

International Public Opinion: Incentives and Options to Comply and Challenge¹

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The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh is dedicated to producing original and impartial analysis that informs policymakers who must confront diverse challenges to international and human security. Center programs address a range of security concerns—from the spread of terrorism and technologies of mass destruction to genocide, failed states, and the abuse of human rights in repressive regimes.

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I. OVERVIEW

International public opinion provides a context more or less conducive to foreign challenges to U.S. government policy preferences in general and in particular ways, on particular issues, and at particular times.² Secondary analysis of polls in recent years can illuminate the conduciveness of public opinion in various parts of the world to foreigners mounting attempts to modify, evade, delay or even resist what Washington would like to do and have them do. International public opinion as used here refers to the views expressed by samples of general publics outside and inside the U.S. It then includes for the political elites in a polled country their domestic public opinion.

As we shall see, public opinion outside the U.S. has in general been evolving in a direction which makes quick, blanket cooperation with U.S. official preferences less likely. The burden of proof of the merits of compliant cooperation increasingly falls on its advocates elsewhere and on the U.S. administration. That, however, does not amount in general to predominant demands by international publics for direct confrontation with the U.S., withdrawal from engagement with it, or commitment to alternative alignments and counter-balancing policy efforts. The sorts of challenges likely to result are more by way of attempts to stand aside from, delay, divert, or modify U.S. government preferences than attempts at direct resistance to and formal separation from the U.S.

The following section develops the case for examining international public opinion as part of the efforts to understand and anticipate challenges to American hegemony and the likelihood and consequences of U.S. responses. The subsequent section summarizes some conservative rules of interpretation to be used in drawing inferences from poll responses to pertinent public opinion. The paper then turns to

responses in public opinion polls conducted in recent years, especially after 9/11.³ Because of data access limitation, national publics are the unit of analysis, and all observations are of those aggregates.⁴ The analysis is further limited to those publics and queries canvassed in polls of high technical quality for which results were readily available. Information on the polls used appears in Appendix.

II. HOW MAY INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION MATTER?

Before turning to poll results, we need to consider the ways in which reports of public opinion may affect courses of action pursued by governments. An extreme view is that of control of policy choices. That view has political elites acting as if they are always expecting a referendum on what they have done vis-à-vis U.S. preferences and, like weathervanes, altering their positions to fit with what they think to be majority views among a public equivalent to a selectorate. The position taken here is less extreme.

International public opinion matters less as an automatic control mechanism on foreign elites and more for them as: 1) an indicator of likely domestic political risks and rewards from one or another stance toward a U.S. policy preference; 2) a clue to how other non-U.S. elites are likely to behave toward the U.S. policy preference and the chances for support or challenge coalitions; 3) a sign of the degree of domestic support in the U.S. for sustaining or modifying the official American policy preference in question, and thus of the chances for coalitions with some participants in American policy formation rather than wholesale U.S. condemnation and retaliatory actions; 4) an instrument useful for bargaining with Washington to extract side-payments for support; and 5) a credible excuse to use with Washington to gain acceptance, even if grudging, of non-support.

For U.S. elites, international public opinion merits consideration in calculations of the likely benefits and costs of particular U.S. policy preferences and American requests, demands, or expectations that foreigners support those preferences. It can provide: 1) an indicator of the domestic incentives foreign leaders have to comply or challenge; 2) a clue to the ‘pyrrhic victory’ possibility that supportive foreign leaders will be replaced by less compliant ones; 3) an aid to forecasting the extent to which policies requiring foreign contributions and compliances will get them in a timely way and in adequate volume and duration; 4) a pointer to how large or small U.S. side-payments on other issues will need to be to secure cooperative compliance on the issue at hand; 5) legitimating ammunition which U.S. proponents of a policy can use (positive public opinion in valued foreign countries, hostile opinion in negatively valued countries) as can U.S. opponents of that policy (negative public opinion in valued foreign countries, positive opinion in negatively valued countries).

In sum, international public opinion can function as a constraint on and as a resource for U.S. and foreign elites to engage in joint action, protracted policy preference modification attempts, or even direct, confrontational opposition. That is because of a widespread recognition that, more often than not, the extent to which others support or challenge U.S. policy preferences and how the U.S. responds depend on both domestic level and international level bargaining (Putnam, 1988). What obviously varies widely from place to place, time to time, and issue to issue is the extent to which those intertwined bargains are easily struck by policy elites be they in the U.S. or elsewhere.

Ease is particularly likely if the issue has low salience for the pertinent national publics, receives little media attention, and involves little change from past policy actions

rather than a “bold departure.” Further, ease is greater when the respective national policy elites have a firm and confident grip on power at home and thus are relatively free to step outside the “zone of permissiveness” that the opinions of their public suggest. Markers of such a situation include the absence of competitive opposition with a clearly distinct stance on dealings with the U.S., substantial time before a ‘mandate renewal’ occasion (e.g., a national election), and a high degree of public approval of incumbent policy performance on matters other than the U.S. related issue under consideration.

While such situations undoubtedly continue to occur, one or more of those conducive conditions often are missing in key foreign polities for issues on which the current U.S. administration (Bush II) has most clearly asserted international policy preferences. Nor are they reliably guaranteed in the U.S. itself. The early 21st century may then be a period in which international public opinion especially affects the prospects for convergence and divergence, leadership and follower-ship between the U.S. and others in the world. That prospect is, if anything, more likely to the extent that the U.S. even more energetically asserts its international predominance and autonomy, and succeeds in exporting American style forms of democracy and market capitalism.

For foreign elites, the impacts on their societies of U.S. actions of commission and omission argue for a high level of attention to pressures in the U.S. public for maintaining or altering official policies. For U.S. elites, it is a matter of prudence and due diligence to be informed about public opinion elsewhere and at home. Efficient hegemony benefits from international public opinion which provide the great positive “force and wealth multiplier” of perceived legitimacy. Wise policy choice involves a realistic appraisal of the likelihood that foreign mass populations will see American

actions as being in their interest and respond accordingly. It also involves estimating the likelihood that the American public at least does not oppose major lines of policy.

Unwarrantedly optimistic estimates on those matters by U.S. policy elites open the door to miscalculations about the costs (underestimation) and benefits (overestimation) entailed by particular U.S. policy emphases. Even if Washington recognizes a general “hearts and minds” deficit abroad, the effectiveness of any steps to reduce it will be no greater than awareness of prevailing foreign attitudes and foresight about likely foreign interpretations of any U.S. moves intended to change them.

III. TREATMENT OF POLL RESPONSES

The content of public opinion as reported in the following sections follows from a number of decisions about how to treat poll responses. Those decisions involve some loss of information in favor of highlighting patterns of *prima facie* political relevance.

First, questions are grouped or bundled together in terms of shared substantive relevance to cooperation with or challenge to U.S. preferences. The bundles follow from a substantive judgment (and an arguable one) of shared relevance rather than a statistically established relationship between question responses. We recognize that public opinion has many facets so that the “faces of an issue” can vary. The bundles try to encompass them.

Second, multiple queries provide a stronger basis for interpretation than answers to a single question. Accordingly, the response summaries report the number of pertinent queries (usually in parentheses).

Third, distributions of responses are treated in terms of crude scores on a seven point scale rather than actual percentages. The scores run from +3 to -3 where the

extremes indicate massively predominant opinions and a zero (0) a split public on the matter in question. Scores are assigned according to the rules in Table 1.

SEE TABLE 1

Several kinds of reasons lead to using those conventions. One involves the well known problems of margins of error, and opinion sensitivity to variations in question and response wording, different interview situations, and question order within surveys. All of those problems are compounded when dealing with otherwise especially attractive surveys for our purposes which ask questions in many different cultures and in many different languages. Small percentage differences are then not a firm basis for inferences even if they exceed a poll's margin of error.

Another is to make comparable response data reported in a variety of forms. The database usable for secondary analysis is expanded by being able to make use of questions for which we have both positive and negative responses which yield net percentages, thermometer judgments, only positive percentages, or choices of points on multipoint scales.

Of at least equal importance, the use of crude scores helps convey the political significance of distributions of public opinion. The categories used are ones which on their face seem to have significantly different implications for political elites in terms of public reactions and the latitude public opinion provides to them.

Finally, inferences can differ between the responses to a single item and ones which place those in relation to other policy possibilities. Accordingly, when data availability permit, rankings of the single item relative to others are reported in brackets

along with its score. That throws some light on relative priorities. When rankings are reported, the highest ranking is indicated by a “1.”

III. PATTERNS OF OPINIONS

The sets of opinions to which we now turn each bear on the possibility and nature of challenges to the U.S.⁵ While data about U.S. public opinion appears in many of the sets, discussion of it will be deferred until the section on the receptivity of American public opinion to foreign views.

The two initial sets focus on issues of special emphasis in U.S. international policy in recent years – terrorism and the Iraq venture. They suggest degrees of support for challenges to the U.S. on specific policies related to those matters. Of course, challenge possibilities are far broader in the scope of issues they may involve. That leads to the third set – broader appraisals of the U.S. in international affairs. That set can throw light on the extent to which specific U.S. policies preferences are viewed in a context of more positive or negative general beliefs about Washington. If the former, the burden of argument for non-cooperation falls on those who would oppose, or at least not comply with, U.S. preferences. If, on the other hand, negative views prevail, the burden of argument with the pertinent publics falls on those who would comply with U.S. preferences. Of particular importance is the extent to which responses on terrorism, Iraq, and the U.S. more generally show a common prevailing pattern of opinion about the U.S. and its policy preferences. If they do not, it would be unwarranted to generalize the likelihood of challenges on other issues from any of the three sets in isolation.

Yet the extent to which even negative prevailing opinion across those three sets suggests public support for challenges also would seem to depend on the degree of

positive consensus within and across pertinent publics about alternatives to U.S. leadership and centrality. Absent attractive alternatives, challenges to the U.S. are likely to range only from the rhetorical to passive withholding of cooperation. Different possibilities which will be explored center on: structural power and specifically military power in the international system; the EU; international governmental organizations (IGOs); and particular nations and leading personalities as alternative foci for coalitions to challenge official U.S. policies of commission and omission.

Finally, political elites at home and abroad, as well as attentive publics, may consider the opinions of the American public as they imply demand for changes in U.S. policies and support for accommodation to foreign government and public views. Those opinions provide one set of indications of the permanence of current U.S. policies, the risks in withholding cooperation or posing direct challenges, and the chances for coalitions with participants in U.S. politics and policy formation. To the extent that U.S. public opinion differs from that elsewhere and rejects accommodation to it, direct challenges seem both more warranted and more risky in terms of a punitive U.S. response. Suppose, in contrast, U.S. public opinion resembles that elsewhere and favors accommodation to others (serious multilateralism). That argues for the sufficiency and safety of posing moderate challenges of abstention, delay, diversion and coalition building with Americans opposed to a particular policy or general stance of the U.S. government.

A. Two Salient Issues

The Bush II administration has attached great importance to waging a “war on terrorism” and to the invasion, occupation, and still far from finished transformation of

Iraq. What has been international public opinion on those matters, and what implications does it suggest for support for cooperation with or challenges to U.S. policies?

Terrorism

With regard to terrorism, this section considers: recognition of it as a threat and a problem; assessments of the U.S. role in combating it; and support for particular types of counter-terrorist responses. Table 2 reports scores and the number of queries on which they are based.

SEE TABLE 2

Threat and problem recognition scores about terrorism in the first column average opinions on: U.S. concern being warranted; it posing an important threat in general and in the public's own country; it being one of two most important issues for their country; fears and worries of citizens about it; and whether it should be a priority for the EU (asked of Europeans) and for U.S. foreign policy (asked of Americans). Responses to each aspect are given equal weight in arriving at the average score.

Few publics tend to reject a threat from international terrorism as being of considerable importance and priority. Yet, with reference to the scoring conventions in Table 1, most publics do not massively or even predominantly hold that view except among the EU accession countries (EUACs). Those that do are often publics whose countries are of regional and even global importance (e.g., the UK, Italy, Spain, Argentina, Mexico, Russia, and India). Terrorism tends to be denied high threat standing by most African publics. They are joined by several in the Middle East, China, and South Korea. The scores decline when terrorism is placed in competition with economic and social welfare problems. In that context, priority rankings are mostly in the middle or

lower end of the posed set of alternatives.⁶ The high priority ranking exceptions are the UK, Italy, Spain, and several Asian small country publics. In sum, there is widespread, if not universal support for treating terrorism as an important problem, but only pockets of support for treating it as a top priority problem.

As for assessments of the U.S. in combating terrorism, the scores in the second column average responses to questions about the U.S. role, the U.S. not being a cause of terrorism; American sincerity in opposing terrorism; favor for a U.S. led counter-terrorist policy; and the effectiveness of U.S. counter-terrorist practices. Opinions are for the most part not prevailingly negative, and indeed are often strongly positive. That is the case for most publics in the EUACs, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The major negative exceptions are in states with predominantly Islamic populations. With that exception, the data suggests support for cooperation with the U.S. in combating terrorism, albeit with only at best thin margins, in much of Western Europe. The enthusiasm for a U.S. led policy has, however, declined with the passage of time since 2002 in the frequently polled West European publics (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), Poland, and India.

The last three columns of Table 2 report scores on different forms actions against terrorism might take: military action with the U.S.; security support (base use and intelligence sharing); and civil role contributions to development. EU-15 publics, for the most part massively or predominantly agreed with security support and civil role contributions. This is also true for participation in military action for many, but not all EU-15 publics but to a lesser extent. Those scores were, however, from polling shortly after 9/11, before the erosion of support for a U.S. led counter-terrorist policy mentioned

earlier. Even later in 2001, massive or predominant opposition to military participation occurred in most of the few publics polled in other regions (with India as a notable exception).

Further insight about public opinion in a number of European countries (and the U.S.) can be gained from a 2003 battery of questions about measures against “another country harboring dangerous international terrorists.” The measures were economic sanctions and use of force if proposed by the U.S., the EU, or both. The national publics polled (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, and the U.S.) all supported economic sanctions, often massively, regardless of the sponsor and equally massively regardless of the sponsor opposed use of force.

In sum, the prospects of public support for cooperation with the U.S. short of military action have been high, other than in Islamic countries. As 9/11 recedes into the past, however, the prospects of public support for joint military action have eroded substantially among initially positively disposed West Europeans.

Iraq

The Iraq venture was initially presented by the U.S. government as a way of dealing with the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in their various chemical, biological, and nuclear forms. Our discussion then begins with WMD as a general problem and threat, and proceeds to consider Iraq as a threat, assessments of the U.S. invasion and occupation, and participation in the reconstruction of Iraq by the UN, EU and U.S. Results appear in Table 3 with ranks in brackets.⁷

SEE TABLE 3

The first column reports opinions on the spread of WMD as a problem and threat. The entries present average scores and average ranks for it as: a general threat and a specific one (Iran and North Korea); a focus for citizens' fears; a foreign policy priority; and one of the two most pressing world dangers. Publics with large majorities recognizing WMD spread as a threat and problem and according it a high ranking seem most likely to support treating it as a policy priority; those doing the opposite tend to deny that priority. Publics with either a high score or rank seem likely to agree with attention to it as a problem, but not as the cardinal problem overriding attention to and performance on other issues.

The intermediate position seems prevalent among EU-15, EUAC, African publics, and some in Latin America and the Middle East. Publics emphasizing the problem are few but are from important countries in international affairs (Brazil, Mexico, Japan). Internationally prominent country publics deemphasizing WMD proliferation as a threat and problem most notably include: Canada, Russia, China, and India. The possibilities of international public support for addressing the WMD proliferation problem are far from uniform with some major dissenters, but positive in Europe unless it becomes treated as the most pressing threat and problem.

That leaves open views of Iraq, in particular, and the motives for harsh treatment of the Saddam regime by the U.S. Polling in 2002 (prior to the U.S. invasion and occupation) on those matters elicited the views of the British, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Russian, and Turkish publics as well as those of Americans. With the exception of Turkey (a split public), the national publics had large (usually very large) majorities stating that Iraq was developing WMD, posed a substantial danger, and the

removal of Saddam was necessary. At the same time, however, none of the non-U.S. publics prevailing viewed Saddam's regime as a great danger to Middle East stability or thought that the U.S. was primarily motivated by perceptions of it as a threat.

The U.S. proceeded, of course, to invasion and occupation. Assessments of that choice appear in the second column of Table 3, and support for military participation in it in the third column. The average assessment scores pool evaluations of: the justification and worth of the war in general; its impact on terrorism and world safety; its impact on the international system (perceived U.S. power and trustworthiness, American alliances, and the UN); and its consequences for the Middle East and the Iraqi people. Those assessments, with few exceptions, were negative and often predominantly or massively so in all regions of the world. The few positive exceptions were, for the most part, publics of entities which are in effect security dependents of the U.S. (Albania, Kosovo, Israel, Kuwait). Even the publics of major participating allies (e.g., the UK, Italy, Australia, the Netherlands) have been split rather than prevailing supportive. In that light, it is hardly surprising that publics were highly negative on military participation as shown in the fifth column.⁸ Further, assessments have tended to become more negative and support for military participation less in more recent years.

As the Iraq venture proceeded, the relevant forms of cooperation sought by the U.S. shifted to transformation. Contributions sought were financing (the fourth column), and taking major responsibilities for reconstruction, the transition to sovereignty and security provision (average scores in the fifth column). For the polled EU-15 publics, each column reports support for such cooperation from the EU or the UN, and views on what the U.S. should do. On financing, most publics would send the bills to the U.S. Only

a few, usually of the militarily participating allies, prevailing support European or UN payments. On management, the UN is clearly favored and such responsibilities for the U.S. or the EU rejected. That emphasis is compatible with the final column where no polled publics tend to oppose and most favor an important role for the UN.

In sum, international public opinion has been for the most part prevailing negative on cooperation with U.S. policy preferences on Iraq, and thus provided a political incentive to many foreign elites either to divorce themselves from those preferences or extract a high price for cooperating with them. That negativism does not seem, however, to stem primarily from indifference to WMD as a threat or problem on which foreign governments might cooperate with the U.S.

B. Views of the U.S.

International public opinion is primarily opposed to U.S. policy preferences for Iraq, but mixed on attention to the WMD problem. Though primarily supportive of counter-terrorism, it provides no clear indication of what may be expected in terms of support for cooperation or challenge on a wide range of other policy matters. Insight on that may be gained from opinion patterns of a more general nature. This section presents those patterns in three stages. The first and most general deals with broad views of the U.S. The second considers evaluations of U.S. foreign policy in general and with particular respect to world peace, environmental quality, and economic matters. The third focuses on Bush II foreign and security policies and the extent to which they are viewed as limited to that Administration or more deeply rooted in American society and culture.

Broad Views of the U.S.

General views provide a starting point and appear in Table 4. The first three columns present average scores on general favorability judgments of the U.S. in 1994, 1999, and post-9/11 so that shifts are readily apparent. The fourth column reports average scores on the U.S. as a role model pooling views on perceived U.S. political and business practices and ideas, customs, and values. The next two columns report, respectively, views on whether the U.S. has it correct in terms of its international activism or does too much or too little. The last column reports on support for the U.S. playing the world role of a “strong leader.”

SEE TABLE 4

General favorability opinions suggest the extent to which the U.S. starts with the “benefit of the doubt,” a general sort of halo which covers a wide range of specific policies for which compliant acceptance or cooperation may be sought by Washington. The results suggest in most publics the prevalence of substantially positive views in 1994 which were still in place in 1999-2000. That positive halo, with the exception of most African and EUAC publics, has largely eroded since 9/11. Even most of the still positively disposed publics are to a lesser extent so than in earlier years. Major power allies in Europe and Asia are now split. Islamic publics are usually markedly negative. For the split publics, that argues for case specific consideration of U.S. policy preferences. For the negative ones, it suggests at least an initial disposition against cooperation. For the most part, scores fell with the invasion and occupation of Iraq and have either not moved upward since then or worsened.

Scores in the fourth column of Table 4 suggest that only a few publics see the U.S. as a role model for emulation (regionally, mostly in Africa). Massively or

predominantly negative opinions mark most EU15 and Middle Eastern publics. EUAC publics tend to be split. Asian publics vary widely with prevailing positive views in India and Vietnam, negative ones in China, and others split. Negative or split opinions have been held by most publics of countries generally in a position to provide substantial cooperation with U.S. policy preferences. Their policy elites may then anticipate domestic controversy or even widespread criticism if they seem to be actively cooperating with American governmental and non-governmental attempts to export political and business practices, ideas, and values.

Turning to the fifth and sixth columns, opinions about U.S. international activism show some of the diversity of international public opinion. In column 5, we see that in most publics only minorities (often small ones) think that the degree of activism is as they would wish. Almost none are prevailing positive on that aspect of the U.S. in the world, and only a few even split. Widespread dissatisfaction does not amount, however, to agreement across international publics about whether the U.S. was doing too much or too little, and surely does not suggest a dominant view of excessive U.S. international activism, except among Asians. Support for challenges may then well be for the U.S. to be more active internationally. That is compatible, for the few publics polled, with support for the U.S. playing a strong leader role (the final column). Scores for the U.S. doing that are usually more positive than the most recent period of favorability and role model judgments.

In sum, the first stage of our exploration of broad attitudes toward the U.S. shows substantial declines in favorability and little enthusiasm for the American political, economic, and cultural model. That is compatible with only minority, and often small

minority, views of the U.S. being appropriately active internationally. Yet, there is more expressed desire for the U.S. to increase its international activity and provide leadership than for their opposites.

U.S. International Impact

The views just summarized are responses to questions not explicitly focused on the foreign policies of the American government. Opinions on those are summarized in Table 5. In that table, the first column presents average scores pooling judgments about the general impact of what the U.S. does (effects on the respondents' country, U.S. consideration for its interests, and American influence on the world and on the respondents' country).⁹ U.S. impacts on different aspects of international well-being are treated more specifically in the following three columns. Those present average scores on contributions to: world peace pooling questions on that and on excessive propensity to use force; environmental quality; and international economic well-being pooling queries about world economic growth, reduction of world poverty and inequality, U.S. influence in globalization and trust of it with respect to globalization, and the absence of an economic threat from America. The final column of Table 5 focuses on views among the few publics polled on the imperative of good relations with the U.S. and pools scores on their importance, and continuation of the U.S.' superpower and largest economic power standing.

SEE TABLE 5

The foreign policy encompassing evaluations in the first column, with the exception of most African publics, are rarely better than thinly positive. Exceptions elsewhere usually are for the publics of small countries in difficult regional or internal

circumstances (for example, Colombia, Venezuela, Georgia, Israel, Kuwait, the Phillipines, and Taiwan). In much of the world, publics view the impact of U.S. policies as adverse and inattentive to their interests and to those of the larger world.

The frequently thin appraisal majorities do suggest, however, near evenly split public opinion predispositions in many countries. That may well have three implications. First, their political elites do not have a strong incentive to pursue clear policies of pure cooperation or opposition. Second, the balance is sufficiently even for the specifics of the issue and case under consideration to matter a great deal. Third, the close balance suggests that cooperation or challenge may seem a viable option to political elites in an otherwise strong position, and those weak on other grounds may find themselves in a quandary.

Results in the second column suggest prevailing negativism for the most part with regard to world peace and use of force. As for environmental quality, the polled EU-15 publics are massively or predominantly negative with few exceptions, while those of most of the EUACs tend to be positive. Proceeding to contributions to the world economy, a similar contrast prevails in the evaluations voiced by publics in “old” and “new” Europe. Negative judgments are held for the most part by publics in other regions. For those others, the scores are heavily shaped by highly negative judgments on the role the U.S. plays with regard to alleviating poverty and that view is shared by most publics in “old” and “new” Europe.

In sum, the first five columns suggest substantial negativism in most of the world about the impact of the U.S. on the world, albeit to a lesser extent in the EUACs and Africa, although it is not clear whether negative impacts are attributed to deliberate intent

or only neglect. Those views suggest at least prevailing skepticism about the self interest and collective interest gains which might result from supporting U.S. government policy preferences. Before assuming that such views generate demands to directly challenge those preferences, the results in the last column need to be considered. After all, challenges no matter how warranted need to take into account U.S. reactions. The perceptions of the importance of good relations with a continuing American superpower may counterbalance the other opinions in Tables 4 and 5. That can work to mute challenges, or at least confrontational ones, especially if foreign elites and publics have a basis for hope that the U.S. will eventually behave with more consideration. Convictions that the U.S. is unswervingly committed to damaging policies may encourage support for other governments to build capacity quietly for direct challenges in the future, as may uncertainty about future U.S. proclivities. Mounting extreme challenges now in ways that might push American costs above the tolerance levels attributed to Washington would seem to involve great risks for very uncertain benefits.

Bush II or America?

What hopes of improvement in U.S. policies may be present in foreign publics in the recent context of the Bush II administration? In Table 6, the first column reports approval of his foreign policies and the second of their impact and his reelection on judgments about the U.S. The third column deals with whether the negative opinions of the various publics, are in their view, a function of the possibly temporary preferences of a particular Administration or have a firm and likely to be sustained basis in less short-lived American characteristics. The final column reports on concern with U.S. unilateralism in its own right and ranking relative to other polled threats.¹⁰

SEE TABLE 6

Evaluations of Bush II foreign policies are negative in most publics and a worsening of opinions about the U.S. is attributed to them and his reelection. That result fits with the decline in favorability judgments reported in Table 4. Yet most publics were more optimistic than pessimistic about the extent to which their disliked policies were not inherent in American society, most generally among the EU-15. Crudely put, for most publics their problems were with Bush II and not America. Further, for the few publics polled, the unilateralism associated with Bush II was indeed massively or predominantly viewed as a threat, but not an especially pressing one, in the context of other world problems. Support would then seem greatest for challenges which would not resonate badly and leave a lasting residue of resentment with Americans, or worsen possibilities for positive U.S. efforts even during the Bush II administration to deal with more immediately severe world problems. The interpretation of the U.S. as just going through a “bad patch,” held by foreign publics, may offer their political elites another reason to accommodate, at least somewhat, an America as superpower future. It also may recommend strategies of delay and evasion to buy time for policy shifts with a different U.S. administration, and efforts to pull the U.S. into multilateral fora and institutions.

The opinion sets discussed to this point suggest substantial demand for and receptivity to alternatives to reflexive followership of the U.S. At the same time, they suggest a continuing demand for and receptivity to American leadership in directions other than those international publics associate with the Bush II administration, and awareness of realist needs to get along with an American superpower. For international public opinion, what alternatives to the *status quo* might then seem attractive?

C. Alternatives to Current American Predominance

The dissatisfaction with the U.S. found in the previous section and with regard to Iraq surely is not conducive to cooperation. That does not mean it equates to support for more than rhetorical challenges, grumbling, delay, and evasion. Challenges with more assertive policy content, which might impose more constraints on the U.S., are more likely as international public opinion positively views major alternatives to U.S. world shaping and leading. The alternatives discussed in the following sections are those of: superpower bipolarity including a military peer power; the European Union; international governmental organizations (IGOs) and especially the United Nations; and rallying political personalities and national governments for “coalitions of the unwilling.”

Bipolarity

One alternative which might appeal given negative views of the U.S. war in Iraq, contribution to world peace and security, and unilateralism could be some form of bipolarity. Scores for opinions on that possibility appear in Table 7. In the first three columns, those are for the world being safer with another superpower, and for the EU and China in that role. Positive scores indicate support for alternatives to the status quo with more bipolarity. The remaining columns deal with what EU-15 and EUAC publics favor in terms of what sort of role the EU might play in influencing world affairs and vis-à-vis the U.S.

SEE TABLE 7

International publics differ in viewing world safety as benefiting from another superpower. While most Latin American and African publics were strongly negative on the consequences, none were in the EU-15. The most recent polling of EU-15 publics

(2005) had them strongly positive. Asians are divided with Chinese and Indians strongly positive and U.S. ally publics in Japan, the Philippines and South Korea opposed as were the Vietnamese. A similar variation characterizes conflict area publics and, with somewhat narrower margins, those in the EUACs. The division of opinion on the desirability of a new era of bipolarity leaves open the issue of who might be supported in the “peer” role and what behavior would be favored for a supported candidate. European and North American publics strongly oppose such a role for China, with support limited to some Islamic publics. A superpower role for the EU, however, receives strong support in Western Europe, Russia, and Turkey. Whether this amounts to support for the EU as a peer superpower can be gauged from the remaining columns. While the scores do suggest support for the EU exercising international leadership and pursuing more independent policies, they also indicate strong preferences for it emphasizing civil rather than military power. Most tellingly, supporters of the EU as a superpower strongly reject a role of balancer and competitor relative to one of cooperator with the U.S. (the penultimate column). In sum, the publics polled support neither China nor the EU as an equivalent pole of comprehensive power to the U.S. even if many are uneasy about American unipolarity.

The European Union

The complex views of European publics, and abundant policy salon discussions of allegedly very different basic policy inclinations in Europe (“Venus”) and the U.S. (“Mars”), warrant further exploration of EU-15 and EUAC public opinion as it may support challenging the U.S. Relevant average scores appear in Table 8. The first six columns report: support for the EU having a Common Foreign Policy and a Common

Defense and Security Policy (CDSP); what goals they should emphasize and what priority they should have; and evaluations of EU performance on foreign and security matters. Rankings appear in brackets. High positive scores on each of these aspects would suggest public support for the EU playing a challenger role or at least an independent one vis-à-vis the U.S. The last two columns on NATO and national military spending provide perspective on the limits of support for mounting challenges and taking independent action.

SEE TABLE 8

Support for a CFP, the first column, pools scores about that in general, a common position on international crises, an EU Foreign Minister, an EU seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), and joint EU-national member government foreign policy decision-making. Publics are massively or predominantly supportive with the exceptions of Finland, the UK, and Sweden none of which are negative. Support for a CDSP, the second column, pools scores about support for it, a rapid reaction force, and for joint EU-national member government defense and security policy decision-making. Compared to a CFP, support is markedly less though still widely prevalent for what amounts to military policy. Publics in Finland, the UK and Sweden are thinly negative, and those in Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and Spain only slightly positive.

The next three columns shed some light on preferred emphases for a CFP or a CDSP and the priorities publics accord to them and to foreign and defense matters more generally (the rankings are in brackets).¹¹ Asserting the importance of the EU in the world received varying degrees of support (only negative in Poland), but uniformly very low relative priority. Achieving peace and security in Europe, the fourth column, always

received massive support and relatively high priority. Political elites do have some incentives in many of the countries to pursue world influence for the EU, but not to expect any such accomplishments to outweigh public perceptions of shortcomings on the other posed issues. Achieving peace and security in Europe may well be far more attractive to them. The incentives for emphasizing it are cast in doubt by the findings in the fifth column. All of the publics massively deny foreign and defense policy cardinal importance for their country and, with the arguable exception of Spain, give only low relative priority. That hardly provides an incentive for EU political elites to spend much energy on foreign and defense matters instead of other issues. There is, as suggested by the evaluation column, reason to stay with the foreign and defense policy EU status quo which is viewed positively and as relative a success story for the EU. That interpretation gains additional support from the last two columns of Table 8. The few publics polled prevalingly expressed continuing support for NATO (pooling importance, trust, and support for strengthening), and lack of enthusiasm (except in Poland) for increased military spending.

At the same time, EU-15 and EUAC publics viewed the EU more positively than the U.S. on a host of international affairs issues and, in general, (for the few polled) saw the EU as more important for their country than the U.S. The first seven columns of Table 9 report the gap between the scores for the U.S. reported in earlier tables and those for the EU in response to similar questions. The maximum possible score is 6 (massively positive about the EU and massively negative about the U.S.).

SEE TABLE 9

EU-15 and EUAC publics have far more positive views of the European than the U.S. contribution to world peace, environmental quality, economic growth, poverty reduction, and role in globalization. That is also true for counter-terrorism among most of the EU-15, but not most of the EUAC publics.

Gaps favoring the EU are, however, less for world economic growth and counter-terrorism, and often for general favorability. Given the lack of prevailing favorability among EU-15 publics for the U.S., the relative favorability gap for the EU should not be confused with strongly positive majorities for it. In light of the favorable international policy opinions in Table 9, the less positive general favorability result suggests lack of public satisfaction with other aspects of EU performance. The rankings in Table 8 suggest those other aspects may be more important to European publics.

If European publics believe that the EU has better policies than the U.S., one might expect them to support efforts to bring U.S. policies closer to EU ones on many issues. Other findings introduced previously, and the general favorability scores in the penultimate column of Table 9, suggest unwillingness to invest heavily in such efforts or to severely strain relations with the U.S., or with the rest of Europe – let alone to mobilize substantial fractions of populations less than enthused about the EU in general.

Challenges there may well be, but probably more of a soft and muted than a directly confrontational and bold nature. Those challenges may well garner some support from non-European publics (the bottom rows in Table 9). In sum, European publics seem inclined to favor active attempts to persuade the U.S. to modify its policy preferences far more than pro-active counter-measures to Washington's preferred courses of action. That

may in part reflect, as shown in Table 6, the hope for eventual U.S. policy accommodation retained by most of the polled European publics.

International Governmental Organizations

We have seen little support for challenging the U.S., be it through China or the EU as balancer or competitor, especially in military matters. We have also seen, among some major publics, desires for some constraint on unwanted U.S. policy preferences and withholding followership in favor of exerting influence for modification. IGOs in general and the UN might provide a vehicle. If international issues are processed through IGOs in which the U.S. participates, other governments with policy preferences different from those of the U.S. have a better chance of delaying and diluting unwanted U.S. actions, diverting American resources to other issues, and perhaps even extracting side-payments for cooperation with the U.S. As will be discussed in a later section, IGO attention and resulting protracted discussion may even help build coalitions with American groupings opposed to the official U.S. government preference. Public opinion supportive of IGOs can make use of them as a venue for issue processing, politically attractive whatever its prospects of ultimate effectiveness in resisting or modifying U.S. policies. Use of IGOs may also appeal to governments which support U.S. preferences if it helps persuade otherwise opposed or skeptical home publics. Yet head on challenges mounted through IGOs run the risk of alienating the U.S. which often has the capacity to fracture or weaken the relevant IGOs.

Table 10 presents average scores on: general evaluations of IGOs (including the UN and some special purpose institutions); support for strengthening the UN in general and making its mandate necessary for the preemptive use of force; enlarging the Security

Council; strengthening major economic IGOs, and favoring their importance in globalization.

SEE TABLE 10

General evaluations were for the most part favorable, massively or predominantly so, among many publics around the world, especially in much of the global south. Negativism in Argentina and Brazil primarily resulted from views of economic IGOs. Negativism in the Middle East was especially pronounced on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All polled publics favored strengthening the UN, in general, and enlargement of the Security Council. There was less consensus between non-American publics on requiring a UN mandate for the preventive use of force with many split but only that of Israel strongly opposed, and many others in favor. Poll results not included in Table 10 further suggest the importance of a UN mandate for major EU member publics (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland). Mid-2002 questions considered military participation in a U.S. attack on an Iraq with WMD or aiding Bin Laden, participation with many or few Western casualties. A UN mandate substantially raised support in each of those publics under each set of conditions. International public opinion conducive to a broad coalition of participants in preventive attacks with the U.S. is far more likely with, than without, a UN mandate. Views of the economic IGOs (the last two columns of Table 10) usually favored strengthening (albeit by smaller majorities than for the UN) and an important role in globalization.

The inclination of most international publics to see IGOs in a positive way and to increase their capacities suggest their being seen as a welcome arena for efforts to modify or undermine U.S. policy preferences. Comparisons in Table 11 of general evaluations of

IGOs, relative to the U.S., support that view. They also suggest significant divisions between EU publics about the extent to which IGOs should or should not be a preferred option to the EU for such efforts. The scores are favorability gaps with six again being the maximum possible.

SEE TABLE 11

Publics providing general favorability judgments of IGOs and the U.S. for the most part favored the IGOs, with only Israel strongly favoring the U.S. A number, however, had essentially equal judgments which suggests case by case inclinations. In comparison with the EU, European publics were divided or split and even in a few cases noticeably more favorable to the EU. These results suggest receptivity in much of international public opinion to shifting issues away from bilateral dealings with the U.S. into IGO fora. They also suggest lack of European consensus for doing that on international economic matters rather than relying primarily on Brussels engaging Washington.

Rallying Leaders and Countries

The last kind of challenge features leadership from positively viewed political personalities and countries for joint action in what amount to coalitions of the unwilling. We reason that even negative evaluations of George W. Bush or the U.S. provide at most a tenuous basis for rallying challengers, absent positive evaluations of a would be rallying leader or nation.¹²

Several aspects of public opinion would seem conducive to a particular leader being well-positioned to rally challenge coalitions. Publics at home and in potential

coalition members should have positive views of his or her international policy inclinations. Those favorable publics should oppose the aspects of U.S. policy to be challenged, or even have generally negative views of the U.S. impact on the world. The leader in question should be perceived to have a firm and continuing, rather than a tenuous and soon to end hold on power at home. Available information appears in Table 12 on Putin, Chirac, Blair, Schroeder, and Annan.

SEE TABLE 12

Putin was mostly viewed negatively, and most of the polled publics were neutral or negative on Schroeder. Annan was positively viewed by polled advanced industrialized country publics, but not those of the global South. Positive views of Blair were held by majorities elsewhere in several European countries, Canada, Australia, Israel, Kuwait, and India, but were negative or split in other publics. Chirac had the most positive evaluations, although hardly universally so. Yet a number of those publics also had positive views of Blair. Public support for an EU wide coalition then seems unlikely absent a common rallying position by those two leaders. Also, weakening in the hold on office of Chirac, Schroeder, and Annan can only reduce their ability to rally challengers.

Favorable initial conditions for public opinion to support a central role for a particular country in a continuing international coalition challenging U.S. policies across issues and locales would seem to involve mutually positive views among the publics of the rallier and the rallied, and generally negative views of the U.S. Narrower and shorter lived issue and incident specific coalitions seem more likely if publics in potential member countries have, at worst, split rather than negative views of each other, and agree in rejecting some particular policy preference attributed to the U.S. Coalitions against

common enemies and pariahs (“my enemies’ enemy is sort of my friend”) seem more likely if publics of potentially cooperating countries share a highly negative view of the target country, are at least not as negative about each other, and the U.S. seems to cooperate and buttress the target regime. Table 13 presents favorability judgments made by some national publics about other countries bearing on possible national leadership for the several kinds of imaginable challenge coalitions.

SEE TABLE 13

In Part A, the entry in each cell before the diagonal is the favorability judgment of the column country’s public about the row country; the entry after the diagonal is that of the row country’s public about the column country. The contents of the cells throw some light on the presence of public opinion conducive to continuing broad, and to issue specific, challenge coalitions.¹³ The countries represented are ones with substantial regional and perhaps international economic and military capabilities.

In terms of public opinion, two European countries might rally a broad, general regional coalition -- France and the U.K. Either might rally Germany, Italy, and Poland and would be inclined to behave as those do. (Results not reported in the Table suggest that this is also true for the Netherlands and Portugal). Yet the U.K public is clearly not disposed to generally challenging the U.S., nor are those of Germany, Italy, Poland, or the Netherlands. An encompassing EU challenge coalition of a broad nature seems unlikely. While the Russian public might favor aligning with France and Germany to challenge the U.S., neither the French nor German publics are well disposed to more than an issue specific coalition with Russia. Turkey seems isolated in terms of mutual regard with Europeans.

In Asia, no pair of major country publics hold mutually favorable judgments. Split opinion in China and South Korea about each other could, however, open the way for issue specific coalitions, and especially ones against Japan.¹⁴ In any event, the Indian, Japanese, and South Korean publics are not well-disposed toward mounting broad challenges to the U.S. The entries are not encouraging for broad coalitions across European-Asian lines. Those might well be regarded with favor in China and India, but Europeans seem disposed toward, at most, issue specific coalitions. While Europeans might seek and respond to Japan as a more general coalition partner, available data does not demonstrate that such an inclination is reciprocated.

Are challenge coalitions against perceived enemies supported by the U.S. more likely? Part B of Table 13 pools available general favorability opinions and judgments about targets which might pose unifying threats to regional stability and world peace. The two coalitions across regions with widespread international public opinion support would probably be against Iran and North Korea. Those would fit rather than clash with current U.S. policies, at least so long as the U.S. refrains from use of force. A coalition against Syria in support of tough U.S. measures would be a hard sell. The coalition possibility with prevailing support most at odds with U.S. policy would be a European one against Israel, although possibly muted by coolness toward the Palestinian Authority. One against Pakistan might also have substantial public support in Asia, as might one against Saudi Arabia in Europe. Each would run counter to current U.S. policy preferences. It should be noted that, with the clear exception of Israel and possibly Kuwait, all Conflict Area publics seem inclined to oppose joining coalitions against those targets for which they were queried.

D. Receptivity of the U.S. Public

The extent to which American public opinion indicates prospects for domestic demand driven eventual U.S. government accommodation to foreign public opinion can be gauged in two ways. The first considers similarities and differences between the views of the U.S. public with those of other publics reported in many of the previous tables. The second involves U.S. public opinion about whether or not foreign views have important consequences for the U.S. and warrant adjustments in U.S. policy. International public opinion on specific issues, of course, needs less leverage if it favors modifications and challenges which match the policy views favored by the American public. That match seems conducive to trans-national coalitions which bring to bear on Washington domestic political incentives and not just foreign criticism.

Comparing U.S. with Foreign Public Opinion

Comparable scores for U.S. public opinion with opinion elsewhere appear in Tables 4-7, 9-11, and 13, and will be discussed in that order. The U.S. public is not an extreme outlier in the extent to which it views terrorism as a threat and problem, or in its appraisal of the U.S. role against it. That is also true with regard to support for civil counter measures against terrorism. The U.S. is an outlier in massive support for assertive military actions. That outlier status is also present in support for military action in Iraq (whether or not that has been thought to be an initially wise policy). American assessments of Iraq policy have been less negative than those made by many others, but over time have become negative. Also, the U.S. public differs from Europeans in rejecting the principal burden of funding reconstruction and ceding management of it to

the UN. As for WMD as a threat, Americans are more prone to give it highest priority than most others but that is in the context of agreement in much of the world that it is a threat.

Moving to more general opinions, Americans do have a more favorable view of the U.S. in recent years than most others. That same difference holds for their appraisal of how, in general, the U.S. impacts the world. They are divided on the U.S. contribution to world peace and security, while most others are negative. They differ from most other publics in having a positive, if only thinly so, assessment of the Bush II administration's foreign policies, but agree with most others that those have worsened world views of America. To this point, Americans seem to deny the justification for challenges without being euphoric about the merits of current policies. They see the U.S. as existing in a dangerous world, and widely support the use of force against perceived dangers while being significantly divided about the payoffs from doing that.

It is then not surprising that they reject the possibility of a new era of bipolarity increasing world safety, and do not support alternatives that might seriously constrain the U.S., especially on military matters. On bipolarity, they differ from major powers in Europe and Asia, but agree with publics of many countries around the world. They tend to agree with most others on the undesirability of China becoming a peer military power. For the EU, they agree with most Europeans in favoring a civil power role and one of transatlantic cooperation and collective action. They do, however, differ from most European publics in preferring that the EU not be more independent in its policy choices. Perhaps that means a preference for more help from the EU but not more say by the EU

in what help is provided for. That may be because, unlike most of the polled publics, Americans have a far more favorable opinion of the U.S. than of the EU.

With regard to IGOs, the American public also is an outlier in having only a split evaluation of the UN while most others are favorable, and in rejecting a norm of UN approval for the preemptive use of force. Americans do, however, prevailingly resemble others in favoring strengthening the UN and economic IGOs, and expanding the Security Council. A speculation similar to that for the EU may be warranted about IGOs – a desire for more help but without more constraint. Americans massively favor the U.S. absolutely and relative to IGOs as a center of international influence. At the same time, they clearly want more burden-bearing by others such as the EU, IGOs, and allies. Predominant preferences have been for shared efforts as contrasted with unilateral U.S. management of world problems, and for less playing of the role of world policeman (an average score of +2.1 on eight queries 2001-2004).

Finally, with regard to pariahs, with the exception of most Islamic publics, the U.S. public resembles others in negative views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. It differs in its view of the sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of Syria as a threat.

In sum, American public opinion differs from much of the world less on specific policies (with the exceptions of Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) than it does on potentially constraining structural changes in the international system, on how the U.S. affects others, and on use of force. When combined with the desire for more international policy support from others, the question becomes what the U.S. public thinks about accommodating the views of foreign governments and publics.

Support for U.S. Responsiveness and Adjustment

There is abundant evidence that the American public is aware of negative views held by much of the international public. In 2003-04 the American public correctly saw that the U.S. world image was worsening (an average score of +1.8 on four queries). Further, in a 2005 poll, the U.S. public stood out in having a predominant view that its country was more disliked than liked.¹⁵

It also is clear that prevailing views have supported the norm of U.S. foreign policy taking into account the interests of others (an average score of +1 on three questions in 2003-04). Substantial majorities thought it important for the U.S. to have a positive rather than negative image in the world (an average score of +1.7 on six questions asked in 2003-04).¹⁶ Further, in 2002 and 2004 questions about how much influence a variety of actors has and should have on U.S. foreign policy, scores were always above a degree of influence mid-point for what foreign governments and publics should have (+1). Those for foreign publics were greater than the current degree of influence attributed to them. Foreign governments and publics were more favored in terms of desired influence than U.S. interest groups (but not the president or Congress).

The possible dynamic of foreign dissent with U.S. government policy preferences increasing domestic demand for modification might favor accommodative American policy shifts if the U.S. and foreign publics share dissatisfactions. The previous section suggested that they often, but not always, have done that. Pressure at home for policy modification is more likely to the extent that a U.S. public receptive to foreign governmental and public opinion also wants Washington to respond to its voice. While the U.S. public was split on its actual influence, it has strongly favored having more say (+2 in both years) in absolute terms. Influence desired for the U.S. public ranked first in

2004 (greater than foreign governments, foreign peoples, U.S. interest groups, the U.S., and the Congress), and in 2002 ranked second only to the president.

There is then a somewhat encouraging basis for foreigners to believe that they will get support in the U.S. for policy accommodation, especially when presented in ways that are perceived to follow from pro-American intent or at least not anti-American or America-weakening motives. Foreign attempts to modify U.S. policies couched in “loyal opposition” terms are more likely to secure partners in the U.S. than are ones featuring harsh general condemnation of the U.S. and, especially, a face of violence against Americans. The “loyal opposition” perception is more likely when the U.S. public is already split or prevailingly negative on current U.S. lines of policy, as it often has been in recent years.

Another conducive condition for U.S. public receptivity is that the foreign publics and governments seeking modifications have been and are viewed positively by Americans, and ones with which good relations are thought to be important. Those sources are more credible as being a “loyal opposition” whose support can and should be retained or regained.¹⁷ Since more importance is attached by the American public to Europe than to Asia, and even less to other regions, receptivity will tend to be greater to European modification requests. As for individual nations, in the early years of the 21st century, as shown in Table 13A and by other data, massively or predominantly positive views have been held about the UK and Japan. Others are Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Mexico, Egypt, Israel, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Africa. India has joined the list in recent years. Germany, and even France, was positively viewed until the Iraq invasion at which time views become prevailingly negative. Polling

in 2005, however, returned them to positive standing. Previous sections have reported substantial disagreements with U.S. policy on many matters by many of those publics, or at least a marked erosion of support. Political elites in those countries seem especially well-positioned to pose challenges with relatively little concern for harsh U.S. retaliation, as shown by the rebound for France and Germany.¹⁸

There is, however, some evidence that argues against the previous assessment. The U.S. public was split on whether Bush II was sufficiently accommodating to foreign interests and preferences (an average score +.3 on twelve questions in 2001-05). It was also split in 2004 on whether improving relations with allies should or should not be a national priority for U.S. foreign policy. While it may be an exceptional issue, the public recognized that international opinion was predominantly negative on the U.S. invasion of Iraq (an average score of +2.2 on six questions in 2003-2004). Yet it did in that period support the Iraq policy and was only split on the need for allied support (an average score of +.3 on six questions 2002-2004). Other doubts about the prospects for foreign stimulation of sufficient domestic public pressure to modify U.S. policy are suggested by the predominant majority delinking their vote in the 2004 presidential election from their view of prevailing international public opinion.

Even the most optimistic interpretation would then raise doubts about the chances of foreign modification requests triggering a prompt public response and one reliably and quickly effective in changing well-advertised U.S. government policy preferences. There is, however, evidence that there will be some concern in the U.S. with negative standing in international public opinion on realist burden sharing, self-image, and affinity grounds. When their own public so wishes, foreign political elites may then see net benefits from

patient, not explicitly confrontational, modification attempts which keep issues and options alive on the world and U.S. policy agenda. In particular, rather inexpensive stratagems of debate, delay, diversion and refraining from active cooperation may be appealing as ways to buy time for developments at home and abroad to induce policy shifts in Washington.

Appendix: Public Opinion Sources

Samples are national ones unless specifically indicated.

Data are drawn from Bobrow and Boyer 2005 and from the following survey sources.

Americans & the World. 2002. Conflict with Iraq. http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/Conflict_Iraq/disarmInsp.cfm.

BBC World Service Poll. 2005. www.pipa.org/onlinereport/BBCworld. Polling November 2004-January 2005. Urban/major metropolitan samples in Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey.

BBC World Service. 2005. Twenty-three Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN and for Increased UN Power. www.pipa.org. Polling Nov. 2004-Jan. 2005. Urban/ metropolitan in Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey.

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Ibid., 2003. FLASH EUROBAROMETER: Iraq and Peace in the World. No.151. [www.europa.eu.int/comm/public opinion](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion). Polling Oct. 2003.

Ibid., 2001. FLASH EUROBAROMETER: Europeans and the International Crisis. No.114.www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch.htm. Polling Nov. 2001.

Gallup International. 2004. US Foreign Policy Effect: An Overall Negative Opinion Across the World. www.voice-of-people. Polling Dec. 2003.

Ibid., 2003. New Gallup International Post War Iraq Poll – Global Opinion from 45 Countries. www.gallupinternational.com. Polling April-May 2003.

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Table 1.

Scoring Conventions

Score:	Net %'s	Thermometer	Positive %'s	10 Point Scales
+3	Massively Supportive 50% or more	Mean 75 degrees or higher	75% or more	8 or higher
+2	Predominantly Supportive 25 to 49%	Mean 65 to 74 degrees	65 to 74 7%	6.5 to 7.9
+1	Supportive 10 to 24%	Mean 55 to 64 degrees	55 to 64%	5.5 to 6.4
0	Split 9% to - 9%	Mean 45 to 54 degrees	45 to 54%	4.5 to 5.4
-1	Rejecting -10 % to --24%	Mean 35 to 44 degrees	35 to 44%	3.5 to 4.4
-2	Predominantly Rejecting -25% to -49%	Mean 25 to 34 degrees	25 to 34%	2 to 3.4
-3	Massively Rejecting -50% or more	Mean 24 degrees or less	24% or less	2 or lower

Table 2. Terrorism

Country	Terrorism as a Threat, Problem (2002-2004)	U.S. and Terrorism (2002-2005)	Support for Military Participation (2001)	Support for Security Enabling (2001)	Support for Civil Role (2001)
WEST EUROPE					
AUSTRIA		-1 (2)	-3 (2)	-1 (2)	3 (2)
	-.3 (7)				
BELGIUM	.3 (7)	0 (2)	0	2.5 (2)	1.5
DENMARK	0 (7)	0 (2)	1.5 (2)	2.5 (2)	3 (2)
FINLAND	-.3 (7)	2 (2)	-3 (2)	-2 (2)	2 (2)
UK	1.4 (12)	.8 (10)	2.5 (2)	2.5 (2)	3 (2)
FRANCE	1.3 (12)	-.9 (10)	2 (2)	2.5 (2)	2.5 (2)
GERMANY	1.2 (12)	.1 (9)	1 (2)	2.5 (2)	1.5 (2)
ITALY	1.8 (11)	1.3 (7)	1 (2)	2.5 (2)	2.5 (2)
GREECE	.5 (7)	-3 (2)	-2.5 (2)	-2 (2)	2.5 (2)
IRELAND	.1 (7)	1 (2)	-2	.5 (2)	2.5 (2)
LUX	0 (7)	0 (2)	1.5 (2)	2.5 (2)	3 (2)
NETH.	.6 (9)	1.3 (4)	2 (2)	2 (2)	3 (2)
PORTUGAL	1 (9)	0 (2)	0 (2)	2 (2)	3 (2)
SPAIN	2.3 (7)	-.5 (4)	-.5 (2)	1.5 (2)	3 (2)
SWEDEN	-.1 (7)	2 (2)	-3	0 (2)	3 (2)
NORTH AMERICA					
CANADA	-3	1.3 (3)			
USA	1.2 (35)	2.2 (36)	3 (4)		2.5 (2)
LATIN AMERICA					
ARGENTINA	2	-2	-3		
BOLIVIA	1	2			
BRAZIL	1	0 (2)			
GUATEMALA	1	3			
HONDURAS	1	3			
MEXICO	2.5 (5)	1	-3		
PERU	2	3	-3		
VENEZUELA	1	3	-3		
EAST EUROPE					
BULGARIA	1.4 (7)	2.5 (3)	-2		
CYPRUS	2 (6)	-2 (2)			
CZECH	1.5 (7)	2.5 (3)	1		
ESTONIA	2 (6)	2 (2)			
HUNGARY	2.7 (6)	2 (2)			
LATVIA	2.3 (6)	1 (2)			
LITHUANIA	2.3 (6)	2 (2)			

MALTA	2.7 (6)	2 (2)		
POLAND	2 (9)	1.3 (7)		
ROMANIA	2.7 (6)	3 (2)		
RUSSIA	1.5 (2)	1 (5)		
SLOVAKIA	1.3 (7)	2 (3)		
SLOVENIA	2 (6)	0 (2)		
UKRAINE	-2	3	-3	
CONFLICT AREA				
EGYPT		-3		
ISRAEL		3		
JORDAN	-3 (2)	-2.5 (5)		
KUWAIT		1		
LEBANON		-1.7 (3)		
MOROCCO	-3	-2.3 (3)		
PAKISTAN	0 (2)	-2.7 (5)	-3	
PAL AUTH		-3		
TURKEY	.4 (8)	-2.3 (7)		
UZBEKISTAN	1 (2)	3		
ASIA				
AUSTRALIA		2		
BANGLADESH	3	-1		
CHINA	-2	2		
INDIA	2.5 (2)	2 (2)	2	
INDONESIA	0	-1.3 (3)		
JAPAN	.5 (2)	2		
MALAYSIA	2			
MYANMAR	-1			
NZ		1		
PHIL.	3	3		
ROK	-1.7 (3)	-2 (2)	-1	
SRI LANKA	1			
THAILAND	-2			
VIETNAM	-1.5 (2)	2		
AFRICA				
ANGOLA	0	2		
GHANA	-2	2		
IVORY COAST	1	3		
KENYA	-1	3		
MALI		1		
NIGERIA		3		
SENEGAL	-2	-2		
SO AFRICA	-1	1	-3	

TANZANIA	-2	1			
UGANDA	0	2			

Notes: Number of queries in parentheses. When absent, indicates one query.

Table 3. WMD and Iraq

Country	WMD Spread as Threat and Problem (2001-2004)	Assessments of Iraq War (2002-2005)	Support for Military Participation (2002-2005)	Who Pays? US/EU/UN (2003)	Who Manages? US/EU/ UN (2003-2004)	UN Role Important (2003)
WEST EUROPE						
AUSTRIA	1 [4] (2)	-2.5 (7)	-2	3/-2.5/-2	-3/ -3/ 1	
BELGIUM	1.5 [3] (2)	-3 (1)	-1	2/-1.3/-1	-3/-1.7/1	
DENMARK	1.5 [3.5] (2)	-.5 (7)	-1	1/1.5/0	-3/-3/1.3	
FINLAND	.5 [3.5] (2)	-2 (7)	0	2/-2.5/-2	-3/ -3/ 2	
UK	1.7 [2.3] (5)	.2 (27)	-.3 (4)	1/1/1	-3/-2.3/1.5	1
FRANCE	1.2 [4.3] (5)	-1.4 (28)	-2.5 (4)	1/-1/-1	-3/ -3/1	1
GERMANY	1.3 [3.5] (5)	-1.3 (26)	-2.5 (4)	3/-.8/1	-3/-1.6/1.3	0
ITALY	1.8 [3.3] (5)	.2 (8)	-1.3 (3)	0/.8/-1	-3/-3/0	0
GREECE	3 [5] (2)	-2.4 (7)	-2	1/-1.5// -2	0/-3/0	
ICELAND		-1.3 (6)				
IRELAND	2.5 [4] (2)	-1	2	1/-.8/-1	-3/-3/1.3	
LUX	2 [4] (2)	-3	-1	2/0/-2	-3/-3/.7	
NETH.	1.5 [3.8] (4)	-.8 (10)	1.5 (2)	0/.5/0	-3/-3/1	
PORTUGAL	3 [2.8] (4)	-.9 (8)	-1	1/-2.2/-2	-3/-3/0	
SPAIN	2 [4] (2)	-1.7 (18)	-2 (3)	1/-.3/-2	-3/-3/.5	1
SWEDEN	2 [3] (2)	-1	1	2/0/-1	-3/-3/2	
SWITZERLAND		-2.4				
NORTH AMERICA						
CANADA	-2 [4]	-.7 (15)	-3 (2)			0
USA	2 [1] (11)	-.5 (48)	1.6 (88)	-1/na/na	na/na/-1.3	0
LATIN AMERICA						
ARGENTINA	-1 [2]	-2.8 (6)	-3			
BOLIVIA	-1 [2]					
BRAZIL	1 [1]	-.2 (4)	-3			2
CHILE			-3			
COLOMBIA		-1.9 (6)				
ECUADOR		-1.8 (6)				
GUATEMALA	-1 [3]					
HONDURAS	-1 [3]					
MEXICO	1.5 [2] (2)	-3 (2)	-3			
PERU	0 [2]					
VENEZUELA	1 [1]					
URUGUAY		-2.9 (6)				
EAST EUROPE						
ALBANIA		1 (6)				
BULGARIA	.3 [3.5] (3)	-.8 (6)				
CYPRUS	1.5 [6] (2)					
CZECH	-.5 [4] (3)					

ESTONIA	2 [5] (2)	-1.5 (6)			
GEORGIA		-.9 (6)			
HUNGARY	1 [4.5] (2)				
KOSOVO		.9 (6)			
LATVIA	2 [3.5] (2)	-2.3 (6)			
LITHUANIA	3 [4] (2)	-.6 (6)			
MACEDONIA		-1.6 (6)			
MALTA	3 [4.5] (2)				
POLAND	1.3 [3.2] (5)	0 (11)	-2.3		
ROMANIA	2 [5.5] (2)				
RUSSIA	-1 [4]	-1.7 (24)	-3		2
SERBIA		-2 (5)			
SLOVAKIA	.8 [2.8] (3)				
SLOVENIA	2 [5] (2)				
UKRAINE	-1 [3]				
CONFLICT AREA					
ISRAEL		1.6 (6)			3
JORDAN	-2 [5]	-2 (14)	-3		3
KUWAIT		1 (4)			0
LEBANON	0 [2]	-1.2 (7)	-3		2
MOROCCO		-2 (12)	-3		1
PAKISTAN	0 [1]	-2.1 (22)	-2.7		2
PAL AUTH					3
TURKEY	1.5 [3] (3)	-1.8 (24)	-3		1
UZBEKISTAN	-1 [3]				
ASIA					
AUSTRALIA		.3 (8)	-1		1
BANGLADESH	-1 [1]				
CHINA	-2 [4]	-2	-2		
INDIA	-1 [3]	-1.6 (8)	-2.5		
INDONESIA	-3 [5]	-2.2 (4)	-3		1
JAPAN	2 [1]	-2.3 (8)	-1		
MALAYSIA		-1.9 (6)			
NZ		-.8 (6)			
PHIL.	0 [1]	.1 (6)	-1		
ROK	-.5 [2.5]	-2.4 (11)	-1		2
VIETNAM	-2 [3]	-2.6 (6)			
AFRICA					
ANGOLA	-1 [2]				
CAMEROON		-1.6 (6)			
GHANA	-1 [2]				
IVORY COAST	-1 [3]				
KENYA	-3 [3]	-1.5 (6)			

MALI	-1 [3]					
NIGERIA	-3 [4]	.2 (9)				
SENEGAL	0 [2]					
SO AFRICA	-1 [2]	-1.4 (6)		-2		
TANZANIA	-2 [2]					
UGANDA	0 [2]	-1.4 (6)				

NOTES: Ranks are in brackets. Numbers of queries are in parentheses. No entry equals one query except for the "Who Pays" and "Who Manages" columns. In "Who Pays," the European publics were asked once about the U.S., once about the UN, and twice about the EU, and the U.S. public was asked twice about the U.S. In "Who Manages," the UK, French, and German publics were asked four times about the US and the others three times, and they and other Europeans were asked three times about the UN and the EU. The U.S. public was asked twice about the UN.

Table 4. Broad Views of the U.S.

Country	Favorable 1994	Favorable 1999-2000	Favorable Post 9/11- 2005)	Role Model (2002- 2004)	Activism OK (2002)	Activism Too Much Less Too Little (2002)	Desired Strong Leader (2002- 2004)
WEST EUROPE							
UK	1	3	1 (8)	-.5 (9)	-2	-1	1.5 (2)
FRANCE	1	1	-.8 (8)	-2.3 (8)	-1	0	-.7 (3)
GERMANY	2	3	-.1 (7)	-1.2 (8)	0	-1	1 (2)
ITALY	3	3	.8 (5)	.1 (8)	-2	-2	1 (2)
NETH.			.8 (3)	-3			2 (2)
PORTUGAL			0	-3			
SPAIN	0		-1.5 (4)	-2 (4)			0
NORTH AMERICA							
CANADA			.5 (4)	-.6 (9)	-2	0	2
USA			3 (3)				3 (2)
LATIN AMERICA							
ARGENTINA	1	0	-2	-2 (3)	-3	-2	
BOLIVIA	2	2	1	-2 (3)	-3	-2	
BRAZIL	1	1	-1 (2)	-1.7 (5)	-2	0	
GUATEMALA	3	3	3	.7 (4)	-2	-2	
HONDURAS	3	3	3	1.3 (4)	-2	-1	
MEXICO	1	2	.3 (3)	-.5 (6)	-3	-2	3
PERU	2	2	2	.3 (3)	-2	-2	
VENEZUELA	1	2	3	1.3 (5)	-3	0	
EAST EUROPE							
BULGARIA	2	3	2	1.2 (5)	-2	0	
CZECH	3	3	2	.3 (5)	1	1	
POLAND	3	3	1.5 (6)	.7 (5)	-2	-1	1.5 (2)
ROMANIA		-1					
RUSSIA	2		-.2 (5)	0 (7)	-2	-1	0
SLOVAKIA	3	2	1	.3 (4)	1	1	
UKRAINE	3	2	3	.7 (3)	0	0	
CONFLICT AREA							
EGYPT			-3	-2 (2)	-3	-2	
ISRAEL			2 (2)	1.3 (4)			2
JORDAN	0		-3 (4)	-1.2 (7)	-2	0	
KUWAIT			1	.3 (3)			
LEBANON			-1.7 (3)	0 (6)			
MOROCCO			-2 (2)	-.3 (3)			
PAKISTAN		-3	-2.2 (4)	-2.3 (6)	-3	-2	
PAL AUTH			-3	-2.7 (3)			

TURKEY	-2	0	-2.4 (5)	-2.5 (6)	-3	-1	
UZBEKISTAN	2	1	3	1.3 (4)	-1	2	
ASIA							
AUSTRALIA			-.5 (2)	-1 (3)			3
BANGLADESH			0		-3	2	
CHINA			-1.5 (2)				
INDIA	1		1.7 (3)	0 (3)	-3	0	
INDONESIA		3	-.7 (3)	.2 (6)	-3	1	
JAPAN	1	3	-.4 (2)	.8 (5)	-2	2	2
MALAYSIA			-3				
PHIL.			3	2 (3)	0	1	
ROK	1	1	.3 (3)	.6 (8)	-2	1	2
VIETNAM			1.5 (2)	0 (3)	-3	2	
AFRICA							
ANGOLA			0	0 (3)	-3	0	
GHANA			3	2 (3)	-3	0	
IVORY COAST			3	2.7 (3)	0	0	
KENYA		3	3	1.7 (3)	-2	1	
MALI			3	-.3 (3)	-2	-1	
NIGERIA		0	2 (2)	2.7 (6)	-3	-1	
SENEGAL			1	0 (3)	0	-1	
SO AFRICA	3		2	1 (3)	-3	-1	
TANZANIA			0	0 (3)	-3	0	
UGANDA			2	2 (3)	-3	0	

Notes: Numbers of queries are in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 5.Appraisals of the U.S. World Impact

Country	General (2001- 2005)	On World Peace (2002-2004)	On Environmental Quality (2001-2003)	On the International Economy (2001-2003)	Greatest Power (2004)
WEST EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	-1.3 (5)	-2.5 (5)	-2.7 (3)	-1.8 (8)	
BELGIUM		-1.5 (4)	-2 (3)	-1.7 (8)	
DENMARK	-.6 (7)	0 (5)	-3 (3)	-.8 (8)	
FINLAND	-.1 (4)	-2.7 (5)	-2.3 (3)	-1.2 (8)	
UK	-.5 (17)	-.6 (6)	-2.2 (5)	-1 (11)	2
FRANCE	-2 (16)	-2.5 (6)	-3 (5)	-2.6 (11)	3
GERMANY	-1.6 (17)	-1.9 (6)	-2.8 (5)	-1.8 (11)	
ITALY	-.6 (10)	-.2 (5)	-1.8 (5)	-1 (11)	
GREECE	-2 (3)	-3 (5)	-3 (3)	-2.9 (8)	
ICELAND	-1.3 (3)	-3			
IRELAND	0	-.5 (4)	-.3 (3)	-.2 (8)	
LUX	0 (5)	-1.2 (4)	-3 (3)	-1.6 (8)	
NETH.	-2.3 (8)	-1.4 (5)	-2.8 (4)	-1.5 (8)	
NORWAY	-2				
PORTUGAL	.2 (7)	-1.6 (5)	-2 (3)	-.5 (9)	
SPAIN	-2.4 (10)	-2.2 (5)	-2 (3)	-2.2 (9)	3
SWEDEN		-1 (4)	-2.7 (3)	-1.1 (8)	
SWITZERLAND	-1.8 (5)	-3			
NORTH AMERICA					
CANADA	-2 (5)	-1.5 (2)		-2.5 (2)	3 (3)
USA	2.1 (4)	.1 (5)			
LATIN AMERICA					
ARGENTINA	-2.5 (9)	-2.5 (2)		-3	
BOLIVIA	-1 (4)			-3	
BRAZIL	-.8 (4)	-3		-2	
CHILE	-1	-2			
COLOMBIA	.8 (4)	-2			
ECUADOR	-1.8 (6)	-2			
GUATEMALA	1			-2	
HONDURAS	2 (2)			-1	
MEXICO	-.5 (4)	-2.5 (2)		-1.5 (2)	1 (3)
PERU	-.5 (3)			-2	
URUGUAY	-2 (4)	-3			
VENEZUELA	1 (2)			-1	
EAST EUROPE					
ALBANIA	3 (3)	-1			
BOSNIA	0				
BOSNIA & HERZ.	-2				

BULGARIA	-1.2 (8)	-1.8 (3)	.5 (2)	.7 (5)	
CROATIA	1				
CYPRUS		-3 (2)	-3 (2)	-2.5 (4)	
CZECH	-.5 (2)	1 (2)	0 (2)	1 (5)	
ESTONIA	.8 (4)	-1.8 (3)	.5 (2)	1.5 (4)	
GEORGIA	1.6 (5)	1			
HUNGARY		-.5 (2)	.5 (2)	1 (4)	
KOSOVO	3 (3)	0			
LATVIA	0 (2)	-2 (3)		.8 (4)	
LITHUANIA	.7 (3)	-.5 (3)		1.8 (4)	
MACEDONIA	-1.6 (5)	-3			
MALTA		.5 (2)	1.5 (2)	1.8 (4)	
POLAND	.2 (5)	-1.5 (4)	.8 (4)	.4 (6)	
ROMANIA	.5 (2)	1.5 (2)	2.5 (2)	2.3 (4)	
RUSSIA	-2 (13)	-2 (4)		-1 (2)	2.5 (2)
SERBIA	-1.7 (3)	-3			
SLOVAKIA		-.5 (2)	0 (2)	0 (5)	
SLOVENIA		-2 (2)	-2 (2)	-.8 (4)	
UKRAINE	-1.8 (4)			-2	
CONFLICT AREA					
EGYPT	-2			-2	
ISRAEL	2.2 (5)	2			2 (2)
JORDAN	-2.6 (7)	-1.5 (2)		-2	
KUWAIT	2				
LEBANON	-1.5 (5)	-1.7 (4)		-3	
MOROCCO	-1.7 (3)	0			
PAKISTAN	-1.4 (13)	-2.3 (3)		-2	
PAL AUTH	-3				
TURKEY	-2.7 (10)	-2.7 (6)	-2 (2)	-2.4 (5)	
UZBEKISTAN	1.8 (3)			-1	
ASIA					
AUSTRALIA	-1.5 (7)	-2 (2)			
BANGLADESH	-2			-2	
CHINA	-.3 (3)	-2			
INDIA	.4	2		-2	
INDONESIA	.3 (4)	-2.3 (3)		-2	
JAPAN	-1 (7)	-1.3 (3)		-3	3 (2)
MALAYSIA	-2.1 (6)	0			
NZ	-1.8 (4)	-2			
PHIL.	2.7 (5)	1 (2)		0	
ROK	-1.3 (8)	-1.3 (3)		-2.5 (2)	2.5 (3)
SRI LANKA	-1				
TAIWAN	1				

THAILAND	2				
VIETNAM	.6 (5)	-2		-2	
AFRICA					
ANGOLA	1			-2	
CAMEROON	-.6 (5)	-1			
GHANA	1			0	
IVORY COAST	0			-1	
KENYA	.3 (5)	-2		1	
MALI	1 (2)			-1	
NIGERIA	1.6 (6)	0		2	
SENEGAL	-2			-1	
SO AFRICA	.8 (6)	-1.5 (2)		-1	
TANZANIA	1			-2	
UGANDA	1 (6)	-1		0	
ZIMBABWE	0				

Notes: Number of queries are in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 6. Focusing on the Bush II Administration

Country	Approval Bush Foreign Policies (2001-2005)	Bush Foreign Policies, Reelection Not Worsen Views of US (2004-2005)	Problems Bush Policies, Not US Values or Nature (2002-2005)	U.S. Unilateralism Not Important Threat (2003)
WEST EUROPE				
UK	-1.3 (9)	-2.5 (2)	1.5 (4)	-2 [6]
FRANCE	-2.8 (9)	-3 (2)	2.5 (4)	-3 [4]
GERMANY	-2 (8)	-3 (2)	2 (4)	-3 [4]
ITALY	-1.1 (7)	-2	1 (3)	-3 [6]
NETH.	-1.5 (2)	-2.5 (2)	2	-3 [5]
PORTUGAL	-1			-3 [7]
SPAIN	-2.7 (3)	-2.5 (2)	1.7 (3)	
SWEDEN		-3		
NORTH AMERICA				
CANADA	-1.5 (2)	-3 (2)	1.3 (3)	
USA	.5 (13)	-2		
LATIN AMERICA				
ARGENTINA		-3	2	
BOLIVIA		-1	0	
BRAZIL	-3 (2)	-2	1 (2)	
COLOMBIA		-1		
GUATEMALA			1	
HONDURAS			2	
MEXICO	-2	-3	1	
PERU		0	2	
URUGUAY		-2		
VENEZUELA		0	2	
EAST EUROPE				
BULGARIA			1	
CZECH		-2	-2	
POLAND	.8 (3)	-1 (2)	.5 (2)	-2 [6]
RUSSIA	-2.3 (4)	-1 (2)	0 (4)	
SLOVAKIA			0	
UKRAINE			2	
CONFLICT AREA				
EGYPT			0	
ISRAEL	2.5 (2)		0	
JORDAN	-3 (2)	.3 (2)		
KUWAIT	2		0	

LEBANON	-3	-2	1 (2)	
MOROCCO	-3 (2)		3	
PAKISTAN	-3 (2)	.5 (2)	1.3 (2)	
PAL AUTH				
TURKEY	-2.7 (3)	-1.4 (2)	.7 (2)	
ASIA				
AUSTRALIA	-1.5 (2)		1	
BANGLADESH			1	
CHINA		-3	-1	
INDIA		0 (2)	.7 (2)	
INDONESIA	-3	2 (2)	-1	
JAPAN	-2	-2	0 (2)	
PHIL.		2	2	
ROK	-2 (2)		-2 (2)	0 [4] *
THAILAND		0		
VIETNAM			2	
AFRICA				
ANGOLA			2	
GHANA		-1	0	
IVORY COAST			-1	
KENYA		-2	2	
MALI			-2	
NIGERIA	0	0	1	
SENEGAL			-1	
SO AFRICA		-1	1	
TANZANIA		-1	0 (2)	
UGANDA			2	
ZIMBABWE		-3		

Notes: * Unlike the other entries in this column, for South Korea that is for 2004 and the rank is out of 12 possibilities queried rather than 7. Numbers of queries are in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 7.A New Era of Bipolarity

Country	World Safer With Another Military Power (2002-2005)	China as Peer Military Power (2005)	EU Superpower, Not Only US (2002-2004)	EU as Strong Leader (2002)	EU Civil Power Emphasis 2002-2003)	EU Balance, Compete With US* (2002-2003)	EU More Independent From US (2002-2005)
WEST EUROPE							
AUSTRIA							2 (3)
BELGIUM							1.7 (3)
DENMARK							1.3 (3)
FINLAND							1.3 (3)
UK	0 (3)	-3	1.7 (3)	3	1.5 (2)	-2.6 (5)	1.1 (8)
FRANCE	.7 (3)	-2	3 (3)	3	1 (2)	-2.8 (5)	1.5 (8)
GERMANY	.7 (3)	-3	2.3 (3)	3	2 (2)	-2.8 (5)	1 (8)
ITALY			3 (2)	3	2 (2)	-3 (5)	1.7 (6)
GREECE							2 (3)
IRELAND							1.7 (3)
LUX							1.7 (3)
NETH.	2	-2	2.5 (2)	3	2 (2)	-2.8 (5)	1.8 (5)
PORTUGAL			3		3	-2.5 (4)	1.5 (4)
SPAIN	3	-3					1.6 (5)
SWEDEN							1.7 (3)
NORTH AMERICA							
CANADA	-.5 (2)	-3					0 (2)
USA	-1.5 (12)	-3	0 (3)		3	-3 (4)	-1.3 (6)
LATIN AMERICA							
ARGENTINA	-2						
BOLIVIA	-2						
BRAZIL	-1						
GUATEMALA	-3						
HONDURAS	-2						
MEXICO	-3						
PERU	-2						
VENEZUELA	0						
EAST EUROPE							
BULGARIA	1						3 (2)
CYPRUS							3 (2)
CZECH	-2						3 (2)
ESTONIA							3 (2)
HUNGARY							3 (2)
LATVIA							3 (2)

LITHUANIA							3 (2)
MALTA							3 (2)
POLAND	.5 (2)	-3	-3 (2)	3	2.5 (2)	-2.6 (4)	1.5 (4)
ROMANIA		-3					3 (2)
RUSSIA	.2 (3)		3				2.5 (2)
SLOVAKIA	-1						3 (2)
SLOVENIA							3 (2)
UKRAINE	-1						
CONFLICT AREA							
EGYPT	-2						
JORDAN	0 (3)	3					
LEBANON	1 (2)	0					
MOROCCO	-2						
PAKISTAN	3	3					
PAL AUTH	-2 (2)						
TURKEY	1 (3)	2	2				2 (4)
UZBEKISTAN	-1						
ASIA							
BANGLADESH	0						
CHINA	3						
INDIA	2 (2)	0					
INDONESIA	.5 (2)	2					
JAPAN	-3						
PHIL.	-2						
ROK	-1						
VIETNAM	-1						
AFRICA							
ANGOLA	-2						
GHANA	-2						
IVORY COAST	-2						
KENYA	-2						
MALI	-1						
NIGERIA	0						
SENEGAL	0						
SO AFRICA	-1						
TANZANIA	-2						
UGANDA	-1						

Notes: Number of queries are in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 8. Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU

Country	Support for CFP (2000-2004)	Support for CDSP (2002-2004)	Assert World Importance (2002-2003)	Achieve Peace & Security In Europe (2003)	Foreign & Defense Policy One of Two Most Important Issues for Country (2003)	Evaluation EU Foreign Affairs & Peace & Security (2003)	NATO Essential, Trust, Strengthen (2002-2003)	Increase Military Spending (2002-2003)
EU-15								
AUSTRIA	2.3	.6	2 [14]	3 [1.5]	-3 [11]	1.5 [5]		
BELGIUM	3	1.9	1 [13]	3 [1.5]	-3 [13.5]	1.5 [3]		
DENMARK	1.3	.1	2 [14]	3 [1.5]	-3 [8]	1.5 [3.3]		
FINLAND	1.5	-.8	0 [14]	3 [1]	-3 [13]	1.3 [4.3]		
UK	1.4	-.3	0 [13]	3 [3]	-3 [9]	.5 [3.5]	2.5 (2)	0 (2)
FRANCE	2.8	1.8	2 [13]	3 [3]	-3 [12]	1.3 [4]	2 (2)	-.5 (2)
GERMANY	2.8	1.2	3 [13]	3 [2]	-3 [10.5]	1.8 [2]	2.5 (2)	
ITALY	3	2.1	1.5 [13]	3 [2]	-3 [12]	2 [2.3]	2 (2)	-1 (2)
GREECE	2.9	.9	3 [13]	3 [2]	-3 [11.5]	2 [2]		
IRELAND	2.6	.2	2 [13]	3 [4]	-3 [13]	2 [3.8]		
LUX	2.9	1.8	2.3 [13]	3 [1]	-3 [13.5]	1.8 [2.3]		
NETH.	2.9	1.3	2 [12.5]	3 [1]	-3 [9.5]	2 [3.3]	2	-2 (2)
PORTUGAL	2.6	1.5	3 [12.5]	3 [2.5]	-3 [13]	2 [2.8]		0
SPAIN	3	.8	2 [13]	3 [2]	-3 [6]	2 [3.8]		
SWEDEN	1.9	-.1	.3 [14]	3 [2]	-3 [11.5]	1.8 [3.3]		
EUACs								
BULGARIA	2.5	2	1.5 [14]	3 [1.5]	-3 [11]	2 [3]	2	
CYPRUS	3	2.8	2 [12]	3 [2]	-3 [8]	3 [4]	1	
CZECH	2.3	1.8	.5 [14]	3 [2]	-3 [14]	2 [2]	-2	
ESTONIA	2.5	2	0 [12]	3 [2.5]	-3 [11.5]	2 [2]	1	
HUNGARY	2.5	1.4	1.5 [14]	3 [1]	-3 [14]	2 [4]	1	
LATVIA	2.7	2.3	0 [12]	3 [2]	-3 [12.5]	2 [2]	2	
LITHUANIA	2.5	1.6	1.5 [13]	3 [3]	-3 [12]	2 [2]	2	
MALTA	2.4	.4	1.5 [13]	3 [1]	-3 [13.5]	2 [4]	1	
POLAND	2.6	2	-.5 [14]	2.5 [3]	-3 [10.5]	2 [2]	2 (2)	2
ROMANIA	3	2.1	1 [14]	3 [2]	-3 [14]	2 [2]	3	
SLOVAKIA	2.8	2.5	2 [14]	3 [1]	-3 [14]	3 [1]	0	
SLOVENIA	3	2.4	1 [14]	3 [3.5]	-3 [11.5]	2 [1]	1	
TURKEY	1.9	.5	0 [14]	2 [6]	-3 [10]	1 [11]	1	
USA							1.7 (3)	

Notes: Ranks are in brackets. For "CFP Support," each of the EU 15 was queried 11 times and each of the EUACs 10 times; in "CDSP Support," 9 and 8 times respectively; in "Assert," 3 and 2 times respectively; in "Achieve and Most Important," all two times; in "Evaluation," four times and once respectively.

Table 9. Comparative Evaluations of the EU Relative to the U.S.

Country	For World Peace (2003)	For Environmental Quality (2003)	For Economic Growth (2003)	For Poverty Reduction (2003)	In Globalization (2003)	In Counter-Terrorism (2003)	General Favorability (for EU 2002-2004, for US post-9/11)	Importance For Country (2002-2003)
EU-15								
AUSTRIA	4.5	3.7	2.3	3	1.3	2.7		
BELGIUM	4.5	4	1.7	3	4.5	1		
DENMARK	3	4	1	4	2.5	2.7		
FINLAND	5.3	3.3	1	4	3.5	1.7		
UK	2.7	3.2	0	1	2	-.2	-.2	1
FRANCE	4.5	4	1.3	3	5	1.9	3.4	3
GERMANY	4.8	4.8	.7	3.3	4.5	2.6	.9	2.5
ITALY	3.2	3.8	1	3	3	.4	2.1	3
GREECE	6	5	4.7	5	3.5	4.3		
IRELAND	3.5	3.3	1	2	4.5	1		
LUX	4.2	5	2.3	4	4.5	1		
NETH.	3.8	4.8	2	4	4	.7	-.2	3
PORTUGAL	4.2	4	2	3	2	1.7	1.5	3
SPAIN	5.3	3	2.7	3	4.5	3	2.3	
SWEDEN	4	4.7	.7	3	2.5	0		
EUACs								
BULGARIA	3.5	2.5	1	2.7		0	0	
CYPRUS	6	6	5	6		3.5		
CZECH	2	3	1	2		-1	-.7	
ESTONIA	3.5	2.5	1	1		-.5		
HUNGARY	3.5	2.5	1	2.5		-.5		
LATVIA	4	2	1.5	2		.5		
LITHUANIA	4	1	1	.5		-1		
MALTA	2.5	1.5	1	1.5		.5		
POLAND	2	2.2	1	2.2		-.1	-.4	3
ROMANIA	1.5	.5	.5	1		-.5		
SLOVAKIA	3.5	3	2	3.5		-.5	.3	
SLOVENIA	5	4.5	3	3.5		0		
TURKEY	4.5	4	4	4.7		1.5	3.2	
Others:								
CANADA							1.5	
MEXICO							.7	
RUSSIA							1.7	
JORDAN							0	
MOROCCO							2	
PAKISTAN							1.2	

ROK							.7	
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Notes: Scores for the U.S. were drawn from Tables 2, 4, and 5 and Bobrow, 2005. Scores for the EU used in calculating the gap in the first five columns are from two questions on each topic asked in 2003; those on terrorism, from three questions that same year. Those on the relative importance of the EU or the U.S. to their country are for two questions in 2002-3 for the responding publics other than Portugal for which there was one question in 2003. General favorability scores for the EU were based on 3 or more questions, except for single queries of the publics in Canada, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Korea.

Table 10. Views of the United Nations and Other IGOs

Country	General Evaluation UN and IR Institutions (2002-2005)	Strengthen UN (2002- 2005)	Require UN Mandate for Preemptive Use of Force (2003- 2004)	Enlarge UNSC (2004- 2005)	Strengthen WTO, IMF, WB (2002)	In Globalization (2003)
WEST EUROPE						
AUSTRIA	.7 (3)					0
BELGIUM	0 (3)					1
DENMARK	3 (3)					1.5
FINLAND	2 (3)					1.5
UK	1.5 ((7)	3 (3)	-.3 (3)	3	1.3	.5
FRANCE	1 (7)	1.7 (3)	1.3 (3)	2	1.3	1
GERMANY	1 (7)	3 (3)	2 (3)	3	0	.5
ITALY	1.2 (6)	2.7 (3)	1 (2)	3	2.3	1
GREECE	-1.3 (3)					0
IRELAND	2 (3)					.5
LUX	1.3 (3)					1
NETH.	1 (3)	3 (2)	1		1.3	2.5
PORTUGAL	1.7 (3)	3				3
SPAIN	.8 (4)	3	2 (2)	3		0
SWEDEN	2.3 (3)					1
NORTH AMERICA						
CANADA	2.3 (3)	3		3		
USA	0 (11)	1.3 (23)	-1.6 (12)	2	1	
LATIN AMERICA						
ARGENTINA	-2.5 (2)	1		3		
BOLIVIA	2 (2)					
BRAZIL	-.3 (3)	2	2	3		
CHILE		2		2		
GUATEMALA	3 (2)					
HONDURAS	3 (2)					
MEXICO	2.3 (4)	3		2		
PERU	2.5 (2)					
VENEZUELA	2.5 (2)					
EAST EUROPE						
BULGARIA	2 (5)					
CYPRUS	.3 (3)					
CZECH	1.8 (5)					
ESTONIA	1.3 (3)					

HUNGARY	2.3 (3)					
LATVIA	1.7 (3)					
LITHUANIA	1.3 (3)					
MALTA	2 (3)					
POLAND	2 (5)	2.7 (3)	0	3	1.7	
ROMANIA	2.3 (3)					
RUSSIA	1.3 (4)	2	1	1		
SLOVAKIA	2.2 (6)					
SLOVENIA	.7 (3)					
UKRAINE	2.5 (2)					
CONFLICT AREA						
ISRAEL	-2		-2			
JORDAN	2 (3)		1.5 (2)			
KUWAIT	3		0			
LEBANON	-.5 (2)	2		3		
MOROCCO	-1 (2)		1 (2)			
PAKISTAN	-.3 (2)		-1 (2)			
PAL AUTH	-3		3			
TURKEY	-.5 (6)	1	0 (2)	2		
UZBEKISTAN	2.6 (5)					
ASIA						
AUSTRALIA	1	3	0	3		
BANGLADESH	2 (2)					
CHINA	2.8 (6)	3		1		
INDIA	2.5 (6)	2		3		
INDONESIA	1.3 (3)	3	2	2		
JAPAN	-.5 (6)	3		3		
MALAYSIA	2 (4)					
PHIL.	3 (3)	3		2		
ROK	1 (9)	1	1	1		
THAILAND	2.2 (4)					
VIETNAM	2.8 (6)					
AFRICA						
ANGOLA	3					
GHANA	3 (2)					
IVORY COAST	3 (2)					
KENYA	2.5 (2)					
MALI	3 (2)					
NIGERIA	2.7 (3)		0			
SENEGAL	3 (2)					
SO AFRICA	3 (2)	2		3		
TANZANIA	2 (2)					

UGANDA	3	(2)					
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Notes: Number of queries for the last two columns were 3 and 2 respectively. For other columns, numbers of queries in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 11. Comparative Evaluations of the UN with the EU and the U.S

Country	In General UN & IR Institutions to EU (2002-2004)	In General UN & IR Institutions to U.S. (UN & IRIs 2002-2005, US post-9/11)	In Globalization IR Institutions to US (2003)	In Globalization IR institutions to EU (2003)
WEST EUROPE				
AUSTRIA	2		.3	-1
BELGIUM	0		3.5	-1
DENMARK	2.7		3	.5
FINLAND	2.7		4	.5
UK	2.3	.5	1.5	.5
FRANCE	-.1	1.8	4	-1
GERMANY	.2	1.1	3.5	-1
ITALY	-1.7	.4	3	0
GREECE	-3		3	-.5
IRELAND	.3		3	-1.5
LUX	.3		3.5	-1
NETH.	.4	.2	5	1
PORTUGAL	.2	1.7	2	0
SPAIN	0	2.3	3	-1.5
SWEDEN	4.3		3.5	1
NORTH AMERICA				
CANADA	.3	2.8		
USA	0	-3		
LATIN AMERICA				
ARGENTINA		-.5		
BOLIVIA		1		
BRAZIL		-.7		
GUATEMALA		0		
HONDURAS		0		
MEXICO	1.3	1.7		
PERU		.5		
VENEZUELA		-.5		
EAST EUROPE				
BULGARIA	0	0		
CYPRUS	-2			
CZECH	.5	-.2		
ESTONIA	1			
HUNGARY	0			
LATVIA	1			
LITHUANIA	0			

MALTA	1		
POLAND	.9	.5	
ROMANIA	-.4		
RUSSIA	-.2	1.5	
SLOVAKIA	.9	1.2	
SLOVENIA	-.3		
UKRAINE		-.5	
CONFLICT AREA			
ISRAEL		-4	
JORDAN	5	5	
KUWAIT		2	
LEBANON		1.2	
MOROCCO	-1	1	
PAKISTAN	.7	1.9	
PAL AUTH		0	
TURKEY		-1.9	
UZBEKISTAN		0	
ASIA			
AUSTRALIA		.5	
BANGLADESH		2	
CHINA		4.2	
INDIA		.3	
INDONESIA		2	
JAPAN		1.4	
PHIL.		0	
ROK	0	1.7	
VIETNAM		1.5	
AFRICA			
ANGOLA		3	
GHANA		0	
IVORY COAST		0	
KENYA		-.5	
MALI		0	
NIGERIA		.7	
SENEGAL		2	
SO AFRICA		1	
TANZANIA		2	
UGANDA		1	

Notes: Gap calculations use the scores for the UN in the first and last columns of Table 10; for the U.S., the third column of Table 4 and two 2003 queries about the American role in globalization; for the EU, see the discussion of Globalization and of General Favorability in the notes to Table 9.

Table 12. Views of Leaders on International Affairs

	Putin (2001-2003)	Schroeder (2001-2003)	Annan (2003-2004)	Blair (2001-2004)	Chirac (2001-2005)
UK	-.5 (2)	0	3 (2)	1 (4)	-.7 (3)
FRANCE	-1.5 (2)	3	2.5 (2)	-1 (3)	2 (3)
GERMANY	1 (2)	2 (2)	3 (2)	-.3 (3)	2.7 (3)
ITALY	-1 (2)	0	2	1 (2)	1
NETHERLANDS				2	2
SPAIN	-2	0	2	-1 (2)	0 (2)
CANADA		1	2	2.5 (3)	1.5 (2)
USA			1	3 (3)	-1.5 (2)
BRAZIL	-2	-2	-1	-2	-1
POLAND				1	0
RUSSIA	3	0	.5 (2)	-.7 (3)	2 (3)
ISRAEL	-1	-1	-1	3 (2)	-3
JORDAN			-2 (2)	-3 (3)	-.5 (3)
KUWAIT			1	2	1
LEBANON		-3	-1	-3 (2)	3 (2)
MOROCCO			-3 (2)	-3 (2)	2 (2)
PAKISTAN			-1 (2)	-3 (3)	-1 (3)
PAL AUTH			-3	-3	-2
TURKEY			-1 (2)	-2.7 (3)	-2.3 (3)
AUSTRALIA	1	2	2	3	0
INDIA				1	1*
INDONESIA			-1	-3 (2)	-.5 (2)
ROK	-1	0	1	0	1
NIGERIA		0	0	0	0

Notes: * About 50% of the Indian public expressed no opinion. Numbers of queries are in parentheses. No entry indicates one query.

Table 13A. Country Views Held by National Publics (2002-2005)

	UK	France	Ger.	Italy	Poland	Russia	Turkey	PRC	Japan	India	ROK
UK											
France	1/0										
Germany	1.5/1	2.5/3									
Italy	1/1	1/1	2/1								
Poland	0/1	0/1.5	1/1.5	1/1							
Russia	0/	0/2	0/3	0/	-1/						
Turkey	0	-1/-1	0/0	-1/	-1/						
PRC	.9/-2	.3/2	-.3/2	.4/	-.4/	.4/0	-.6/				
Japan	3/-2	3/	2/		3/	2/-3	/2	-2.5/-8			
India	/1	/2	/2			/2		-3/1.5	-3/2.5		
ROK	/-1					/-3		0/0	-2/-7	0/-1.5	
USA	1/ 2.7	-.8/ .4	-.1/9	.8/2	1.5/1	-.2/1	-2.4/0	-1.5/-1	-.4/2.5	1.7/2	.3/0

Table 13B. Country Views of Possible Pariahs (2003-2005)

	Iran	Syria	Pal. Auth.	Israel	Pakistan	Saudi Arabia	North Korea
WEST EUROPE							
AUSTRIA	0	1		-2	-1		-2
BELGIUM	-1	1		-2	0		0
DENMARK	-1	1		-2	0		-2
FINLAND	0	2		-1	0		-1
UK	-1.3 (4)	-.7 (3)	0	-1 (2)	0	0	-2.3 (3)
FRANCE	-.8 (4)	0 (3)	0	-1 (2)	-1	-1	0 (3)
GERMANY	-1.8 (4)	.7 (3)	-1	-1.5 (2)	0	-1	-2.3 (3)
ITALY	-1.3 (3)	0 (3)	0	-.5 (2)	0	-1	0 (2)
GREECE	2	3		-2	2		2
IRELAND	-1	1		-2	0		-2
LUX.	-2	0		-2	-1		-2
NETH.	-2 (2)	-.5 (2)	-1	-1 (2)	-1	-1	-2
PORTUGAL	-2 (2)	-.5 (2)	-1	-1 (2)	-1	-1	-2
SPAIN	0 (2)	1 (2)		-1	1		0
SWEDEN	0	2		-1	1		0
NORTH AMERICA							
CANADA	-2						-3
USA	-2.5 (2)	-2	-2 (2)	.8 (5)		-1.2 (5)	-2 (4)
LATIN AMERICA							
MEXICO				-1	-3		-3
EAST EUROPE							
POLAND	-2	-1	-2	-2		-1	
RUSSIA	-1 (2)	2					2 (2)
CONFLICT AREA							
ISRAEL	-3	-2					-2
JORDAN	3	3					0
KUWAIT	0	1					-1
LEBANON	2	3					1
MOROCCO	2	1					1
PAKISTAN	2	2					2
PAL. AUTHORITY	2	2					1

TURKEY	1 (2)	1				1 (2)
ASIA						
AUSTRALIA	-2	-1				-3
CHINA					-3	-1
INDIA					-3	0
INDONESIA	-2	1				1
JAPAN					-3	-3
MALAYSIA					-2	-2
ROK	0	-1	0		-3	-2.5 (2)
VIETNAM					-3	-3
AFRICA						
NIGERIA	0	0				0

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu March 2-5, 2005

² Other contextual factors do of course have great relevance as well, most obviously military capabilities and economic assets and interdependencies. Why choose to focus on international public opinion instead? First, those other factors are already likely to receive great attention in U.S. and external policy circles, a ‘coals to Newcastle’ reason. Second, military and economic capabilities are for the most part rather stable in absolute and relative terms and highly path dependent. Their tangible realities and running trends may well be much less likely to change quickly than public opinion about U.S. foreign and security policies in general, specific salient issues of American conduct, or the desirability and feasibility of challenging courses of action others may take.

³ Determining past and present correlations between the particular patterns of public opinion found and the actual strategies used by foreign governments lies outside the scope of this essay.

⁴ The ecological fallacy is avoided formally so long as no inferences are drawn to sub-national opinion or sub-national combinations of opinions (Langbein and Lichtman, 1978). Informally, when opinions on several items in the same survey are held by very high percentages of a national public, they are likely to be held simultaneously by a substantial fraction of the sample queried.

⁵ More details about many of the opinions summarized can be found in Bobrow, 2005.

⁶ The rankings are in a diverse context of possible threats and problems of which terrorism was one. Europeans were posed the other possibilities of: US economic competition, Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. unilateralism, immigrants, Israel-Arab military conflict, Iran WMD and North Korea WMD. Those to South Koreans were : AIDS/the Ebola virus/other potential epidemics, global warming, the development of China as a major power, economic competition from low wage countries, U.S. unilateralism, world population growth, North Korea becoming a nuclear power, the rise of Japanese military power, Sino-Japanese rivalry, a large number of illegal foreign workers, and tensions between China and Taiwan. For the Mexican public, they were: world environmental problems, the development of China as a world power, chemical and biological weapons, economic competition from the U.S., drug trafficking, and world economic crises. European were also asked about their fears with the other possibilities being: a world war, a nuclear conflict in Europe, a conventional war in Europe, an

accidental launch of a nuclear missile, an accident in a nuclear power station, spread of NBC weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts in Europe, organized crime, and epidemics. The other possible worries posed to publics in Asia and Uzbekistan were: poverty, economic inequality in your society, fair world trade, environmental problems, wars and conflicts, natural disasters, globalization, health issues, domestic economic problems, global recession, crime, human rights, corruption, lack of democracy, illegal drugs and drug addiction, refugee and political asylum problems, unemployment and difficulties getting employment, education, domestic social welfare system, ethics in science, the aging of society, the fast pace of social and technological improvement, the threat of industry power, religious fundamentalism, overpopulation, and moral decline/spiritual decadence. Europeans were also asked about EU priorities with the other possibilities being: enlargement, getting closer to European citizens by informing them more about the EU, implementing the Euro, fighting poverty and social exclusion, protecting the environment, guaranteeing food quality, protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of products, fighting unemployment, reforming EU institutions, fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the world, maintaining peace and security in Europe, guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for democracy in Europe, and fighting illegal immigration. As for priorities for their own country, EU and EUAC publics were also given the possibilities of: crime, public transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health care system, educational system, pensions, and protecting the environment.

As a problem for their country, publics in 44 countries were posed with the other possibilities of: crime, group conflict, corrupt political leaders, moral decline, poor quality drinking water, poor quality public schools, immigration, and emigration. The U.S. publics were periodically posed with two relevant batteries of questions. The other possibilities in those about critical threats to U.S. vital interests recently have had as other possibilities: chemical and biological weapons, unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, AIDS/the Ebola virus/other potential epidemics, immigrants and refugees, Israel-Arab military conflict, Islamic fundamentalism, global warming, economic competition from low wage countries, development of China as a world power, world population growth, India-Pakistan tensions, economic competition from Europe. In that, on foreign policy goals, the other possibilities were: protecting American jobs, preventing WMD spread, securing energy supplies, stopping inflow of illegal drugs, controlling and reducing illegal immigration, maintaining worldwide military superiority, improving the global environment, combating world hunger, strengthening the UN, protecting American business interests abroad, protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression, helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries, and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations.

⁷ The rankings are largely based on responses to those sets summarized in Footnote 5 with a WMD component. They also draw on a 44 nation survey battery on major world problems in which the other possibilities were: religious and ethnic hatred, infectious disease/AIDS, pollution and the environment, and the rich-poor gap.

⁸ Several of the few positive West European publics (Ireland, Sweden) were so only for participation in a post-war international PKO operation.

⁹ For Americans, the questions were about the U.S. effect on others, U.S. consideration of their interests, and general influence on the world.

¹⁰ The other threats posed appear in Footnote 5 for those batteries in which U.S. unilateralism was posed.

¹¹ Rankings in the third and fourth columns are for those batteries in Footnote 5 where world importance and peace and security in Europe were posed. Those in the fifth and sixth columns are for the battery in Footnote 5 on priorities for their own country (“crime ...”).

¹² That is not to say that positive evaluations of such potential coalition leaders provide a sufficient condition.

¹³ Column country publics’ scores for the U.S. are drawn from the post 9/11 favorability entries in Table 4.

¹⁴ That has been evident in their governmental and public lack of support for Japan as a permanent UNSC member.

¹⁵ Of the publics queried, those with similar judgments about their country were only Russians and Turks. Germans were split. Being liked was the prevailing judgment elsewhere (Canada, the UK, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Pakistan, India, Lebanon, Jordan, Indonesia, and China).

¹⁶ Specific illustration of those views can be found in responses to a battery of question on U.S. use of force to destroy North Korean nuclear weapons. Support was massively predominant with approval of the UN, U.S. allies, and South Korea. When posed with opposition from one of more of them, support declined. With opposition from two of them, U.S. public opinion was split or negative.

¹⁷ The opposites, general abhorrence and unimportance, make challenges from such sources in effect validation of the merits of the U.S. policies they oppose. Hostile U.S. public reactions seem especially likely in response to negative views and actions from Arab states and movements, Cuba, and North Korea.

¹⁸ That was true for challengers in the UN Security Council on Iraq. A predominant U.S. majority was against punishment when asked in 2003.