

The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism¹

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INTRODUCTION

In introducing the theme of this volume, Bobrow notes that when faced with the commitment of American foreign policy elites to hegemony, “state and non-state others will seek ways to resist and modify U.S. policy preferences and intensify their pursuit of different visions about what will enhance or maintain one or more aspect of their diversity.” Hegemony describes one type of relationship between two or more actors, one in which the hegemon tries to secure compliance with its preferences so as to maintain a global order or system. From the perspective of those actors whose compliance is sought, however, why compliance is being asked for or how it is legitimized is secondary to the reality that they are asked to modify their own policy preferences. States and other actors have historically tried to modify the behavior of others, irrespective of whether the world system in which the phenomenon occurred could best be characterized as hegemonic, duopolistic or a balance of power system.¹ In case of divergence between policy choices, the more powerful actors have naturally been more successful in getting others to do what they want them to do and to prevent the latter from doing what they want to do. Therefore, “resisting and modifying policy preferences and pursuing of different visions...” against the hegemony of an actor appears, at best, to be a special case of the unequal distribution of power among actors and the ensuing unequal relationship between them.

Under any international system, all actors, whether their relationship is characterized as friendly or adversarial, will try to modify the actions and decisions of others. It is only too evident that those with more means to elicit compliance are more likely to achieve greater success. Yet, those with lesser means also have access to strategies and actions which may deny the former complete achievement of what they want or force it to consider revision of goals. This is a dynamic process in which power relationships change as a result of changes in the various aspects of the relationship between actors as well as changes in the environment.

A natural disaster, a change in the relationship of one or both of the actors with a third party, political change through elections or revolution and the unexpected death of a political leader on one side or the other are examples. Nevertheless, patterns emerge on how actors try to influence and modify each other's behavior through a variety of actions and modalities as cited in Bobrow's introduction.

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES

This paper will examine the relations between the United States and Turkey from the perspective of how Turkey has tried to limit, modify, resist, control, undermine and render ineffective the policy preferences of the United States on several occasions. The United States and Turkey developed close relations after the Second World War within the context of a western defense system. This is a relationship that had been sought by both parties. Turkey had feared that it constituted a target for the geographical and ideological expansion of the Soviet Union, while the United States, in assuming the defense of Western Europe, had come to judge that an effective defense system would have to include Turkey on the Southern Flank of NATO.² This convergence of interests constituted the underpinnings of a partnership that has continued to this day. Nevertheless, even during the days when the severity of the Soviet threat constituted a factor that encouraged the perception that mutual interests were highly convergent, thereby facilitating the according of relatively easy compliance to American preferences in planning the strategy of the alliance and the broad framework of allies' foreign policies, there were instances where the policy preferences of the United States and Turkey diverged sharply. After the end of the Cold War and the appearance of what many have called a unipolar world, perceptions regarding the convergence of interests continued to hold until the American invasion of Iraq.

What I propose to do in the following pages is to examine briefly four instances where there were significant divergences between the two countries and how Turkey tried to affect

changes in U.S. policies. The four cases are the Turkish threat to intervene in Cyprus in 1964, the American demand to terminate opium cultivation in Turkey from 1971-1974, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo, and the American plans to use Turkish facilities and geographical space for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

CASE STUDIES

The 1964 Cyprus Crisis

The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 by trilateral agreements between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The island had been a part of the Ottoman Empire but taken by Britain in 1878 and made into a British colony. The majority of the residents of the island were Greeks but there was a twenty five percent Turkish minority. A Greek nationalist movement going back to the 1930s, desiring to unite the island with Greece gained new momentum in the 1950s as colonial rules were crumbling and challenged British rule as Britain had already begun to withdraw from its other colonies. Turkey became a party to the conflict when the possibility of ending British rule began to be discussed. Britain had acquired the island from the Turks. The Turks viewed the British possession of the island as the cornerstone of a balance that had been established between Greece and Turkey at Lausanne in 1923 after the conclusion of the Turkish War of National Independence. As Turkey entered the picture, the nationalistic terrorist Greek movement turned also against the Turks. A *modus vivendi* was eventually found by the efforts of the British, Turkish and Greek governments. A constitutional system establishing checks and balances to insure the security and protection of the rights of the Turkish community was devised. The British agreed to make the island independent but would keep two military bases indefinitely. Britain, Turkey and Greece, through a treaty of guarantee, would jointly insure the protection of the constitutional order. Each retained the right to intervene independently on the island if the constitutional order

were to be violated, but it was expected that the three guarantors of the agreement would cooperate to make it work.³

Soon after the independence of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, the president of the new republic, began to complain that the constitution was too complex to be workable. In December 1963, he presented a memorandum to the Turkish side, asking for approval of changes in thirteen provisions of the constitution, which taken together, would fundamentally alter the ethnic power balance on the island, rendering it fully Greek Cypriot. With strong objections from both the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot side, tensions on the island began to rise. On December 23, 1963, Greek gangs began to attack members of the Turkish ethnic community, prompting Turkey to consider intervention on the island to protect its kin. From early on, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü had wanted the United States to address the problem, but was informed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that his country was not a party to it. To underline the urgency of the problem, Turkey flew its jets over the island on Christmas day. This action prompted all parties to the dispute to come together and agree on working for the establishment of a peacekeeping force on the island. The effort failed, however, and inter-communal fighting prompted by the Greek community to force the Turkish Cypriots to accede to Greek Cypriot constitutional demands continued. The Turkish prime minister told the U.S. ambassador on January 28 that unless the rights of the Turkish Cypriots were assured, Turkey would have to intervene on the island.⁴

The Turkish threat led to the production of an Anglo-American plan recommending the establishment of a NATO force of 10,000, a proposal that was accepted by all but Mr. Makarios. The Greek Cypriot president predicting that a NATO force would work to consolidate the existing arrangement said that he would accept only a UN peacekeeping force. Various efforts to force him to accept the plan proved fruitless. He then managed to carry the debate to the UN Security Council which decided on March 4, among other things, to send a

UN Peacekeeping Force to Cyprus, a decision that became operational in a couple of weeks. This neither stopped the violence directed against the Turkish Cypriot community nor deterred the Greek side from efforts to change the constitutional order. Mr. Makarios finally abrogated unilaterally the treaty of alliance with Britain, Greece and Turkey and then announced that a new Cypriot army would be developed.⁵

The intransigence of the Greek Cypriot regime and the intensification of physical attacks on the Turkish community led Turkey once again to consider a military intervention on the island. The United States was still trying to not get actively involved in the conflict, hoping that Britain, Turkey and Greece would be able to find a solution. But on June 2, the U.S. ambassador was informed that the Turkish troops were to leave for Cyprus the next day. He asked that the operation be held back for twenty four hours while he consulted his government. Within that period, the Turkish government received by most accounts an unusually undiplomatically worded note from President Johnson, asking Turkey not to stage a military intervention. The prime minister was also invited to Washington, an invitation also extended to the Greek prime minister, so that the differences could be settled by negotiations. The relations were back to diplomatic efforts.⁶

As the power that planned NATO strategy, gave credibility to the NATO defense posture and insured the internal coherence of the alliance, the United States had initially kept its distance from a conflict between two members of the alliance. By considering unilateral military action and advising the United States of its intentions, Turkey succeeded in bringing the United States into the conflict as a party. Turkey felt that Britain, whose retention of bases on the island depended on the consent of the Greek Cypriot government, could not be an impartial party. Furthermore, it was seen neither as being strong enough to provide leadership in affecting a solution nor as possessing the means to insure its implementation. The idea of a NATO peacekeeping force was an American formula. After that proved unacceptable to the

Greek Cypriot side, the eventual sending of a UN peacekeeping force would not have been possible without American support.

The prevention of a Turkish military intervention on Cyprus, on the face of it, looks like the case of a powerful ally issuing an ultimatum to a weaker partner which has no option but to oblige. Since Turkey appeared to register a strong reaction to the Johnson letter of June 5, 1964 both at the official and public opinion level, it might be inferred that threats from a superpower, going as far as implying that NATO might not come to the defense of Turkey if its unilateral action would elicit a Soviet intervention, had subdued an ally into compliance. Yet, later analyses have offered other explanations. The main thrust of these explanations is that the Turkish prime minister was far from sure that a military intervention would succeed. At the time Turkey did not have landing craft, its soldiers were not trained for a landing operation and it might not have been able to provide sufficient air and logistical support for its troops. From the perspective of domestic politics, there were strong pressures to stage an intervention in the face of uncontrolled commitment of brutal acts against the Turkish Cypriots. Only a strong warning from the United States could justify reconsidering the military option. Prime Minister İnönü had announced Turkey's intention to intervene to the U.S. ambassador with the full expectation that Ambassador Hare would ask for a postponement which he had the full intention of giving. The warning produced the Johnson letter, sparing Turkey from a military intervention. The United States got the blame.⁷

The aftermath of the Johnson letter is even more interesting. President Johnson's reference to whether the NATO protection would be honored was met by İnönü's reply that if the commitment of the alliance was conditional, this would destroy the credibility of the alliance. "In the case of such an event, a new world order will be established and Turkey will take its place in that order," the prime minister said. In this way, Turkey communicated that conditionalities would undermine the *raison d'etat* of NATO. That the point was never raised

later including the time when Turkey did actually stage an intervention on Cyprus suggests that the U.S. leadership saw the potential dangers of the statement it made in a hastily drafted letter. It may be that mutual membership in an alliance constrains the superior party in its actions toward the weaker party, limiting the possible range of actions that it can resort to.⁸

Having stopped the Turkish intervention but being unable to stop the Greek Cypriot government from destroying the constitutional order that was created in 1960 and preventing attacks on the island's Turks, the United States lost the moral ground on which it could offer advice to its ally to do this or that in the interest of alliance harmony. The domestic anti-American movements, on the other hand, acquired a political legitimacy that they had never had before. Turkey began to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and its neighbors in the Middle East. It began to make military preparations so as to be more capable of staging, when needed, a military intervention on the island. Finally, when Turkey actually intervened in 1974, it could point to the fact that following American advice had failed to produce results and that the mistakes of 1964 would not be repeated.

The Opium Problem

Richard Nixon, in his bid for the presidency in 1968 promised the American voter that one of the major problems that he would address and solve in addition to the Vietnam War, was the narcotics problem which not only had devastating results on American youth but was also a main source of crime in the United States.⁹

Turkey had come to be identified as one of the main sources of opium and its derivatives reaching the American markets long before Nixon's bid for the presidency. Despite Turkey's strict laws and cooperative attitude in fighting the drug trade, its failure to bring the illicit trade under control had led to frustrations on the American side, leading to

suggestions that Turkey should ban opium cultivation altogether. Successive Turkish governments had been cool to the idea of a total ban since the opium production constituted the main means of livelihood of a significant number of peasants. They had argued that they would welcome United States assistance both in the field of processing the drug and in the improvement of controls at both production and selling stages. To demonstrate that they meant what they said, the post-1960 governments had proceeded to reduce the number of provinces where opium cultivation was permitted from 30 in 1961 to four by 1971.¹⁰ Turkey had also signed the Single Convention on Narcotics by the end of 1966.¹¹ For its part, the U.S. had extended to Turkey in 1968 a loan of 3 million dollars for research into the development of alternative products to replace opium and to improve law enforcement.¹² Despite such efforts, there was constant mutual dissatisfaction and irritation. The United States felt that Turkey was not doing enough to control cultivation and trade while Turkey felt that the United States was singling out Turkey and blaming it unfairly.

After Richard Nixon became president in 1968, tensions in Turkish-American relations generated by the opium issue began to rise. Concerned about the rise of drug abuse in the United States, the U.S. administration became increasingly committed to the idea that Turkey should terminate opium cultivation, since it believed that this country was the major source of drugs. In a congressional hearing in 1969, the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs volunteered an estimate that 80 percent of the illicit drugs on the U.S. market came from Turkey. Though not based on reliable measurement and despite Turkish protestations that the entire opium product in Turkey was not enough to supply the American drug market for more than three weeks, the idea found adherents in many quarters of American society from the press to the U.S Congress, all identifying Turkey as the main culprit. The United States was following a carrot and stick strategy to get Turkey to stop the cultivation of opium. On the positive side were offers to buy the entire crop to give Turkey

assistance to compensate for the losses farmers would incur as a result of the opium ban, to help with programs to help farmers make adjustments to new crops and suggestions that Turkey would accumulate prestige which would facilitate its other business with the United States. On the negative side were threats of economic and military sanctions such as the introduction of a trade embargo, a ban on weapons sales and the suspension of trade.¹³

Turkey met the pressure in two ways. At the level of public opinion, including the political leadership, American demands to end poppy cultivation were met with indignation. At the level of policy, however, Turkish government constantly worked to improve controlling the production and monitoring the trading of opium. It also cooperated in the international arena with the U.N. Narcotics Commission in its efforts to develop international means to fight the illicit narcotics trade. But, some American public opinion makers and political leaders, it appeared, had found an issue which could be exploited for political ends. Turkey continued to be a target of American demands. Some analysts in Turkey felt that narcotics trade was used by ethnic lobbies to mobilize American public and congressional opinion against Turkey in order to weaken support for Turkish positions on other issues such as Cyprus.¹⁴

In 1971, it seemed that the tensions generated by Turkey's opium production were spiraling to ever higher levels. Turkey resisted demands which it found to be poorly substantiated, insensitive to Turkey's domestic politics and appearing to be part of a campaign the intentions of which had little to do with the merits of the actual situation. Yet, developments in the American domestic environment had led to a situation where the U.S. Administration could not settle for anything less than the total banning of opium production. Relations had reached a deadlock.

What made a change in the situation possible was an indirect military intervention by the military. On March 12, 1971, the leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces gave an ultimatum to the Demirel government then in power, asking it to resign. The generals proposed that a national unity government be formed to bring about changes in the constitution and the laws so that the government could combat more effectively public disturbances caused by radical groups on the right and the left. Mr. Demirel resigned and a government along the lines the military leadership demanded was formed under Professor Nihat Erim. Under the watchful eyes of the military, the Erim government received a vote of confidence in the parliament but it was a weak government both domestically and internationally. It had taken office at a time when pressures against Turkey in the United States were mounting. Congress was demanding action, the U.S. administration was saying that Turkey should end cultivation altogether, the American public was expecting their government to do something. The U.S. government called its ambassador back for consultations. Later President Nixon invited a number of ambassadors of countries including Turkey to explain to them that the eradication of narcotics was the highest priority in U.S. foreign policy.

Under heavy pressure, in late June, the Turkish government told the U.S. government that it was ready to discuss the nature and scope of the production ban. Negotiations quickly moved in the direction of how much compensation was to be given to Turkey. The difference between the Turkish figures regarding the total cost of the ban and the amount the United States was willing to consider was almost hundredfold. Eventually, the Turkish government agreed to a much lower sum than it had set out to get and reached an agreement to terminate opium cultivation. The decision was welcomed by the United States, praised by members of Congress and the U.S. administration alike. The reverse was the case in Turkey where the decision was heavily criticized, many observers suggesting that much of Turkish opium had gone to meet demands of the pharmaceutical industries and these would now turn to India as

an alternative supplier. A motion to repeal the ban was introduced in the parliament but it was defeated.

1971 and 1972 were not times of stable governments in Turkey. No less than five governments took office within a span of two years. Governments were unable to formulate and pursue clear-cut policies. After the initial acceptance of the opium ban, this volatility had made it difficult for governments to pursue sustained policies to get sufficient compensation and to take other measures to render the ban more acceptable to the public at large. As the country began to move toward the 1973 elections, all political parties claimed that they would repeal the opium ban. In addition to failing to convince those who were opposed to the ban on ideological grounds, the successive post-1971 governments had failed to deliver much to the farmers who had been asked to stop raising opium as a result of the ban. Furthermore, in the international arena, the United States had not had sufficient success to treat the Turkish case as part of a wider ban in the world. It was clear that whatever Turkey did not produce would be compensated by other countries to meet the world demand. This only served to aggravate the local sense of deprivation and of having been forced to suffer injustices.

The elections were won by the Republican People's Party that prided itself in pursuing "anti-imperialist stands in the tradition of the founding fathers of the republic." Being short of a few votes for a parliamentary majority, the party formed a coalition with the National Salvation Party, a religious and nationalistic party that shared the anti-American stance of the plurality party on the question of poppy production. The coalition program had devoted substantial space to the lifting of the opium ban.

During the interim when the ban was in force, it had become apparent that the ban was not serving any of the purposes for which it had been designed. It was, however, imposing deprivations on Turkey. The decline in opium production had generated hardships for the medical industries in the U.S. Their efforts to get the U.S. government to help increase

production had led to the commencement of opium production in parts of the United States as well as increased production in India. The Turkish producers, for their part, felt that the compensation they were being given was insufficient and they were not getting the support they needed in moving to alternative crops. Finally, there seemed to be little indication that America's drug abuse problem was decreasing. It was becoming apparent that 80 percent of the illicit heroine in the U.S. had not come from Turkey after all.¹⁵

Despite such information, the U.S. administration still insisted that Turkey should stick with the ban. The U.S. ambassador pursued this point consistently with Turkish authorities but to no avail. A couple of congressmen who had been the flag bearers against Turkey's opium production commenced with efforts to stop economic and military aid to Turkey. A similar approach was displayed by Secretary of State Kissinger to the Turkish foreign minister when they met in New York in April 1974¹⁶. These threats did not alter the Turkish government's determination to repeal the ban. A final attempt in the form of a concurrent resolution of both houses, asking the U.S. government to consult with the Turkish government not to repeal the ban and withhold economic assistance if the Turkish government did not oblige, also failed.¹⁷ The Turkish government announced that the ban was lifted on July 1, 1974. Cultivation would still be allowed in limited areas and under strict government controls. The Turkish government would also be open to international cooperation to insure that opium would be used for only appropriate purposes. As a first step, the slicing of poppies was banned at the beginning of 1975.

The American reaction to the Turkish decision was immediate. The ambassador was called back for consultations. Both houses passed resolutions asking the president to withhold military and economic aid to Turkey and to stage a formal protest with the United Nations. The president, however, confined his actions to the suspension of aid that was being given as part of the ban package. There were writings in the American press highly critical of Turkey

and supportive of congressional recommendations. A new resolution was passed introducing bans on assistance to Turkey contingent on Turkey's refusal to reinstate the ban.

In the middle of this debate, Turkey staged an intervention in Cyprus which eventually prompted the United States to impose an arms embargo on her. The congressional opponents of Turkey's resumption of opium cultivation produced more congressional resolutions asking the president to make efforts to have the Turkish government to reinstate the ban. These recommendations did not produce any action on the part of the U.S. administration in the direction the Congress recommended. The American government, in contrast to the legislative branch, had come to observe that with the effective measures the Turkish government had instituted and implemented, the illicit trading of opium originating in Turkey had been to a large extent brought under control. In the summer of 1975, the U.S. undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco and the U.S. ambassador both testified in the House of Representatives that Turkey's measures in controlling trade had proven effective.¹⁸ With this testimony, the poppy issue dropped off the agenda of U.S.-Turkish relations.

In the opium episode, The United States succeeded temporarily in pushing Turkey to introduce an opium cultivation ban. The government that affected the ban had low levels of domestic support and low esteem on the international stage. Elected governments had not been able to accommodate U.S. demands, and the ban had been repealed soon after an elected government took office. Democratic governance appears to introduce an important constraint on the extent to which U.S. demands on another country can be met. But, Turkey had not relied exclusively on a "democracy limits what governments can do" argument. Rather, it had tried to demonstrate that it was willing to cooperate with the United States and international agencies that were involved in drug control. It also took concrete steps to reduce the illicit cultivation and trade, convincing at the end the U.S. administration that it was not the main source of illicit opium. It had also pointed to inaccuracies and inconsistencies in U.S.

arguments and actions to persuade the American leadership that their demands were unreasonable. Finally, the Ecevit government that lifted the ban had communicated to the U.S. government that the repeal was non-negotiable, thereby forcing the U.S. government to decide whether it would be worth it to escalate tensions when Turkey seemed to make a sincere attempt to bring illegal drug trade under control.

The Cyprus Intervention and the U.S. Arms Embargo

We have already discussed the nature of the Cyprus problem in the context of the 1964 Crisis. The introduction of a UN Peacekeeping force had reduced the violence committed against members of the Turkish Cypriot community but had not brought about any change in the Greek Cypriot desires to change the constitutional arrangement so as to fully run the government by Greek Cypriots with a view to affecting eventual union with Greece. In 1967, a military junta had taken over the government in Greece. The junta had worked to enhance military penetration of the island by Greece. Threats of a Turkish intervention had forced the Greek government to pull back some of its soldiers but only temporarily.¹⁹ Also, under the pretense of training, Greece had penetrated the security forces of Cyprus, turning them into an organization that was more loyal to the colonels in Greece than to the government of Archbishop Makarios who had distanced himself from the regime of the colonels.

The colonels, growing unpopular at home, planned to enhance their domestic popularity by realizing Cyprus's union with Greece. In the summer of 1974, they concluded that they had mustered sufficient resources on the island to replace the Cypriot government with a coup. The junta backed government that would take over would deliver Cyprus to Greece. The calculation was that while a coup would not receive international approval, nobody would do much to reverse the *fait accompli*. Turkey would certainly object, but it would be constrained by others not to intervene. With such thinking, a coup was engineered and put into operation on July 15, 1974.²⁰ The timing seems to have been logical: Turkish-

American relations were still tense from Turkey's resumption of opium cultivation. A former Greek Cypriot guerilla leader, a strong supporter of union with Greece, Nikos Sampson, worked with the Cypriot National Guard whose loyalties were more to mainland Greece than to their national government, to attack the presidential palace in Nicosia. The president, it later turned out, managed to escape. Sampson assumed control.

The Turkish government, caught by surprise, began to discuss the change in Cyprus. All members of the National Security Council that discussed the question before it went to the government were convinced that this was the beginning step of the union of the island with Greece. After a review of options, it was decided that only a military intervention could reverse the situation. Turkey had the right to intervene according to the Treaty of Guarantee, but the government decided to consult with the British to comply with the treaty which depicted mutual consultations. Prime Minister Ecevit went to London and offered Britain to carry out a military intervention together, but the British government wanted continuation of the search for peaceful alternatives. The U.S. government sent Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco to talk with Mr. Ecevit who did not accept the idea that Mr. Sisco should join in on the talks with the British.²¹

Mr. Ecevit saw Mr. Sisco later. As he expected, Mr. Sisco tried to dissuade him from military intervention by a combination of rewards and threats. The U.S. would expedite the shipments of military supplies to Turkey that had been slowed down as a result of the opium conflict; a military intervention might well mean the end of U.S. assistance. The Turkish intervention would probably lead to a Turco-Greek war which would in turn damage U.S.-Turkish relations. The Soviets would also oppose the Turkish action. Mr. Ecevit, not yielding, put forth his own conditions: the Greek officers who had conducted the coup should be withdrawn from the island; Turkey should be able to send a sizable armed contingent to the

island to match the Greek military presence; Turkish Cypriots should be given control of a coastal region in the north and negotiations for the creation of a federal system should start. Sisco took these to the Greek leadership who refused to accept them. Another tour by Sisco also produced no positive outcome save a Greek willingness to withdraw the officers that had taken part in the coup.²²

In the meantime, Kissinger had held several phone conversations with Ecevit, his former student from a seminar at Harvard, to dissuade him from military action. Ecevit asked Kissinger that the U.S. should not apply the same type of pressure as it had in 1964 which, he indicated, might lead to the permanent rupture in Turkey's relationship with the western alliance.²³

Turkey intervened on the island on July 20, 1974 as part of a two stage plan. In the first stage, a beachhead in the north would be secured. Negotiations based on Turkish demands would be started. If no success was obtained in a short time, the second stage of extending Turkey's military control of the northern part of the island would be implemented. In the meantime, Turkey maintained significant military capability facing the Aegean to counter a possible Greek assault. The Turkish forces met greater resistance than they had anticipated in view of the fact that the Greek forces on the island had reached an army of 30,000. But, within two days, a beachhead was secured and Turkey told the U.S. that it was ready to engage in negotiations. During this interim, the U.S. administration abstained from using threats to induce compliance although military shipments had in fact been slowed down, something which would not have escaped the attention of the Turkish side.

Turkey and Greece agreed to a cease fire in compliance with a UN resolution on July 22. On July 23, the Greek junta resigned, opening the way for Constantine Karamanlis to return from exile to take over the Greek government.²⁴ In Cyprus, Sampson left to be replaced by Glafkos Klerides, the head of the Cypriot Senate. Negotiations started in Geneva on 25

July. After the ceasefire, the Greek National Guard began to occupy Turkish villages while the Turkish forces also expanded their area of control.²⁵ From the perspective of Turkey, the goal of negotiations was to create a new political arrangement on the island that would insure the security and the survival of the Turkish community. For Greeks, it was the restoration of the pre-coup situation. The United States was involved in trying to break deadlocks. For example, Henry Kissinger had proposed to Mr. Ecevit a cantonal system which the Turkish government accepted after brief consideration.²⁶ But the Greek Cypriot and the Greek side were not oriented toward reaching a compromise. They seem to have thought that as time passed, Turkey's intervention would lose its effectiveness and the status quo ante could be restored. Therefore, not only did they refuse Turkish offers, but also ignored both Mr. Callahan's and Mr. Kissinger's recommendations of a federal state and their threats that they might not be able to prevent Turkey from conducting a second operation.

On August 14, Turkey resumed the second stage of its military operation. Within two days, the Turkish military established control over 36 percent of the northern part of the island.²⁷ The Turkish hope was that the Greeks would return to the conference table, but that did not materialize. The disagreements within the Turkish government regarding concessions to be offered to the Greek side led to the resignation of the Ecevit government in mid-November, at a time when Mr. Kissinger had a trip planned to the Eastern Mediterranean. The resignation threw Turkey into political turmoil. Parties could not agree among themselves to form a coalition such that, for a period of four months, Turkey was ruled by a caretaker government that had no support in the parliament. It was not in a position to demonstrate initiative in addressing a major foreign policy problem such as Cyprus.²⁸ In the United States, on the other hand, the Watergate crisis had weakened the credibility of the administration. At the same time, Congress was showing disappointment with the president and his team in their

running of American foreign policy.²⁹The weakening of the administration opened the way for greater influence of ethnic lobbies.

The seizing of the initiative by the U.S. Congress did not mean total loss of initiative by the executive. After the first and the second military operations, several congressmen had written to Henry Kissinger, asking him to terminate military assistance to Turkey in accordance with American laws, but to no avail. Later, twice the U.S. Congress enacted bills that were vetoed by President Ford. On both occasions, attempts to override the veto failed but by a few votes. The president, albeit reluctantly, concluded that a compromise had to be reached with Congress. Accordingly, two bills were passed in late 1974, one terminating military assistance to Turkey, the other imposing an arms embargo. Military assistance was terminated in December, and the arms embargo went into effect on 10 February 1975.

The American administration did not feel that an arms embargo was an effective way of conducting policy. On many occasions, the president and the secretary of state tried to convince members of Congress and prominent members of the Greek lobby such as the North American Greek Archbishop that the embargo was not achieving its purpose while weakening the western defense system. They also did manage, in late 1975, after an initial rebuff by the House, to allow for a one time only commercial sale of military equipment as well as the shipment of those that had already been paid for.³⁰

Turkey responded in a multiplicity of ways to the American embargo. These included symbolic measures such as indicating that bilateral defense talks had been rendered meaningless and the cancellation of the Turkish ambassador's visit to Mr. Kissinger. Of greater significance was the establishment of the Federated Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. On the military side, Turkey cancelled its participation in NATO winter exercises of 1975 and announced that American bases and installations would have to be closed if the embargo were not repealed. This was in fact partly done in the summer of 1975 when the

activities of these facilities were suspended and their control taken over by the Turkish armed forces. The government, nevertheless, allowed American personnel to stay in order to prevent total rupture in view of the fact that the U.S. administration was working hard to end the embargo.³¹

On the broader foreign policy front, Turkey turned to improving its relations with the Soviet Union and with countries of the Middle East.³² As the embargo continued, Turkey also began to talk about leaving NATO since it was not certain that NATO would be able to provide for the security of Turkey.³³ Despite such developments, Turkey continued its cordial relations with the American administration which was also convinced that the embargo had weakened NATO's defense posture. A defense and economic cooperation agreement was signed, for example, in March 1976 as a goodwill gesture with the full knowledge that it would not become operational until the embargo was lifted.³⁴

The election of Jimmy Carter as president in 1976 was not initially perceived by Turkey as a good sign since Mr. Carter had displayed a clearly pro-Greek position in his campaign. But after taking office, he appreciated that Cyprus lent itself to no easy solution while the problematical relations with Turkey produced important problems for the Western defense system. Therefore, the U.S. administration began to show renewed emphasis in lifting the embargo and became critical of the Congressional stance which tied lifting of the embargo to the solution of the Cyprus problem.³⁵ The initial attempt in 1978 to get authorization to offer Turkey 50 million USD economic assistance and to sell arms worth 175 million USD was not approved by Congress. But the administration persisted in its determination to have the embargo lifted and managed to get, if barely, congressional approval. The law required the president to give a bimonthly progress report to the Congress. Now, the U.S. could return to using its bases and installations in Turkey.³⁶

The Cyprus intervention and the ensuing arms embargo brought two allies into conflict. The interest of the United States was in preventing two of its allies from engaging in armed conflict. The failure of the U.S. to prevent the Greek government from fomenting a coup on the island, however, weakened its ability to restrain the Turkish side from intervening to redress the balance. The Turkish side felt that in a situation where its fundamental interests might be permanently damaged, the imperative of maintaining alliance solidarity had a lower priority. The United States administration, on the other hand, judged that a certain accommodation was preferable to the possibility of a bigger rupture in the relationship. The fact that a clear difference emerged between the policy preferences of the U.S. administration and the U.S. Congress, not only prevented a more comprehensive break in relations, but made it easier for Turkey to follow the course on Cyprus that it did.³⁷

The Iraqi Crisis

Turkish-American relations had moved to closer cooperation after the end of the Cold War. In contrast to 1970s marred by problematical relations all emanating from Cyprus, from the 1980s on, no new problems had emerged while the memories of the past had subsided into the background. During the Gulf War, Incirlik Air Base was used for logistical purposes as well as for air raids into Northern Iraq. After the War, the same base was used for the implementation of Operation Provide Comfort and to enforce the No-Fly zone for Iraqi planes north of the 36th parallel.³⁸ The United States had been behind efforts to build a pipeline from Baku to Tbilisi to Ceyhan, Turkey as part of a project to render Turkey an energy corridor for oil and gas mined in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey, the United States and Israel developed a close working relationship for security. Turkey began to be referred to as a “strategic partner” of the United States. The changing of governments seemed not to alter in a significant way the close nature of the relationship. It was assumed that the interests of Turkey and the United States were highly convergent. Two problems bothered the Turks from

time to time. The first was the cloud of mist that surrounded what was being done within the framework of Operation Provide Comfort. Some people suspected and some actually claimed to have witnessed U.S. helicopters delivering supplies to the PKK, the terrorist organization from Turkey, elements of which had taken refuge in Northern Iraq. Secondly, Turkey felt that it had incurred substantial losses as a result of the Gulf War and Provide Comfort and complained that it had not been compensated for those losses.

When the United States government began to develop plans to invade Iraq, ostensibly because Iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction and was not submitting itself to international inspections, it felt that Turkey's cooperation would be relatively easy to secure. These plans had been in the making during the Clinton administration. The then Secretary of Defense Cohen had come to Ankara as early as November 1998 and raised the possibility of an intervention to depose Saddam Hussein, but had been told that this would be difficult. Later in 1991, when Madeleine Albright was on a tour of the region and had called Prime Minister Yilmaz, she was told of the three concerns of Turkey regarding a military operation in Iraq. First, as was the case in the Gulf War, Turkey was concerned about a massive influx of refugees. Second, the violation of the territorial integrity of Iraq might lead to the founding of a Kurdish state in the north which Turkey would find unacceptable. Third, Turkey would likely incur major economic costs. Finally, if Iraq did have WMDs, Turkey might be a potential target.³⁹

In later contacts with American officials, the question of Iraq frequently came up. The election of George W. Bush did not change but probably reinforced American proclivities to intervene in Iraq. When Vice President Cheney visited Ankara on March 19, 2002, changing the regime in Iraq, if necessary by military intervention was the most important topic to be discussed. Knowing the special weight of the Turkish military in security policy broadly defined, Mr. Cheney had wanted to talk to the Turkish chief of staff separately, but the

Turkish government had found a face saving formula whereby they could get together within a small group that included the prime minister and the foreign minister among others. In this way, his direct communication with the generals, bypassing the government had been avoided. Mr. Cheney communicated the American determination to bring Saddam down, if necessary without the support of others. But he wanted to be assured of Turkish support.⁴⁰ What this meant became more concrete in September when a message from the U.S. Department of Defense reached the Turkish General Staff headquarters. The message indicated that “full and complete” cooperation of Turkey was expected in an American led operation against Iraq. Permission was requested to deploy army, navy and air force units in various facilities in Turkey including air bases, naval bases, airports and harbors. What was unique was the fact that the letter had been sent to the General Staff whereas many of the requests contained therein could only be granted after parliamentary approval.⁴¹

The American requests continued to be expressed through visits of Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Undersecretary of State Department Marc Grossman as well as military leaders. These came at a time when domestic politics in Turkey were in turmoil. The plurality party had a split in its ranks, a junior partner had decided to call for early elections and the government was in disarray. It appeared difficult for the government to produce a decision. Nevertheless, a widely shared concern regarding the evolution of a Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq was evident among all Turks. Further, Turks were generally not favorably disposed toward a military operation in Iraq.⁴² In fact, Turkey had responded favorably to a Russian offer to work together to prevent a military operation which was likely to lead to the break up of Iraq.

In order to impress upon the Turks the American determination to stage an intervention, the U.S. administration tried to reach high ranking bureaucrats and military officers since politicians were experiencing a pre-election volatility confounded by

fragmentation of political parties. In late August, the undersecretary for foreign affairs visited Washington where he was told that the United States was planning to send 75,000-80,000 troops through Turkey to Iraq. For this purpose, the existing facilities needed to be repaired, expanded and readied to handle the load. The undersecretary responded by pointing out that the Turkish experience with the 1991 Gulf War had not been a happy one, but the request of an ally could still be considered provided that sufficient guarantees were given. All these necessitated, of course, a decision of the parliament. Unfortunately, the government and the parliament were in their final days. Further progress would have to await the completion of elections due at the beginning of November.⁴³ The Americans were in a hurry, however. In late September, they repeated their requests to the Turkish general staff. The chief of staff immediately passed the information on to the prime minister. The government decided to have the general staff and the foreign ministry study the matter. In this way, the government was trying to gain time. It was not ready to make a decision right before the elections. Simultaneous efforts of the Turkish government to persuade Saddam Hussein was falling on deaf ears and antagonizing the Americans.

On October 11, the U.S. Congress authorized President Bush to declare war on Iraq without waiting for UN support. Right afterwards, the Turkish general staff received yet another reiteration of the earlier requests from the U.S. for the use of military and logistical facilities, and crossing of up to 80,000 troops to Northern Iraq. The Chief of Staff General Özkök explained in a letter to General Wald, the Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe that his request could be met only by a decision of the parliament and that it would be impossible to get the parliament to produce a favorable decision two weeks before the elections.⁴⁴

The elections brought the recently formed Justice and Development party to power with an astounding majority. Although the party came from a political tradition that had been active in Turkish politics for some time, many of the MPs and ministers in the cabinet had not

had long national political experience. As they were beginning to feel comfortable in their new jobs, they received a message that Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Grossman wanted to come to Ankara to discuss Iraq, particularly the use of military bases. During their visit, the duo clarified that Turkey was to be a primary supply base and a secondary base for operations. If Turkey agreed, a three stage procedure comprising site inspection, site preparation and site utilization would be employed. Mr. Wolfowitz appeared impatient and complained that enough time had been lost while prime minister Gül reminded his guests that they had been in office only a week and though they had a majority in the parliament, it was still necessary to persuade the MPs to grant their American allies the right to use bases and territory. Eventually, Mr. Gül said that site inspection, if done by U.S. personnel already located in Incirlik air base and accompanied by Turkish officers, might be possible without parliamentary approval. He hastened to add, however, that the granting of the first step should in no way be construed as the acceptance of further steps. The American team, other than assuring Turks that territorial integrity of Iraq would be preserved, was not ready to provide specific answers on how costs Turkey incurred would be reimbursed and what role Turkey might assume in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Turkish side received the impression that the American visitors were so occupied with their own concerns that they had not sensed, despite Turkish efforts, to communicate that no clear-cut commitments were being made.⁴⁵

The Americans continued to use various channels to get a commitment from Turkey. They invited Mr. Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of the government party (but not yet prime minister for reasons we will not detail here) to Washington to visit President Bush. During this visit, Mr. Erdoğan made it clear that he did not want Turkey to be the only Muslim country to cooperate with the United States in its Iraqi operation. The U.S. administration had hoped to receive a commitment from him for cooperation but it was not forthcoming.

The Americans were also unhappy that despite the verbal commitment, the commencement of on site inspections was not progressing. Turkish authorities were saying that bureaucratic formalities took a long time. In the meantime, American military had begun to move military ware into and around Turkey. Newspapers were full of pictures and stories about trucks moving toward the Iraqi border and material being unloaded from ships. It seemed as if the American were behaving under the assumption that all their requests would, in the end, be approved. After yet another message from Mr. Wolfowitz, the Turkish government authorized the commencement of site inspection, but reiterated that this did not imply further commitments.

In the meantime, the government was still debating how to proceed. There was no unanimity of opinion. There was great concern that Turkey would end up being the only country in the region extending support to the American project. The prime minister decided that he would make trips to consult with Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran early in January 2003. But the United States was becoming impatient. Supplies and equipment were waiting off the shores of Iskenderun and the troops were waiting to board their vessels for Turkey. The government took the question up in the intra-governmental Iraqi summit where the military representatives carefully evaluated alternative courses of action and recommended that the U.S. requests be accommodated. The prime minister was hesitant and volunteered that it would be most difficult for him to explain a positive decision to his deputies in the parliament.⁴⁶

Later meetings including a cabinet meeting and a meeting of the National Security Council were also inconclusive. It was proposed that negotiations with the U.S. should be conducted in three different areas (military, political and economic) by three different committees and the agreements reached should be recorded in memoranda of understanding. This idea was also accepted by the Americans. The negotiations soon started. The political

negotiations were particularly ridden with conflict. They were stopped several times on a variety of issues from whether American soldiers should pay value added tax on their shopping in Turkey to rules of engagement of Turkish soldiers with PKK guerillas. This situation was not the result of dilatory tactics employed by the Turkish side but rather diametrically opposed viewpoints of the negotiators where the American negotiator seemed to think that she was in a commanding position.

The trips of the prime minister to the neighboring countries at the beginning of January had not been fruitful. While all agreed that Iraq should cooperate with the UN arms inspectors, they were also convinced that Saddam Hussein would not be accommodating. Mr. Gül may have hoped that these trips might have facilitated the passing of a UN resolution, making it easier for Turkey to take part in an operation against Iraq without being branded an instrument of American policies,⁴⁷ but this was not happening. Rather, the United States was sending messages again that they were expecting a decision as soon as possible and that they expected the decision to be in the affirmative.

The Turkish general staff that had been negotiating with the U.S. on the military side reported on January 6 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the parliament that the U.S. appeared to be determined to go into Iraq. At this stage, a more accommodating stance by Saddam would not affect their decision. Turkey would be affected by such an action whether it was a party to the conflict or not. Turkey had related its concerns about a Kurdish state in the North and keeping Mosul and Kirkuk under the control of the Iraqi government. Plans had also been made to meet the influx of refugees from Iraq. But the critical point was that a decision was needed. Indecision, in the words of the deputy chief of staff, was even worse than a bad decision since a decision could be changed or corrected. The next day, permission was granted to have the site inspections start on January 16. This was a month later than the original consent of Turkey that on site inspections would be allowed.

The Turkish government was well aware that there was significant opposition in the parliament to extending full support to American requests. It was searching for ways to reduce that opposition. For example, several attempts were made to increase American support for the Turkish position in Cyprus, without significant results. Attempts to motivate the Arab leaders to convince Iraq to cooperate with the UN also proved fruitless. The prospect that somehow the United Nations might adopt a stand closer to American viewpoints did not seem bright. America, on the other, was unwilling to make specific commitments about Northern Iraq that would alleviate Turkish concerns. Yet a decision needed to be made. The General Staff had made it clear to the government that American requests ought to be accommodated, insisting however, that it was the government that had to make a decision. Prime Minister Gül, however, was still hoping that Saddam Hussein might be persuaded to change his mind. He asked for a high level representative to visit Ankara, Baghdad responded and sent Taha Yassin Ramazan and the Iraqi foreign Minister Najji Sabry on a jet sent from Ankara to pick them up. But the result was the same as before.⁴⁸

The prime minister after consulting with the opposition and receiving the clear message that no support would be forthcoming decided to take up the matter in a cabinet meeting on February 4. He explained to his colleagues that the conditions were appropriate to move on to the stage of site preparation but there were still political and military concerns for acceding to the demands past that. When some ministers queried whether site preparation would not imply a commitment to full cooperation, he argued that this important distinction could be retained, especially in light of the fact that negotiations had not yet been concluded. The government decided to take the site preparation authorization bill to the parliament. It was accepted but 53 deputies of the government party had voted against it.

The negotiations on the economic and political front were not going well. The Kurds of Northern Iraq were opposed to the presence of Turkish troops in Northern Iraq and the

Americans were wavering between keeping them happy and securing Turkish cooperation. On the economic front, the compensation that the U.S. was offering appeared to be far below Turkish expectations. In an earlier conversation with Vice President Cheney, Mr. Gül had said that the decision allowing U.S troops to go through Turkey could be made around February 18. That date was approaching but no progress was being made. The prime minister, the foreign minister, the minister of state for economic affairs and some advisors then tried to diagnose why progress was so slow and concluded that the American negotiators did not have sufficient discretion and therefore had to consult Washington very frequently, resulting in loss of much time. The solution that emerged was for a high level delegation to go to Washington to talk with the decision makers including Mr. Bush. This was done, but did not produce the intended results. The U.S. did not want quantitative restrictions on forces and was offering what Turks felt to be modest compensation for the losses Turkey would incur.

The prime minister decided that he would not submit a resolution to the approval of the parliament to allow American troops use Turkish facilities. The next day, he stipulated that the memorandum of understanding would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress. These remarks reflected a high level of distrust of the American administration. The next day, the American negotiators did not arrive for their scheduled meeting. Tensions were escalating. In the meantime, ships carrying American troops had arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean and were awaiting Turkey's decision in order to disembark. On February 24, the Turkish government announced that the proposed resolution would be open for signing by the ministers. The next day, the text had reached the parliament. But, the agreements were not yet complete. The Kurds had openly said that they would resist Turkish soldiers in the North. Further complications arose when a newspaper divulged that the military had reservations about the arms that were to be distributed to Kurds in the North while both the speaker of the parliament and the president of the republic announced, independently of each other, that a

UN Resolution was necessary. Fearing that the motion might be defeated, the government decided to postpone the vote until after February 28. The National Security Council was to meet on the 28th and it was almost certain that the military leadership would recommend approval, a position that would not only strengthen the government's hand but would enable it to share some of the responsibility with the soldiers. The military leadership saw what was happening and chose to repeat its earlier stand that the decision was for the government to make.⁴⁹

The resolution came to the floor on March 1. Groups with different orientations were united in their opposition to Turkey's involvement in the Iraqi War. Students were demonstrating a mile from the parliament, while Islamic intellectuals were walking around the parliament building and asking the government party deputies to vote no. The opposition was adamant in its resistance. An opposition deputy had managed to strike a deep chord in the hearts of many a government deputy when he said: "Fear not America, fear God!" As the parliament was debating, it was announced that the memorandum of understanding was ready, but that was a belated message. The voting was completed in the early evening. Yes votes were in the majority but the motion had failed because it was not a majority of those present and voting. According to the Turkish constitution and the standing orders of the Grand National Assembly, abstentions counted as no. The yes votes were three short of a majority. One hundred deputies of the government party had joined the opposition in voting against their government's recommendation.

After the initial shock, the U.S. tried to see if the resolution might be reconsidered, but it could not. Mr. Erdoğan was running in a by election on March 9 to become a member of parliament which would then enable him to become prime minister. The government could not devote energies and political resources to the reconsideration of the resolution. The U.S.

decided not to spend more time hoping that Turkey might reverse its earlier decision. It asked for use of Turkish airspace which it was granted.

Turkey had not given the U.S. what it had wanted from it but had managed to keep out of the Iraq War. Turkey's failure to respond to U.S. requests was a result of several factors. The Turkish public was clearly against such involvement. There were also disagreements among various branches of government. The president was insistent on a UN resolution, the opposition party was adamant in its resistance; the government party was divided within itself and could not get its deputies and even some ministers in the cabinet to vote for it. The military while supportive of the resolution had abstained from strong public statements in its favor in order to prevent the government from blaming the military for dragging Turkey into Iraq. The decision appears not so much the result of deliberate policies to say no to the U.S. but a failure on the part of the government to mobilize sufficient support for the resolution to pass. The foot dragging on the part of the Turkish government was often a result of uncertainty about how much their party would back them and an unrealistic optimism that somehow Saddam might be persuaded to change his course.

DISCUSSION

Some General Considerations

Before evaluating the Turkish experience of resisting American domination within the framework that has been proposed by Bobrow, it may be useful to conduct a general discussion on the modalities and actions of resistance. The beginning point of such a discussion might be what appears to be a truism that not all modalities and actions are available to an actor that is interested in preventing, modifying, subverting or diverting an American policy preference or action. What are the determinants of the particular modalities and actions that an actor chooses in dealing with the United States?

To begin with, the choice of modalities and actions is affected by the nature of the relationship between the United States and the actor, in our case, the government of Turkey. The relationship between Turkey and the United States has been one of alliance since 1952. From after the late 90's until before the Iraqi intervention there were additional references to a not particularly well defined "strategic partnership." Turkish choices and American responses were formed within the framework of this broader relationship, taking into consideration that there were a multiplicity of bonds that connected the two governments and that care should be exercised to protect the comprehensive relationship and control the damage generated by disagreement in any one area or incident. The proclivity on Turkey's part, for example, to prefer the unilateral modality over others, may be explained in part, by the alliance relationship, directing Turkey to confine its responses to those that did not include bringing in third parties.

In this context, the question of whether the relationship between the United States and the other actor is one of dependence, interdependence or independence may also be raised. Understandably, a relationship of dependence would impose severe limitations on the other party's choice of both modalities and actions. Mutual dependence or put differently, interdependence, might increase choices but constrain them in the direction of being moderate. Little or no dependence, on the other hand, might increase the choices available to an actor that wants to resist American domination. During the period of Turkish-American relations under study, the relations between the United States and Turkey could be characterized mainly in terms of some degree of dependence of the latter on the former. Modalities and actions were constrained accordingly.

The choice of modalities and actions is also affected by the characteristics of the international environment prevailing at the time of the conflictual relationship between the United States and the other actor. Of particular relevance here are the differences between the

time of the Cold War and the current times often characterized as one of unipolarity. For example, during the period of the Cold War, it might have been much more difficult for an ally of the United States that was at the forefront of contact with the adversary to turn to such modalities as coalitions of the unwilling without compromising its own security. Some actions such as standing aside might also have been more difficult to use. An example relating to Turkey is that during the arms embargo, Turkey could not entertain the idea of buying weapons from the Soviet Union to reduce the burden of the American embargo because such action would have been considered unacceptable within the framework of the alliance though it might have been an effective way to undermine the embargo.

The international environment may affect efforts to constrain American efforts to dominate others in another way. There may be international precedents; international organizations with agendas that may get involved even when such involvement is not sought either by the United States or the other party. The involvement of the WTO in a trade dispute between the United States and another country would be a case in point. What is to be recognized here is that others may become involved in a dispute though neither of the contestants may want it. Such involvement, however, may stand in the way or alternatively facilitate the choice of some modalities and actions over others. For example, today any significant tension between Turkey and Cyprus would involve, in addition to the United States, the European Union whether either party is interested in such an intervention or not because Cyprus is a member of the European Union.

Third, the nature of the issue between the United States and the other actor would also be expected to play a part in the determination of the modalities and the actions to be employed. Is the question on which there is disagreement big or small, how significant is it to the United States and to the other actor, where does it fit in the sum total of relationships, who is involved, is it just governments or considerable segments of the public that are both

interested and affected, are there other international actors which are either or are likely to be involved? A host of other questions may be added to the list. An attempt by the United States to set up an Armed Forces radio that a host country does not want to permit might require modest modalities and actions such as unilateral and simple persuasion, respectively. Deployment of nuclear weapons or the use of territory for military operations, on the other hand, might involve multifarious modalities and actions. For example, Turkey, in its effort to contain the tensions generated by the opium ban, did not resort to actions that would have damaged relationships on other fronts such as security.

Fourthly, the nature of resources available to the United States and the other actor(s) would also have to be considered. Can the other side mobilize additional actors in the international arena and in the United States, what kind of financial means are available to it, are examples of questions that need to be answered in examining the choice of modalities and actions. Turkey, for example, does not have a major ethnic community in the United States that it can mobilize to influence congressional politics, an option that is open to others like Greeks and Armenians.

Finally, the nature of the actor itself is of relevance. Not all modalities and actions may be open to all actors. For example, a contestation between the United States government and UNESCO would by necessity involve other actors on the side of UNESCO and the latter would hardly be in a position to opt for a unilateral modality.

Turkey and the United States:

Modalities and Actions of Resisting the Hegemon

These general observations might be kept in mind in analyzing the four cases described earlier. Before commencing with the discussion of the cases, however, let me restate three basic features of the relations between the United States and Turkey that have

already been mentioned in passing earlier. These have constituted a background influencing how each party has behaved in its relations with the other in the four events under study. First, these relations have been formed and sustained within the framework of a security alliance. Each country has referred to the other as a strong ally. While some of the actions employed by either side may not have been becoming of an ally, the rhetoric has always been reflective of a strong, long term relationship. Second, these relations have been characterized both by interdependence and by the dependence of Turkey on the United States in the fields of security and economics. On the security front, Turkey has been a recipient of American military grants and loans, its armed forces have been equipped, for the most part, with American built and supplied equipment. On the economic front, not only has Turkey been a recipient of economic aid (earlier grants and in later years loans) but it has always turned to the United States for support when its economy has encountered major difficulties. Finally, the relations between the two countries have been conducted mainly through governments and bureaucracies. In other words, the relations have generally been in the nature of state to state relations. Turkey has not had the appreciation, the resources and the skills to influence the behavior of American government by working through or with other actors.

The Johnson Letter

The problematic of this book has been couched in terms of resisting the hegemon, i.e. the United States, by weaker others, including countries. This approach has influenced the identification of modalities and actions that others employ against the United States. The Turkish effort to bring the United States into the Cyprus conflict deviates from this mode of analysis in the sense that it was Turkey that pushed the latter to become involved in an affair that it had wanted to stay away from because it involved two countries, Turkey and Greece, both allies of America. It seemed prudent to maintain equal distance to both of them.

Furthermore, the problem was one with which Britain had historically been involved and considered it to be within its domain of responsibility.

The Turkish response to the attacks on the lives and property of Turks on Cyprus was unilateral for understandable reasons. The question was of interest mainly to the United States, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The United States was interested in alliance harmony but did not want to become involved in the affair, hoping that the British would bring about an acceptable solution. Britain, on the other hand, was interested in insuring the continued use of its two bases on the island. Since the Greek Cypriots were the stronger side, the British appeared to be more accommodating to them, leading to a continual weakening of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish positions over time. Cooperation with Greece, on the other hand, was out of the question since it was seen as part of the adversarial configuration in this particular issue. Other countries were not interested in becoming entangled in an affair that was of little interest to them but were sure to stimulate the wrath of Turkey, Greece or both in addition to that of Britain. The UN membership was favorably disposed, for the most part, toward the Greek government of the island. Hence, the modality had to be unilateral.

Turkey threatened rule based action and then scheduled delays. The London and Zurich accords that made the British colony an independent country identified Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of the independence and the constitutional order of Cyprus and gave each of the guarantors the right to intervene jointly or independently on the island to implement the provisions of the accords. Turkey announced its intention to intervene unilaterally but then deliberately scheduled a delay to allow for the United States to respond. The Turkish prime minister calculated that as the leader of the alliance, the United States would proceed to insure alliance solidarity which Britain had failed to achieve. In this way, the United States was pulled into the conflict as an active participant. Thereafter, America

was permanently involved in the never ending efforts to bring peace to the island. Turkey had managed to change American policy and force the United States to do what it wanted it to do.

The Opium Ban

In contrast to the events that led to the Johnson letter, the American determination to have Turkey terminate opium cultivation, alleging that most of the opium that reached the illicit market in the United States came from Turkey, is much more like the typical case of a hegemon attempting to impose its will on a weaker ally. Furthermore, the affair occurred through a longer period of time, allowing the two sides to implement both several actions at the same time and different actions at different stages of the process. As in the case of the Johnson letter, the modality was unilateral. This was dictated in part by the fact that Turkey was used to dealing exclusively with the American administration and did not have the resources or the experience to mobilize non-governmental actors either in the United States or on the international scene. But, Turkey's confining itself to the unilateral mode was also a function of the nature of the issue of contention. The debate was about drugs. The United States did have a drug problem; some of the illicit opium did probably come through or from Turkey. It would have been difficult for Turkey to mobilize support among other actors even if it had tried to do. Under the circumstances, the unilateral mode appeared to be the only choice available to the Turkish government.

Turkey met the American demands for the termination of opium cultivation in a number of ways. Initially, while protesting American allegations that Turkey was the main source of illicit opium reaching the American market, Turkey tried to improve its law enforcement and cooperated with the UN Narcotics Commission to that effect. The Turkish action can be described as

“protest, consent and try to implement” though evidently not to the satisfaction of the United States. As the latter continued its pressure on Turkey to ban opium production, Turkey first

tried to prolong the debate, attempt to persuade the United States that it was doing its best in the hope that the latter would give up, a course of action that may be referred to as “melting,” but it failed.

The international standing of the Turkish government was considerably weakened in the spring of 1971 when the military forced the resignation of the Demirel government and forced the establishment of a government of national unity in the face of intensifying public disturbances. The search of the military backed government which the parliament had been coerced into supporting, to achieve international support forced it to become more accommodating to American demands. It too, however, made references to “conditional support commitments,” indicating that it would need to receive extensive compensatory payments to be used to buy the existing crop and to help farmers change to alternative crops. Eventually, an agreement was reached in which Turkey consented to suspending opium production while the United States promised to make a certain amount of funding available to help farmers.

While it was difficult to engage in active opposition to government policies during the early stages of the indirect military intervention, criticisms of the opium ban began to intensify when it became apparent that the elections of 1973 would be held on time. All parties promised to remove the ban. This is precisely what the post-election Ecevit government did despite American protestations. The Turkish government had been pressured by the United States to make a promise amidst protests of the very political parties that had been forced into supporting the government of national unity by the military. Retraction quickly followed when electoral politics were restored. Turkey tried to demonstrate its predisposition to international cooperation to prevent illicit trade by banning the slicing of poppies.

The fact that the problematic is stated in terms of others trying to restrain the American government should not lead us to overlook the fact that the United States itself may also be responding to arguments, pressures and threats by the other, and that there might be fissures in the formation and the implementation of American policy, rendering it difficult to produce concerted action. While the American government threatened to cut off military and economic assistance to Turkey, it conceded that the ban was causing a shortage of opium for medical purposes. It then undermined its own position by asking Indian and American farmers to increase or begin production, respectively. When Turkey retracted its ban, on the other hand, the administration, while expressing indignation, did not proceed to take further steps although Congress seemed interested in imposing further sanctions.

The U.S. Arms Embargo

The introduction of an arms embargo against Turkey after its military intervention on Cyprus produced a Turkish response which was again unilateral in its modality. Turkey had in fact originally offered Great Britain to stage an intervention together since Britain was a party to the guaranteeing of the independence of Cyprus and its constitutional arrangement. The latter, however, had refused the offer for reasons already cited in the discussion of the Johnson letter, causing Turkey to proceed along in countering a Greek *fait accompli* which Turkey felt would become irreversible if allowed to stand. The American failure to restrain Turkey derived from Turkey's determination that the annexation of the island by Greece would alter the balance between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean unacceptably and permanently. Such an outcome, Turkey felt, could not be allowed under any circumstances. This was evident in the remarks of Prime Minister Ecevit to Henry Kissinger indicating that too much pressure on the part of the United States to restrain Turkey on corrective action on Cyprus might lead to a permanent rupture in Turkey's relationship with the western alliance.

Turkey's intervention produced the U.S. arms embargo, even though such action was not preferred by the administration but pushed strongly by the Congress. Turkey responded to the embargo by resorting to a set of actions that would fall under the general heading of rule based retaliation such as cancellation of participation in some NATO exercises, threats to close some American facilities on Turkish soil and in the transfer of the control of some bases to the Turkish government.

Another interesting action was the building of a network among other NATO member countries to supply Turkey with spare parts for its military ware, particularly fighter jets. This was done, interestingly enough with the knowledge and discreet support of the American administration which was unhappy with the congressionally imposed embargo. While, on the face of it, such action might have appeared to be "bloc creation," because it was done with the tacit knowledge of the United States, the term has to be applied with caution. Nevertheless, the action implied making informal arrangements or forming an interest group within an IGO to which the U.S. also belonged in order to neutralize the effects of formal American policy.

The Iraqi Crisis

The refusal of the Turkish parliament to allow American troops to use its facilities for logistical support in its invasion of Iraq, the use of Turkish territory for the transiting of American troops and equipment, and for the Turkish military to go into certain parts of Iraq to extend support to the United States stands out as being different from the three previous cases we have treated in terms of its comprehensiveness and its timing. It was more comprehensive in the sense that Turkey would be involved in a war effort that was bound to last a long time and require significant commitments on Turkey's part. In terms of its timing, on the other hand, it took place long after the end of the Cold War and talk about a bipolar world had been replaced by judgments that the United States had become a hegemon of a unipolar world. The American plans to attack Iraq and to utilize Turkish facilities and territory unfolded as a

process taking considerable time such that there were opportunities for different modalities and actions to be employed.

Beginning with the modalities that Turkey employed, we must once again turn to the unilateral. While it was the case that some critical members of the European Union to which Turkey was seeking membership were adamantly opposed to the American invasion, Turkey did not search for ways of cooperating with them to subvert American policies. Similarly, while the Turkish president and the speaker of the parliament both announced that a United Nations resolution was needed before Turkey would consider the American request, the Turkish government not only did not adopt the existence of a UN decision as a precondition but it also abstained from positive or negative activities in the international organization as a way of influencing American behavior. Finally, while Turkey consulted with Iran and Syria in the hope that Saddam Hussein might be persuaded to open Iraq up for inspections, these contacts could hardly be evaluated as building a coalition of those that were opposed to the American action. The discussion on the modalities may be concluded by pointing out that it is yet to be established whether the Turkish government was deliberate in failing to produce a parliamentary resolution to extend facilities and transit rights to the Americans or whether what transpired was a result of simple miscalculation. If the failure of the parliament was the product of the government's misjudgment as this author is inclined to believe, then resorting to other modalities in the period preceding the failed resolution would have been unlikely.

A multiplicity of actions and their combinations were employed to influence American behavior regarding the invasion of Iraq. To begin with, the Turkish government moved very slowly. It was decided early on that the American requests would be divided into three consecutive steps and they would be taken up one at a time. It was emphasized that any agreement reached, at one stage would not necessarily imply any commitment for acceding to American requests at the next stage, even though in many instances the preceding step would

have been useless unless the next step was anticipated. The first stage, for example, was the inspection of existing facilities to identify what needed to be done in order for them to be suitable for American use in the Iraqi invasion. The next stage was site preparation and so on. Each stage was characterized by long negotiations that broke down on more than one occasion. There appears to have been some feeling on the part of some of the key decision makers in the Turkish government that the United States would not be able to launch an invasion of Iraq without access to facilities in Turkey. Therefore, by slowing the process of acceding to American demands and letting the “military operation season” pass, the Turkish government may have hoped to force a deferment of American invasion plans for more than half a year and gain time for diplomatic interventions to be conducted. To conclude, delays were scheduled and used in addition to what may best be described as ordinary “foot dragging.”

The Turkish government, despite American displeasure, also engaged in regional consultations not only with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan that had good relations with the United States but also with Syria and Iran which the Americans viewed as being outside the group of friendly countries whose support should be mobilized. Discussions were held with the leaders of these countries, as all had common borders with Iraq and were therefore in the frontline of states that would be negatively affected by the American invasion, to try to influence the Iraqi government that it should not withhold cooperation from international agencies. The Turkish government also sent the minister of state for external trade to Iraq to relay messages to Saddam Hussein, encouraging him to accede to demands for weapons inspection in order to avoid further consequences. By taking such steps, Turkey hoped that the grounds on which the American invasion plans were based would be weakened while also reminding the Americans that there were neighboring countries of Iraq that had legitimate

interests in what they planned to do in Iraq. These actions may be viewed as attempts to build a counterweight to American arguments and impatience to commence with the invasion.

During the negotiation process, the Turkish government or some of the actors that are involved in the foreign policy process raised a variety of conditions that they wanted to have met in order to allow Turkish facilities to be used for the Iraqi invasion. Some of these conditions were monetary. Citing that the Iraqi embargo had cost Turkey significant losses of income from the transit fees of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline and Turkish exports to Iraq, and anticipating that an American invasion would generate new costs, Turkey wanted to be assured of sufficient compensation. The initial sum quoted by Turkey approached a hundred billion dollars, an unusually sum of money, but it was eventually negotiated down to a high but much smaller figure. This compensation was in addition to sharing the operational costs that would be generated by the American invasion and limited Turkish participation in it. The rules of cost sharing regarding the latter were included in a memorandum of understanding developed after lengthy negotiations.

The memorandum dealt with many other questions as well, detailing how Turkish-American cooperation regarding the Iraqi invasion would be implemented. To insure that the American commitments cited in the memorandum of understanding would be firm, the Turkish government raised at one point another condition that this document be adopted by the American Congress. This was an unusual request, showing on the one hand, the degree of distrust in the intentions and the commitments of the United States government, and on the other, the limited familiarity of the new Turkish government with the way the American government operates. As regards the last point, it does seem to this author that while the new Turkish government might well not be sufficiently familiar with how the American government works, experts and Turkish diplomats would have advised that it was not customary for such documents as a memorandum of understanding to go to the Congress and

be acted upon. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the government was raising unlikely conditions to gain additional time. The insistence on congressional approval was later dropped.

Turkish concerns did not stop at financial considerations. There were concerns that the United States might not want to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. The Americans seemed to rely extensively on the Kurds in Northern Iraq for the implementation of their invasion plans. This, in the Turkish mind, seemed to constitute a sequel to the American policy of imposing

a No-Fly Zone after the Gulf War, a period during which the Kurds were allowed to develop their own institutions of governance and acquire some, if limited, military capability. Turkey suspected that the goal of the northern Iraqis was independence, a step that was seen as destabilizing for the region since such a state would likely develop territorial disputes with all its neighbors and permanently rely on the protection of an external power since it would be weak and landlocked. Turkey, wanted assurances that Iraq would remain a united country. Otherwise stated, Turkey's cooperation was conditional on the maintenance of Iraqi unity.

Some segments of the policy establishment as well as the parliamentary opposition wanted to attach another condition to the support Turkey would be extending to the United States. As was mentioned earlier, the president of the republic and the speaker of the Turkish parliament argued independently of each other that a United Nations Security Council resolution would be needed before Turkey could accede to American requests to use Turkish territory for the purpose of conducting war against Iraq. The Republican People's Party, the only opposition party in the parliament, pursued a similar line and attacked the course that the government was following. As shall be recalled, a remark "Fear not the Americans, but God," uttered by an opposition speaker, left a deep impression on the deputies from the religiously inclined government party as they debated whether to allow the United States to use Turkish

facilities. Such opposition was also supported by parties that had failed to achieve parliamentary representation during the last election as a result of the ten percent national threshold. As the parliament debated the resolution, public demonstrations were going on not too far away from the parliament building. Although the Turkish government had promised the American government that they would pass the resolution, it failed. Was this a case of promise, but then retraction in the face of public protests? Not entirely. The government had not retracted its promise deliberately, but had simply underestimated how many of its own deputies would defect from the government position.

Finally, the Turkish government had hoped that its support of the United States might be tied to other side payments. Turkey was particularly interested in having other countries recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that had come into being after the Turkish intervention on the island. The European Union was at the time proceeding to accept the Greek run Republic of Cyprus in the south of the island as the government of the entire island and Turkey was interested in counterbalancing this. Such a side payment might have shifted the balance in favor of the American requests from Turkey but this was a payment that was never formally asked nor would it have been given in view of the relations of the United States with other parties including Greece and the domestic lobbies in the United States.

Concluding Remarks

It was stated at the beginning of this article that resisting a hegemon in a unipolar environment was a special case within the broader context of how weaker states try to influence, control, subvert and manipulate the policies of a stronger state. The preceding discussion has attempted, by looking at four events in Turkish-American relations, three of them during the bipolar period and the fourth during the period of unipolarity, to demonstrate that several modalities and a multiplicity of actions may be pursued by weaker states to achieve their aims. It is the case that not all modalities and actions are available to an actor at

all times and some are suitable for use in some cases while some are more appropriate in others. Nevertheless, together they illustrate that the weak are not totally defenseless in affecting changes in the policies of the strong.

¹ This classification of structures in the international system was offered by Robert Gilpin in his *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 29.

² There are many accounts of this relationship both in Turkish and English. See for example, Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964* (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler, 1979); George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972); Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987).

³ There are many accounts of the history of the founding of Cyprus. I have relied on Melek M. Fırat, *1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), Ch. 3. For a summary in English. See Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, ch. 5. Henry Kissinger devotes considerable space to the history of the Cyprus conflict in his *Years of Renewal* (New York: Touchstone Books, 2000), Ch. 7 entitled "Cyprus: A Study in Ethnic Conflict," pp. 192-239. Finally, an excellent summary of Cypriot history and the Cyprus problem until the 1974 Crisis can be found in Süha Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988).

⁴ This account relies mainly on Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995), pp. 7-28; and Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964*, pp. 225-241.

⁵ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, p. 14. George Lenczowski has a very good summary of the period in his *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 92-104.

⁶ The most comprehensive study of the Johnson letter has been conducted by Haluk Şahin. See *Johnson Mektubu* (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002). The full English language text of the Johnson letter and Prime Minister İnönü's response is available in *Middle East Journal*, 20:3 (Summer 1996), pp. 386-393.

⁷ This thesis is advanced convincingly by two authors. Cf. Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29:3 (July 1993) and Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu.*, pp. 102-103. The same interpretation is shared by George Harris in his *Troubled Alliance*, p. 114

⁸ Nasuh Uslu makes this argument in "Türk Tarafı Açısından Kıbrıs Sorununun Boyutları" in *Liberal Düşünce*, 4:13 (Winter 1999), p. 125.

⁹ The following account has relied mainly on three sources: Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1996); George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 191-198 and Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, pp. 57-67

¹⁰ Erhan, *ibid.*, p. 86

¹¹ Harris, *ibid.*, p. 192.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 193

¹³ The economic threat was made by Attorney General John Mitchell at a Congressional hearing. After widespread protests by various groups and institutions in the

Turkish body politic, Turkey was given assurances that such a measure was not being entertained. See Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savas*, p. 107.

¹⁴ Erhan, *Beyaz Savas*, p. 114.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 137

¹⁷ Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁸ Erhan, *Beyaz Savas*, pp. 150-151.

¹⁹ In 1967, Turkey had threatened another military intervention whereupon with the intermediation of Cyrus Vance, Greece had agreed to withdraw the forces that it had placed on the island contrary to the international agreements regarding the establishment of the republic of Cyprus. See Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), pp. 206-218. Also Süha Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 138-143.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 243-253

²¹ The summary of events come mainly from Süha Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American ...*, pp. 188-192.

²² Ibid., pp. 193-195.

²³ Ibid., p. 193. Mr Kissinger gives an account of what happened and his own analysis of the situation in his *Years of Renewal*, pp. 192-239. The chapter is entitled "Cyprus: A Case Study in Ethnic Conflict."

²⁴ Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, p. 281.

²⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American ...*, pp. 200-201

²⁶ Ibid., p.205.

²⁷ Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, pp. 299-301

²⁸ Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, pp. 99-102.

²⁹ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American..*, p. 212

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 96-97. also see Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, p. 318.

³¹ These developments occurred during the administration of President Ford. They are summarized among others, in George Lenczowski, *American Presidents . . .*, pp. 142-147.

³² Firat, *Aras Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 203-207;

³³ Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, p. 112.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

³⁵ Paul B. Henze, "Out of Kilter- Greeks, Turks and U.S. Policy," *National Interest* (Summer 1987), p. 78.

³⁶ Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, pp 321-323 and Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, pp. 113-115.

³⁷ Some have speculated that the U.S. administration might not have been averse to having a Turkish presence on the island because it would deny to Makarios who was seen as being close to Soviet Union. A similar argument could be made that the U.S. would have supported the Sampson coup since it would bring the alliance eventually within the fold of the alliance. There is no evidence to support this type of speculation.

³⁸ The 1991 Gulf War and the problems emanating from it has been treated in detail in Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kışkırcısında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Liberte, 2000)

³⁹ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), pp. 16-17.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 43-44.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴² Ibid. pp. 66-67.

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- ⁴³ Ibid., pp. 74-75.
⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 85-87.
⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 99-102
⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 117.
⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 127-128.
⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 133-145.
⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 162-170.