⁰ There is one reason why they might: if they seek to attain a position of leadership within the Group 77 states. This would apply to strong states such as the former Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. The G7 states however do not seek to lead those Group 77 states that are fundamentally opposed to the international economic status quo.

³¹ There remains one way in which policy cohesion is not be measured well by UNGA voting commonality. The measure is based on the cohesiveness of the group in response to contested resolutions. While there is a broad array of such resolutions, they fail to capture the full array of activities occurring in the international environment, and clearly the agenda of the UNGA is not controlled by the G7.

³² See Volgy, Frazier, and Stewart-ingersoll, 2003.

issues. Observing commonalities in the voting behavior of G7 states across the full range of annual, contested resolutions submitted for vote in the UNGA plenary sessions yields us annual observations across a span of years covering the existence of the G7, and yields observations we believe to be valid indicators of its cohesiveness.


Essentially, there are two methods for assessing the cohesiveness of policy preferences through voting in the UNGA. One is to use the technique of factor analysis; the other is to develop a group defection ratio. Factor analysis allows for an empirical, inductive clustering of votes on a variety of dimensions, and then it is able to demonstrate the relative cohesiveness of a group of states on those dimensions. Unfortunately, factor analysis limits our observations in a number of ways, of which two are crucial. First, given the type of data we have on UNGA voting, factor analysis can at best provide snapshots aggregated across several years rather than annual observations. Second, the method itself generates data that discount a large percentage of contested votes, often dismissing as much as 50 percent of the “explained variance” in voting. The strength of factor analysis on the other hand, is in identifying dimensions of voting over time and the extent to which policy congruence changes on the most salient dimensions over time.

Figures 4 and 5 illustrate both the strength and weaknesses of the factorial analysis method.³³ The two primary dimensions of voting in the UNGA in both the 1990 – 1992 period and the 1997 – 1999 period consisted of a North-South dimension and a Middle East dimension. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate very strong policy congruence between all G7 states on the first dimension, and substantial variation between the United States and the G6 (and

³³ We use principal factors factor analysis, replicating the methodology used in recent successful efforts in the literature (*e.g.*, Russett and Kim, 1996) to identify dimensions of voting issues, except that we raise the threshold for minimum variance by 50 percent in order to address concerns that this method uncovers too many dimensions. Voeten, 2000. For the methodology used and the empirical results derived from them, see Volgy, Frazier and Stewart Ingersoll, 2003.

within the G6) on the second dimension. This appears to be the case across both time periods, 1990 to 1992 and 1997 to 1999.

Figure 4: Factor Values for G7 States for Sessions 45 – 47 (1990-92)




Unfortunately, factor analysis restricts us to sampling three year aggregates. Furthermore, in Figures 4 and 5, the two primary voting dimensions revealed by factor analytic techniques account for only 49 and 50 percent, respectively, of the variance in UNGA voting. Alternatively, we can focus on cohesion in terms of creating a group value for each year's votes, and then estimate defections from the group's voting norms. Previous research examining the cohesion of Third World states in the UNGA used a defection ratio measure to estimate the deviation of individual members from a common group position.³⁴ We use the same defection ratio, and it is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{Defect} = [\text{defections}/(7 \times \# \text{ of resolutions})] \times 100$$

Where: Defect = defection ratio
 Defections = number of defections in UN roll call votes
 7 = number of G7 members

³⁴ Iida 1988

Figure 5: Factor Values for G7 States for Sessions 52 – 54 (1997 – 99)



We produce an annual defection ratio for the G7 group from its inception, 1975, through 2003. The defection ratio measure is visually displayed in Figure 6. We use this measure as our primary vehicle for operationalizing G7 policy cohesion; it allows us to chart variation annually in policy congruence within the group.³⁵ For illustrative purposes, we display as well “individual” state defections in Figure 6.

³⁵ We include in the figure the defection ratio for the UNGA as a whole to allow for a comparison between the relative cohesiveness of the G7 and an Assembly that is meant to be relatively cohesive. In addition, the lack of correspondence between changes in Assembly defection and G7 defection ($r = -.0372$; ns) indicates that G7 defection scores are not in response to the same dynamics driving other members of the UNGA.

Figure 6: Defection Scores for the UNGA as a whole, and for G7 States, 1975 – 2003





Figure 7: Defections by Individual G7 States from U.S. Voting, 1975 – 2003



As illustrated in both Figures 6 and 7, there is considerably more variation in policy congruence than is indicated by the alliance portfolio data. Furthermore, such variation is

exhibited both in the aggregate and across individual defections. At the same time, there is some correspondence (and therefore a bit more validation for the voting measure) between the two data sets. For example, the alliance portfolios indicate that Japan is most remote and the UK is most proximate to the United States on this structural measure. The voting data on individual defections provide average scores that reflect these relationships.³⁶ In a similar vein as the congruence of alliance portfolios declines after the end of the Cold War, so does voting congruence with the United States after 1989, and for all the G6 states. The average G6 state defection during the Cold War from US baseline voting is 24.7 %; this increases after the Cold War to an average of 34.4 % (an increase of some 39 % in defection).

Two trends are worthy of further note. First, while policy disagreements with the second Bush administration are clearly noticeable in the data (showing post-Cold War level highs in defections among G7 states), they appear to indicate a broader pattern of growing policy disagreements with post-Cold War American administrations, including especially during the first Clinton Administration. Although the Iraqi war and the policy disagreements over American use of coercion to achieve regime change were most publicly debated, a substantial amount of policy disagreement already existed prior to that event, and as well prior to 9/11. Second, the pattern of defections continues to demonstrate substantial underlying policy agreements³⁷ between the G7 states, for example, the level of policy agreements within the global community as a whole (note Figure 6). This is consistent with

³⁶ The average defection scores range from a high of 36.1 % for Japan, to a low of 22.91 % for the United Kingdom.

³⁷ Is it possible that G6 states continue to vote cohesively while searching for alternative coalitions to the United States? We believe that this measure carries sufficient validity to reflect such attempts. For example, in the late 1990s, Japan sought to develop a new coalition with China for an alternative to the dominant role of the IMF in Asia. Bergsten, 2000. We should find increasing Japanese defection scores in UNGA voting during this period, and Figure 7 indeed shows just such a pattern of defection.

the notion that the G7 includes primarily very powerful states that are benefiting from the global status quo.

Accounting for Policy Dissension within the G7

We believe that the evidence presented above, including the structural indicator associated with alliance portfolios and the more fluid indicator associated with UNGA voting (both through factor analysis and defection ratios) present a two-fold image regarding policy cohesiveness within the G7, and consequently for concurrence with hegemonic leadership. On the one hand, there has been—and continues to be—a substantial amount of policy cohesion within the group. The G7 is an institution of the major status quo powers, and this should come as no surprise. On the other hand, there is significant variation in such cohesiveness, both before and after the Cold War. While there is a notable decline in policy support of hegemonic preferences after 1989 (with the collapse of the Cold War pillar of the status quo) it would be foolish to view the post 1989 period as the only period of significant policy resistance. Although there is more individual deviation from hegemonic direction after 1989, it is also clear that there is substantial variation in policy congruence *before* the end of the Cold War, consistent with Bobrow's injunction that resistance to global leadership needs to be studied as a phenomenon that is not unique to present circumstances.³⁸

Our primary task then is to uncover reasons for variation in G7 policy cohesiveness across both Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Recall that the G7 was created in the belief that by institutionalizing the group, in the context of a commonality of policy preferences toward the status quo and within a framework of overwhelming strength, would allow the G7 to respond to systemic disturbances and challenges to the international status

³⁸ Bobrow 2004.

quo. Institutionalizing the G7 would also help create a forum for generating new norms and rules when needed. Three types of systemic disturbances that the G7 envisioned included interstate wars, crises, and turbulence within the global economy. These are “typical” disturbances in the sense that much of international politics has been historically focused on these phenomena, and the G7 was constructed to provide a coordinated response to these types of impending and actual economic and political crises. Much of the cohesion the G7 has historically demonstrated has been due to the similarity in policy preferences in response to traditional systemic disturbances by states relatively satisfied with the status quo. Therefore, we don’t typically expect that wars,³⁹ interstate crises, and global economic threats⁴⁰ will negatively impact on the cohesiveness of the G7 group. We suspect instead that it is in the realm of relatively new (atypical) systemic disturbances to the status quo where the cohesiveness of G7 policy preferences is more likely to be tested. Two such disturbances include international terrorism and intrastate conflicts. Both of these disturbances are relatively new in international politics, both in terms of the scope and growth of their impact on the relations between G7 states.

While terrorists have acted throughout the history of international politics, international terrorism qualifies as a relatively new systemic disturbance compared to crises and interstate wars. The sheer magnitude of recent international terrorist activity—from

³⁹ We see the conflict over Iraq not as a failure of the G7 to cooperate in response to an emerging interstate war threatening the status quo but in response to the US using high levels of coercion as an instrument of “regime change.”

⁴⁰ Note, for example, that in the midst of substantial conflict over the events in Iraq, the G7 unanimously acted to demand that OPEC states face their responsibilities in reducing oil prices to a “level consistent with lasting economic prosperity.” *G7 nations demand OPEC cut oil prices*, International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2004, at 1.

1968⁴¹ onward—represents disturbances relatively new to the international system, and as the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated, international terrorism has come to rival, if not surpass, interstate wars in its potential to disrupt the fabric of international politics.

International terrorism has clearly left its mark on the last third of the 20th century, and the sheer volume of such activity has been enormous. An average of over 400 international terrorist acts annually have been recorded by the U.S. State Department since 1968,⁴² and the one G7 state that had been relatively immune to terrorism on its own soil became the site of what is now known everywhere as 9/11. Even before 9/11, as the frequency of terrorism declined in the 1990s compared to earlier periods, the level of violence per attack has increased significantly.⁴³

The growing persistence of domestic conflict and intrastate war, in terms of sheer volume, also qualify this phenomenon as a new type of systemic disturbance, one that has become a numerically far larger threat to the status quo than interstate wars.⁴⁴ In the 19th century, roughly 60 % of all wars were international in character. By the last third of the 20th century intrastate wars constituted 70 % of all conflicts.⁴⁵ Nor have intrastate conflicts been infrequent. Over the last quarter of the 20th century, nearly three such conflicts occurred per year, at a total loss of nearly nine million lives, compared to less than 1.3 million lives lost in

⁴¹ Both the U.S. State Department and the Rand Corporation have been collecting data on international terrorism since 1968. Hoffman notes that 1968 represented the start of “modern international terrorism.” Hoffman 2003, at 46.

⁴² See <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt>. The sharp reductions in international terrorist acts in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, following the attacks on Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, appear to be temporary and understate terrorist activity occurring in both Iraq and Afghanistan. For more on the deterrence effects on terrorism, see Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994.

⁴³ See Muller, 2003, at 24.

⁴⁴ See Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, 2003.

⁴⁵ See Sarkees, Wayman and Singer, 2003, at 61.

interstate wars during the same period.⁴⁶ Furthermore, intrastate conflicts, particularly when violent, tend to contribute substantially to turbulence in international politics, often through turbulence generated by large migration flows that tend to create additional ethnic conflicts, militarized interstate disputes, and occasionally interstate wars.⁴⁷ As such, they should be a major concern for the G7 and its members.

Both types of these disturbances, domestic and intrastate conflicts, pose substantial challenges to the international status quo and to the G7's leadership and maintenance of global relations. As relatively new phenomena, they challenge existing institutional mechanisms within the G7.⁴⁸ As dynamics that primarily involve non-state actors, they threaten historical norms and rules embedded in the system regarding the primacy of interstate relations. How can we account for the cohesiveness of the G7 under these conditions?

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Congruence

Our primary approach to policy makers' responses to new systemic disturbances is from the perspective of domestic politics.⁴⁹ We share with others who operate from this perspective the basic notion that the primary foreign policy makers are domestic political actors. While they may pursue critical foreign policy objectives, foreign policy makers are

⁴⁶ See Sarkees, Wyman and Singer, 2003, at 65.

⁴⁷ See Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003; Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2003. See also Davies, 2002.

⁴⁸ We argue that these phenomena are relatively new for two reasons. First, as we have noted earlier, the scope and volume of these activities are relatively unique to recent international politics. Second, we are not aware of the creation of institutionalized procedures and mechanisms established within the G7 to respond to their occurrence until very recently.

⁴⁹ For a few recent examples using this perspective, see Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and James Smith, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1991.

also motivated by domestic political considerations, and will likely view new systemic disturbances through domestic political lenses at least as much as by their foreign policy preferences.⁵⁰

From a domestic political perspective, all new systemic disturbances are not alike. We suggest that there are at the minimum, three types of disturbances. First, there are disturbances with minimum immediate and/or long term domestic political consequences. Second, there are disturbances with similar substantial short and long-term domestic political consequences for G7 policy makers. Third, there are disturbances with varying substantial domestic political consequences for G7 members. Fashioning policy congruence among the G7 to systemic disturbances that have minimal or similar domestic political costs should not pose great difficulties for G7 policy makers. However, systemic disturbances that are laden with varying domestic political costs for group members are the disturbances that are most likely to create policy dissension within the group and therefore are most likely to generate defections from hegemonic policy preferences.

We assume that this is precisely what has occurred between G7 members as they entertain some sort of a collective response to international terrorism. Terrorism carries with it at least two types of non-uniform domestic political consequences for G7 members: selectorate turmoil and domestic security risks. First, terrorism carries the potential of electoral disorder by creating increased conflicts within the electorate and between the

⁵⁰ We are assuming here that a state's key policy makers are motivated both by their desire to stay in office and as well to pursue a series of policy preferences (both foreign and domestic), and through those preferences, to do a "good job" while in office. Bueno de Mesquita, 2003. We assume as well that the desire to stay in office is paramount, since without it, policy preferences cannot be pursued. The dynamics of staying in office vary across political systems, but in the case of the G7, democratic principles apply to the policy makers of all seven states.

winning coalitions that determine the political fortunes of individual G7 governments.⁵¹ G7 states vary greatly in the nature and composition of their selectorates. For instance, G7 members vary greatly with the size of Arab and Muslim constituencies within their populations. Those sub-groups may withhold support from their governments in solidarity with groups perceived as being targeted as terrorists in and from the Middle East or over Middle East issues or policies. There is substantial variation across the G7 regarding the size of Arab and Muslim groups within the electorates. France, for example, has nearly ten percent Arabs and Muslims within its population, while Japan's Arab and Muslim population is negligible. We would not expect a uniform impact on the G7 through such selectorate turmoil, but that is precisely the point: we would expect that domestic electoral situations would lead to differential responses among G7 states concerning commonality of foreign policy positions regarding terrorism.

A second domestic political consideration regarding terrorism involves varied perceptions and experiences regarding domestic security risks. G7 members articulating similar strong policy responses to terrorism run the risk of increasing terrorist activity in their own countries and in the countries sharing such strong responses. Foreign policy makers experiencing little or no terrorist activity at home run the risk of becoming terrorist targets, and, due to their foreign policy decisions, run the risk of alienating their electorates for having increased perceived national insecurity. Even for those G7 members with extensive previous experiences with terrorism, there is considerable variability over success in dealing with such activity and the willingness to risk more incidents due to foreign policy changes.⁵²

⁵¹ See, *e.g.*, see Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2000.

⁵² Even in states where policy makers have experienced extensive domestic terrorism, terrorism driven by domestic disruptions, the risk of now introducing international terrorism within the

Again, we don't expect this domestic political consideration to impact uniformly across all G7 states. Britain, for instance, with a long history of terrorist experience, is likely to respond differently to this problem than Japan, which has had little. American policy makers, in the aftermath of 9/11, are likely to see terrorism in a different light than the French, who survived the terrorist attacks of the 1980s and 1990s, and may be less likely to want to see another such round of attacks on French soil. Domestic political considerations regarding security may drive an American president and a French president to precisely opposite policy perspectives in the aftermath of tragedies such as 9/11.⁵³

Since we expect that responding to international terrorism carries with it dramatic domestic political consequences and costs, we see this type of international disturbance for G7 states as a classic example of an international phenomenon that falls within the category of being laden with varying domestic political costs for group members. As such, it would be expected that increasing levels of international terrorist activity will be associated with less policy cohesion within the group,⁵⁴ setting into motion critical conditions for G6 resistance to U.S. leadership in this area.

We have no such expectations that G7 countries will resist however, when it comes to the G7 addressing issues related to intrastate conflicts. As we noted above, intrastate conflicts also constitute a salient phenomenon of systemic turbulence capable of undermining

polity, terrorism as a result of foreign policy or actions abroad, may greatly impact on the survival of the government. For example, witness the electoral costs of Spanish participation in the Iraqi war and the fall of the government when terrorists attacked on the eve of national elections.

⁵³ We suspect that there is a substantial interaction between the two variables of electorate turmoil and perception of security risks. In the case of France, the strongest of G7 opponents to American initiatives, there is both a large Arab population in the selectorate and a history of battling terrorism on French soil.

⁵⁴ For a formal model of these relationships and how to aggregate them from the state to the G7 level, see the explanation in Volgy, Kanthak, Frazier, and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2004.

the status quo, but its impact on the domestic politics of G7 members falls into a different category than that of international terrorism. We assume that most intrastate conflicts will either not translate directly into the domestic politics of G7 states (*e.g.*, the recent Sudanese civil war) or if they do, they will likely have a uniform domestic political impact on most G7 states (*e.g.*, a civil war in Saudi Arabia would have similar economic consequences for all G7 states as all would experience severe increases in energy costs). We recognize that on some occasions an intrastate conflict will come to resemble international terrorism in terms of having a variable domestic political impact on G7 members (*e.g.*, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo), but these are likely to be relatively rare instances compared to the differential domestic consequences of international terrorism. Therefore, our model based on domestic political factors, while of significant import in accounting for G7 responses to international terrorism, should not perform well in ascertaining G7 policy congruence in dealing with intrastate conflicts. For this reason, and also to test the value of the domestic politics model compared to other explanations of international politics, we now turn to two other alternative explanatory frameworks.

Alternative Perspectives

We will not review the broad range of theoretical debates in the field of international relations; such tasks are better done elsewhere.⁵⁵ Instead, we offer two additional ideas based on alternative approaches to theorizing about international politics that may help account for fluctuations in the policy cohesiveness of the G7: first, a realist/neorealist-based explanation revolving around the relative strength of the dominant actor in the coalition; and

⁵⁵ Finding valuable explanations for the cohesiveness of a group of major states in international politics may not be a good yardstick for such a purpose. See Lamborn, 1997 for the varied uses of competing theoretical perspectives.

second, a liberal/ institutionalist explanation based on patterns of institutionalized cooperation within the group to respond to potential threats to the status quo. It is plausible that these perspectives can challenge the value of the domestic politics explanation we have suggested. Furthermore, those two perspectives may shed light as on G7 responses to intrastate conflicts as well.

The realist/neorealist contribution toward conflict and cooperation (where cohesion is one aspect of cooperation) comes in many forms with the principle focus on relative power capabilities of major actors in international politics.⁵⁶ Much argument exists over how power and relative strength matter. Hegemons, or states with asymmetrically strong capabilities, may deter conflict with potential competitors and foster cooperation through leadership.⁵⁷ Alternatively, sustained periods of predominance can foster coalitions against a dominant nation.⁵⁸ Relative parity between states may foster much greater competition among states than asymmetrical power relationships all things being equal.⁵⁹ Additionally, power transitions between states may be symptomatic of ongoing challenges to the lead nation and the global status quo, or the dynamics involved in such transition may alone motivate dissatisfied states to reconsider their roles and the opportunities such transitions create, leading to greater conflict between states.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ See *e.g.*, Schweller and Priess, 1997.

⁵⁷ Mastanduno, 1997.

⁵⁸ Modelski, 1987; Rasler and Thompson, 1994.

⁵⁹ Lemke and Werner, 1996.

⁶⁰ See *e.g.*, Doran, 1989; Tammen et. al., 2000.

The literature employs competing theories and competing operational measures of key concepts, and has at times yielded contradictory results.⁶¹ Yet, the idea that power and relative strength matter in shaping patterns of conflict and cooperation between major states continues to enjoy currency in the literature. At first glance, it looks to have relevance as well to questions about the cohesion of the G7. Since the United States is the strongest of the G7 actors, variation in its strength relative to the rest of the group could influence the group's cohesiveness. As American strength increases, its ability to dominate the terms by which G7 actors view and respond to global circumstances might be enhanced as well. The more other G7 states reach relative parity with the United States, the more likely the stronger G7 states would question American policy positions. From this perspective, we would predict that the G7's policy cohesiveness to both intrastate conflicts and international terrorist threats will co-vary with relative American strength: the greater U.S. strength, the more cohesiveness the G7 as a group will demonstrate.

The liberal/institutionalist tradition provides still another perspective. Most relevant here is the work of John Ikenberry, whose theory focuses on the dynamics driving the creation and maintenance of global order mechanisms.⁶² For Ikenberry, institutions of governance are possible because members benefit more from cooperation relative to the cost of participation and the surrendering of some autonomy, and because institutional members also gain when the major power in the system (such as the United States), through its willingness to abide as well by institutional rules (rules that are consistent with its own interest), also surrenders some of its sovereignty. Thus, and irrespective of power

⁶¹ See *e.g.*, DeSoysa, Oneal, and Park, 1997; Mansfeld, 1993.

⁶² See *e.g.*, Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1996; Keohane, 1984; Martin and Simmons, 1999.

differences, members can cooperate through major institutional arrangements, and do so to help perpetuate their interests. In the case of the G7, that interest is warding off threats to the status quo that might upset the strengths of the G7 member states.

Given a successful, institutionalized history of cooperation between G7 members, all else being equal, the group's members will likely continue to use existing institutional mechanisms and respond similarly to systemic disturbances and threats to the international status quo. Such similarity in policy responses should mean that the G7's cohesion would increase when such threats occur. Intrastate conflicts should serve such a stimulus for increasing G7 cohesion, since such conflicts have substantial consequences for immigration flows, intrastate and interstate ethnic conflicts, militarized interstate disputes, and even interstate wars. Thus, from the liberal/institutional perspective, one would expect that increases in intrastate conflicts should increase the policy cohesiveness of the G7.⁶³

Testing Alternative Perspectives

We noted earlier the treatment of foreign policy congruence through a UNGA voting measure of defections (designated in our test as the variable "defect") from the group's votes. These observations, as shown in Figure 6, constitute our dependent variable. We use four independent variables with which to predict changing levels of G7 cohesion. The first is simply the defection ratio lagged (the variable "LDR"). We use this variable to assess the extent to which the previous level of cohesion may impact the present level of cohesion. This variable allows us to assess the influence of possible autocorrelation in the equation, and control for it, if necessary.

⁶³ This perspective would suggest the same relationship between international terrorism and G7 policy cohesion.

A second independent variable assesses the strength of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the G7 in terms of its relative strength. We generated the values of this variable by creating an aggregate measure that is the average of U.S. military spending and GDP, divided by the index for the group (the variable “LUSRS”).⁶⁴ Since we consider this a structural variable, we lagged it one year behind the other dependent and independent variables in the analysis. We created a third measure based on the frequency of intrastate conflicts annually in the international system (the variable “DMCON”). We used data on domestic conflict collected by the Uppsala Conflict Project on Armed Conflict.⁶⁵ The fourth measure is based on annual frequencies of international terrorist incidences (the variable “TERROR”). While a number of sources exist for data on interstate terrorism, we use the U.S. State Department’s classification of international terrorism. Its database is the most comprehensive and up-to-date source publicly available.⁶⁶ Using these four variables, we constructed the following model to predict defections:

$$\text{Defect} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{LDR}) + \beta_2 (\text{LUSRS}) + \beta_3 (\text{DMCON}) + \beta_4 (\text{TERROR}).$$

⁶⁴ For military expenditures, we used the SIPRI yearbooks; for GDP data we relied on annual estimates from the International Monetary Fund. See *e.g.*, Spiezio, 1990; see also Volgy and Imwalle, 2000.

⁶⁵ These data are available at: <http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/>. We are grateful to Nils Petter Gleditsch for helping to secure the data for our purposes. An alternative data set on intrastate conflicts exists through the updated COW project (Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, 2003); however that data set only goes through 1997 and does not as yet provide publicly the broader range of intrastate conflicts noted by Gleditsch and colleagues. Gleditsch et. al., 2002.

⁶⁶ For the operational measure used to obtain the data, see <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10297.pdf>. For the U.S. State Department’s data archive, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html.

In addition to the base model, we provide three others as well, as noted in Table 1. One, the external disturbance model, is meant to capture a range of interstate challenges to the status quo. The second model, the “factored-in” model represents the cumulative effects of interstate wars and crises on levels of defection. Our third model, the mixed disturbance model, focuses on both domestic and external disturbances. We provide these alternative models for two reasons. First, as we argued earlier, crises and interstate wars⁶⁷ may be already factored into the policy cohesiveness of the group and thus be unlikely to predict to variation in G7 defection scores. This argument finds support from our equation 2a. Nevertheless, these disturbances may constitute a set of exogenous considerations that may alter policy commonalities between G7 members by nullifying the predicted relationship between policy cohesion, intrastate conflicts, and terrorism as these latter disturbances may be judged subordinate to more typical concerns about crises and wars. Alternatively, if the predicted relationships are robust, then we should be able to find them even in models that include disturbances such as crises and interstate wars. Thus, even though we are testing the utility of the predicted model, our assertions should hold across the alternative models as well. Equations 2 and 3 assess these possibilities.

⁶⁷ Data on crises is from the International Crisis Behavior Project, available at <http://www.icbnet.org/>. We are grateful to Jonathan Wilkenfeld for sharing the latest updates. The interstate war data are from the Uppsala project at: <http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/>.

Table 1: OLS Regression Equations for G7 Defection Ratios with Selected Independent Variables

| | Equation 1 (Predicted Model) | Equation 2 (External Disturbance Model) | Equation 2a (Factored-In Model) | Equation 3 (Internal/External Disturbance Model) |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| Constant | 5.046 (12.107) | 2.023 (15.044) | 10.45*** (1.456) | 7.396 (14.048) |
| LDR | .022 (.107) | | | |
| LUSRS | -5.542 (24.975) | .601 (30.586) | | -9.739 (28.5) |
| DMCON | -.238* (.116) | | | -.237* (.115) |
| TERROR | .021*** (.006) | .022*** (.007) | | .021*** (.006) |
| CRISES | | -.04 (.206) | .201 (.185) | -.068 (.187) |
| WARS | | -.447 (.651) | -.087 (.755) | |
| R ² | .49 | .40 | .05 | .49 |
| Adjusted R ² | .39 | .28 | .03 | .39 |
| Probability > F | .007 | .029 | ns | .007 |
| N | 25 | 25 | 26 | 25 |

* p = .06 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 (Standard Errors in parentheses)

Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis. As three of the equations illustrate, there is no significant relationship between varying levels of U.S. relational strength and variation in G7 defection scores. This is consistent with our predictions. While we are loath to dismiss out of hand the arguments stemming from the neorealist perspective, these equations do show empirically that relational strength contributes little to policy

cohesion in the group. These results, of course, do not negate the possible salience of relative state strength for other matters, including the likelihood that a very strong state might be able to override policy dissension within the G7 group. However, here we are searching for conditions that will impact on policy congruence, rather than a capability to counteract policy differences between states.

The results in Equation 1 indicate that lagging the defection ratio adds little significance to the amount of variation explained. The group's prior level of defection does not predict to its present level of defection. We are not surprised by this result either UNGA resolutions change substantially from year to year, and G7 responses to these resolutions are primarily a function of immediate policy preferences rather than any type of legislative dynamics that would likely endure across sessions of the UN, such as caucusing group activity designed to encourage cohesion above and beyond policy preferences.

Further, variation in the frequency of intrastate conflicts does have a minimally significant impact on the group's defection ratio. The relationship between this variable and the defection ratio is negative, as we predicted, although barely significant (at the .06 level) across both Equations 1 our predicted model, and 3, the internal/external disturbance model. These two equations illustrate that increased levels of intrastate conflict are associated with some decreases in the group's defection ratio.

Most importantly, there is a very strong, negative relationship between the frequency of terrorist activity and G7 cohesiveness. This is demonstrated both by its significance level and the positive relationship with the defection ratio. The relationship is dramatically evident across all equations. These results are consistent with the prediction that we generated from the domestic politics model: across G7 actors, there is substantial variability in domestic

political costs for addressing international terrorism. Such variation is based on intra-G7 differences across selectorates and winning political coalitions, and in part on differences in experiencing and coping with international terrorism. From this model, we expected substantial policy differences in response to increased international terrorist activity, and that is precisely what is suggested by Table 1.⁶⁸

Finally, as equation 2a illustrates, the typical systemic disturbances portrayed by interstate wars and crises appear to have no significant impact on the G7's defection ratio. As we had noted earlier, this is the context in which the G7 was built, and such disturbances appear to act more as a given than as fluctuating variables in accounting for G7 policy cohesion. As equations 2 and 3 illustrate, variations in neither crises nor interstate wars seem to reduce the salience of intrastate conflicts and terrorist activity in predicting the variation in the G7's defection ratio.

The Future of G7 Policy Congruence and Resistance to Hegemony within the Core

Our findings suggest a number of conclusions regarding the ability of the G7 to continue to seek policy cohesion, or, alternatively, the likelihood that even within the G7 we will find increased resistance to hegemonic leadership in the future. Most obviously, we would expect that the typical "old" systemic challenges to the status quo are likely to be met with a relatively unified policy response in the near future, as they have been in the past.⁶⁹

G7 states will likely exhibit similar policy preferences when major interstate conflicts erupt,

⁶⁸ Due to the fairly young life-span of the G7, our analysis is limited to a maximum N of 26. Thus, for each model, we confine our analysis to no more than four independent variables per equation in order to not stretch our models beyond all reasonableness.

⁶⁹ This assertion carries with it two very important caveats. First, we expect that the G7 maintains its current membership (see our further discussion)—this assumption may be severely challenged in the near future. A second caveat is that the U.S. administration continues to commit itself to the G7 as a multilateral forum. Despite the Bush Administration's unilateralism over Iraq, the Kyoto protocol, etc., it has continued with the G7 process.

when interstate crises threaten established norms of international politics, or when international economic turbulence threatens the well being of G7 states, such as if OPEC were to decide to drive up the price of oil. Issues of this sort should continue to generate relative consensus and little resistance to U.S. leadership as long as the United States continues to employ the G7's institutions, and continues to pursue its own policies in consultation with its G7 partners (an enormous bone of contention is policy toward, Iraq). The greater dangers for policy defection and G6 resistance to U.S. leadership revolve around those issues that are relatively new, for which there are no well developed, relatively successful, institutionalized group responses, and/or those issues with differential and significant domestic political consequences for the members of the group.

Our analysis suggests that international terrorism is just such a divisive issue. While there has been substantial collaboration between G7 members in certain areas (*e.g.*, cooperation to hamper terrorist economic networks, the sharing of intelligence, etc.), more visible or aggressive tactics in the hunt for terrorist organizations and states that may harbor them is likely to continue to create major rifts between the members of the group.

Although clearly not the same issue, nor one that is particularly new, the Middle East conflict, and especially the relationship between Israel, Palestinians, and their surrounding neighbors, is fraught with consequences similar to the issue of international terrorism this issue is also one that has yet to enjoy much success in being addressed. Through the Cold War and its aftermath, U.S. leadership on this issue has been aggressively challenged by some of the G7 members, and as the factor scores earlier demonstrated in Figure 7, has substantially split the coalition. We suspect that a significant reason again involves the domestic political consequences accompanying this international issue. Clearly, these

differences had not split the G7 on a permanent basis at any time in the past. However, the intersection between this issue, the ongoing conflict in Iraq, and differences over how to combat international terrorism makes it more problematic than ever before for G7 partners. Even the staunch ally Tony Blair has demanded more attention from the U.S. administration on a new peace initiative in the Middle East in exchange for continued British support in Iraq. Joint German, French, and British efforts under a common EU umbrella to negotiate Iran's nuclear capabilities, coupled with a skeptical response by the United States, further underscore the divisive nature of the Middle East for G7 partners.

It is likely that U.S. leadership will be challenged in other issue areas, as well and particularly when domestic political consequences divide the group. Global ecological issues, as manifested, for instance, in conflicts over the Kyoto Protocols constitute both a relatively new issue area for the G7 and a stimulus for substantial domestic political consequences for member states with large "green" groupings within their electorates, a significant political threat to the fortunes of some political leaders. This is no less problematic for U.S. policy makers, whose political support within the winning coalition appears to be critically dependent on actors unwilling to risk the economic impact of joining the protocols (*e.g.*, corporations that donate large contributions to both political parties).

Changes to the membership of the G7 constitute another potential problem for continued policy cohesion. With the exception of Japan, the other members of the presently constituted group carry very similar alliance portfolios, reflecting similar orientations to international politics. Perhaps at least as important is the fact that along with Japan, all seven are democracies, with widely varying selectorates but similar democratic processes governing the retention and fortunes of political leaders. This is not the case with Russia, the

next state most likely to become a full member of the group. Russian domestic politics play out under dramatically different rules than those of the G7 states. Therefore, Russian policy makers within the group are likely to respond with different domestic imperatives in mind than other G7 leaders.⁷⁰ This problem is further magnified by a generic Russian orientation to international politics substantially different from those of the original G7 members.⁷¹

Chinese inclusion into the G7 would amplify even further these differences. China, at least as presently constituted, would bring a new group of policy makers to the G7 table, responsive to a pattern of domestic politics with even a smaller electorate than that of Russia, as China would be the least democratic of all G8 actors. Likewise, China's foreign policy preferences have been demonstrably different from not only the G7, but also from Russia.⁷² It is not likely that an institution historically based on the relative homogeneity of its members both in terms of preference for the international status quo, and the democratic nature of their polities would be able to survive such a challenge to the cohesiveness of the group.

Finally, we should note that there is much that is still unexplained in the empirical models outlined above. While statistically speaking, we can account for nearly half of the variation in our best model—an outcome that is substantial given that each equation included no more than four variables—there remains much variation in G7 cohesion as of yet unexplained by our domestic politics approach. We suspect that the power of the model can be substantially increased by inserting one of the missing elements typically found in

⁷⁰ See *e.g.*, see Bueno de Mesquita, 2003, on the differences between democratic versus non-democratic leadership.

⁷¹ For an excellent empirical analysis of differences in orientation to security issues between the United States, Russia, and China, see Lake, 2004.

⁷² See *e.g.*, see Volgy, Kanthak, Frazier, and Stewart Ingersoll, 2003.

strategic perspectives utilized to assess domestic political explanations for foreign policies: such as the foreign policy orientations that new political elites bring to office.⁷³ Clearly, foreign policy makers are more than just domestic political actors. They also bring with them into office policy orientations and interests that are likely to vary across the G7 states with respect to direction and salience, and in addition to the variation across domestic political contexts.

Who is in office is likely to matter, but in the context of broader forces working both in domestic and international politics. For example, the foreign policy orientations found in the Bush administration, tempered by domestic political dynamics, is far from being identical to the foreign policy orientations found in the Clinton Administration. As long as domestic political imperatives and external pressures remain the same across successive administrations, important differences may lie dormant and we would expect little fundamental difference in foreign policy preference. However, as contexts and forces change—and we believe this to be clearly the case in the context of 9/11—the policy orientations toward more unilateral action and toward regime change in the Bush administration come to the fore in a manner likely to be different from a Gore or Kerry administration, for example. Likewise, the policy orientations of successors to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac will matter as well, yet again these orientations will likely be translated through the context of domestic politics and the manner in which such politics filter external threats and opportunities. Who is in office matters (depending on changing domestic and international stimuli), and accounting for such variation should increase substantially the predictive capacity of our model in predicting G7 policy cohesion. However, our purpose in this analysis was to the likely importance of varying domestic political

⁷³ See *e.g.*, see Bueno de Mesquita, 2003.

conditions for effecting policy congruence in the G7. To the extent that our model and the empirical analysis were able to further this end, we demonstrated the importance of domestic political contexts for foreign policy defection within the core of the international system.

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